Opinion
March 2, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Deeley, J.).
Ordered that the judgment, as amended, is affirmed.
Police Officer Jones was justified in stopping the defendant in order to make inquiry of him when he observed him in a high-crime area, at night, running from a subway station at the heels of the codefendant Murphy, who had a gold chain in his hand, particularly since the defendant did not stop when he saw the officer, but instead appeared to try to warn Murphy of the officer's presence (see, People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, cert denied 449 U.S. 1023; People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106; People v Joy, 114 A.D.2d 517). In response to Jones's inquiry, the defendant gave an implausible explanation for his behavior, thus failing to dispel Jones's reasonable suspicion. At this point Jones was justified in pursuing the minimally intrusive course of escorting the defendant 2 1/2 blocks to where other officers had stopped Murphy, since the defendant was not handcuffed, there was no showing of force, the defendant was not taken to the police station, the total time and distance involved were brief and no information was asked of the defendant after the initial inquiry (see, People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234). In short, "the police diligently pursued a minimally intrusive means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel suspicion quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant" (People v. Hicks, supra, at 242). Finally, Jones was justified in frisking the defendant after hearing a radio transmission describing two men fitting the description of the defendant and Murphy as the men who shortly before committed an armed robbery nearby (see, People v. Middleton, 119 A.D.2d 593). Therefore, the hearing court did not err in denying those branches of the defendant's motion which were to suppress the gun discovered during the frisk and testimony regarding a later identification on the basis that they were the tainted fruits of an illegal detention.
We note our strong disapproval of the prosecutor's summation, wherein he unnecessarily sought to bolster his case by repeatedly appealing to the jurors' emotions and by calling upon the jury to draw conclusions which were not fairly inferrible from the evidence. While his conduct was clearly improper (see, People v Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105; People v. Blackman, 88 A.D.2d 620), in light of the strong evidence of the defendant's guilt, the curative instructions issued by the trial court, and the similar conduct engaged by defense counsel on summation, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's misconduct substantially prejudiced the defendant's trial (see, People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396; People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254; People v. Roopchand, 107 A.D.2d 35, affd 65 N.Y.2d 837).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be either without merit or unpreserved for our review. Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Brown and Spatt, JJ., concur.