¶ 35 Section 103-5(a)'s 120-day period commences automatically. People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 38. As this court explained in McBride, the addition of new charges brings a different wrinkle:
¶ 34 Section 103-5(a)'s 120-day period commences automatically. People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 38. As this court explained in McBride, the addition of new charges brings a different wrinkle:
The 120-day period commences automatically. People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 38.
"If a defendant is not tried within the requisite period, such defendant 'shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance.'" People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 38 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2020)). The speedy-trial analysis "becomes more complicated when the defendant is charged with multiple, but factually related, offenses at different times."
The 120-day term begins to run automatically if the defendant remains in custody pending trial. People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 38. If the defendant is not tried within that period, he or she shall be discharged from custody.
Knowledge for compulsory-joinder purposes means "the conscious awareness of evidence that is sufficient to give the State a reasonable chance to secure a conviction." Luciano II, 2013 IL App (2d) 110792, ¶ 78; see also People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 41. We conclude that the State had "knowledge" under the compulsory-joinder statute.
People v. Dryer, 2021 IL App (2d) 190187, ¶ 16, 173 N.E.3d 261. "If a defendant is not tried within the requisite period, such defendant 'shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance.'" People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 38, 224 N.E.3d 255 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2020)).
People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 38. However, courts exclude from the calculation any of the delays described in section 103-5(a), including delays" 'occasioned by the defendant'" and delays to which the defendant agreed.
A party may not claim error in the procedure employed by the court if the party willingly participated in that procedure without objection. People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 31 (citing People v. Schmitt, 131 Ill.2d 128, 137 (1989)). In People v. Bowman, the parties agreed that the aggravating factor in the defendant's enhanced driving while license revoked charge, that the defendant's revocation rested upon a prior conviction for DUI, would only be used for sentencing purposes and not presented to the jury.
Thus, we follow the line of cases which hold that "[a] trial court's factual findings on a speedy-trial claim are reviewed under a manifest weight of the evidence standard [and the] de novo standard of review is applied to determine if a defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial has been violated." See People v. Sykes, 2017 IL App (1st) 150023, ¶ 35; People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301, ¶ 28. This bifurcated standard of review has long applied to constitutional speedy-trial claims (People v. Crane, 195 Ill.2d 42, 51 (2001)) and we find it to be appropriate under the circumstances in this case.