Opinion
A148465
01-09-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOU MEDINA-QUIJAS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR-674179)
Defendant Lou Medina-Quijas pleaded no contest to one count of second degree commercial burglary. The trial court ordered defendant to serve the last half of her sentence on mandatory supervised release. As a condition of defendant's release, the court ordered her not to possess or use alcohol. Defendant now argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing this condition. We agree and strike the condition.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the presentence report, the charges in this case arose out of two burglaries at GrowGeneration in Santa Rosa. On November 21, 2015, four women, including defendant, and one man, entered the front of the business. As one of the women distracted the store manager, the others absconded with several bottles of expensive liquid fertilizer. Defendant was involved with a similar burglary at GrowGeneration a few days later. This time eight suspects were involved. Two distracted store employees, while the others took various merchandise from store displays and exited through the store's rear door. A witness was able to take pictures of two fleeing vehicles, including a Cadillac Escalade associated with defendant. A review of the store's surveillance footage revealed defendant taking various items from the store. Defendant later admitted to police that all of the stolen items were taken for a friend's marijuana grow operation in exchange for money.
Defendant was charged by information with two counts of second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; counts 1 & 5), two counts of grand theft of personal property valued at over $950 (§ 487, subd. (a); counts 2 & 6), two counts of conspiracy to commit burglary (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); counts 3 & 7), and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (§ 272, subd. (a)(1); counts 4 & 8). Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of commercial burglary and admitted to a probation violation in another case. The trial court dismissed the remaining counts in the instant action, and sentenced defendant to two years eight months. The first 16 months of the sentence was to be served in the county jail, and the remaining 16 months on mandatory supervised release.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code. --------
As a condition of defendant's release on mandatory supervision, the trial court ordered her not to "possess or use any alcohol or be in a place where you know alcohol is the primary item of sale." Defendant objected to this condition, arguing there were not any allegations alcohol was an issue in the case or defendant's history. The trial court overruled the objection, stating: "[Defendant] has been a thief for 20 years, something like that. [¶] I am imposing the alcohol conditions because I want to see her lead a different type of life than what she had when I saw her first in this courtroom."
II. DISCUSSION
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in forbidding defendant from consuming alcohol as a condition of her release on mandatory supervision. We conclude it did.
The validity of parole conditions, as well as conditions of mandatory supervision, are analyzed by the same standard as probation conditions. (See People v. Douglas (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 864 [postrelease community supervision has been compared to parole supervision]; People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 764 [parole and probation conditions analyzed under the same standard].) A trial court's discretion to determine such conditions, "although broad, is nonetheless subject to the limitation that conditions must be 'reasonable.' " (People v. Beal (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 84, 86 (Beal).)
Under our Supreme Court's decision in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), a condition is valid unless it " '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .' " (Id. at p. 486.) "This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. [Citation.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality." (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379-380.)
Here, the record contains no information alcohol was involved in the burglary, and alcohol possession and use are legal for someone, like defendant, who is over 21 years of age. The only issue, therefore, is whether the alcohol condition forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality. This analysis is highly fact specific. (People v. Lindsay (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1644 (Lindsay).)
Some courts have found alcohol-related conditions reasonable where the record reveals a factual basis to find that the defendant abused alcohol. For example, in Lindsay, the defendant had an " 'alcohol problem' " and an " 'addictive personality' " and his crime involved selling drugs to support his addiction. (Lindsay, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1644-1645.) The addiction to drugs, combined with the defendant's alcohol problem, created a nexus between the potentially impaired judgment resulting from alcohol use and an increase in the potential for a drug use relapse in the future. (Id. at p. 1645.) The alcohol use prohibition was therefore reasonably related to future criminality. Similarly, in People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, the defendant smelled of alcohol when she committed elder abuse on her mother. (Id. at p. 61.) The trial court commented at the plea hearing that the defendant " 'need[ed] treatment for what everybody appears to agree is an alcohol problem.' " (Id. at p. 62.)
Other courts have imposed a no-alcohol condition even when the defendant had no history of alcohol abuse. In People v. Smith (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1032 (Smith), the court concluded a no-alcohol condition was reasonably related to the defendant's conviction for PCP possession and to his future criminality because he had an "extensive involvement with drugs," was "emotionally unstable," and had "a poorly integrated personality." (Id. at pp. 1034, 1035.) The court recognized a "nexus between drug use and alcohol consumption," and noted that "the physical effects of alcohol are not conducive to controlled behavior." (Id. at p. 1035.) Smith upheld conditions of probation forbidding alcohol use and presence at alcohol-sale premises under the circumstances, concluding these conditions were "reasonably related to . . . future criminality." (Ibid.)
By contrast, in People v. Kiddoo (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 922 (Kiddoo), the Court of Appeal invalidated a condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing or consuming alcohol following his guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. The defendant had been selling drugs to support a gambling habit; he had been using drugs and alcohol since he was 14, but he considered himself only a "social drinker." (Id. at p. 927.) Because Kiddoo's past drug use had involved substances other than alcohol, the court believed the alcohol conditions were not reasonably related to criminality. (Id. at p. 928.) The court accordingly found no facts to support the conclusion that the prohibited conduct was reasonably related to future criminality, and it struck the condition. (Ibid.)
In Beal, on the other hand, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Kiddoo's implicit assumption that alcohol use and drug abuse are not reasonably related. (Beal, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 87.) The defendant in that case pleaded guilty to possession for sale and simple possession of methamphetamine. (Id. at p. 85.) Like the defendant in Kiddoo, defendant Beal described herself as a "social drinker," but she did not view alcohol use to be a problem for her. (Beal, at pp. 86-87, fn. 1.) She did, however, admit that she suffered from chemical dependency, having used methamphetamine and other drugs for several years. (Ibid.) The Beal court expressed the view that "empirical evidence shows that there is a nexus between drug use and alcohol consumption. It is well documented that the use of alcohol lessens self-control and thus may create a situation where the user has reduced ability to stay away from drugs. [Citation.] Presumably for this very reason, the vast majority of drug treatment programs, including the one Beal participates in as a condition of her probation, require abstinence from alcohol use." (Id. at p. 87.) The court concluded the alcohol condition was reasonable because "alcohol use may lead to future criminality where the defendant has a history of substance abuse and is convicted of a drug-related offense." (Ibid.)
Here, there is no evidence defendant had a history of alcohol abuse. According to the presentence report, defendant reported consuming alcohol on one occasion at age 16 and has never participated in residential treatment. There is no other information concerning her use or abuse of alcohol in the record. Moreover, defendant's crime did not appear to involve alcohol consumption. Nor is there a reason to impose an alcohol condition based on a nexus between drug use and alcohol consumption. While defendant has used drugs in the past—she smoked methamphetamine daily between 2005 and 2012, when she was not incarcerated—there is no indication she currently has a drug problem. And there appears to be no connection between defendant's past methamphetamine use and the charged crime, which involved stealing property that was to be used in a marijuana grow operation. Because there is no reasonable relationship between the subject condition and future criminality, and since none of the other Lent factors apply, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the alcohol condition here.
III. DISPOSITION
That portion of the order prohibiting defendant from possessing or using alcohol and from frequenting places where such beverages are the chief item of sale as a condition of probation is stricken. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/s/_________
Margulies, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J. /s/_________
Banke, J.