Opinion
F077782
10-21-2019
In re MATTHEW G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MATTHEW G., Defendant and Appellant.
Candice L. Christensen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein and Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JJD070623)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Hugo J. Loza, Judge. Candice L. Christensen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein and Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Franson, Acting P.J., Peña, J. and Smith, J.
-ooOoo-
The court adjudged appellant Matthew G. a ward of the court and placed him on probation after he admitted a charge of bringing a weapon onto school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor, and the court sustained allegations in a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) charging him with second degree robbery (§ 211). On appeal, appellant contends the court prejudicially erred when it admitted certain statements in violation of Miranda. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
FACTS
The fact relating to appellant's bringing a weapon onto school grounds offense are omitted because he does not raise any issues with respect to that offense.
At appellant's jurisdictional hearing, Esther M. testified that on February 14, 2018, sometime after 3:30 p.m., she was with her sister and a friend at Jefferson Park in Visalia when she saw some boys walk up to Justin G. Someone said, "Okay, let's go," and the boys started hitting him. Esther identified appellant as a boy from the group who hit Justin and took from him a silver neck chain, money, and a backpack. Esther knew appellant because he was her friend's boyfriend.
References to dates are to dates in 2018.
Appellant was 16 years old when the underlying incident occurred.
The assault and robbery of Justin occurred approximately 20 feet away from Esther. On March 5, Esther identified appellant from a photo lineup as one of the boys who assaulted Justin. She repeated her identification in court.
Justin testified that he was at Jefferson Park in Visalia on February 14 at about 3:50 p.m. when he was called over by appellant, whom he knew from his fifth period class at school, and two other boys. When he walked over to them, he felt his neck chain being yanked and the boys began beating him. Justin identified appellant as the boy who took his neck chain and backpack, which contained $20 and several other items. When the assault ended, Justin ran one way while appellant and the other boys ran the other way. After the assault, Justin had two cuts on his lip and swelling on the side of his face.
Visalia Police Officer Maximillian Navo testified he was the youth service officer for Mount Whitney High School, the school appellant attended. Justin told Navo that one of his attackers was named Matt. After Navo assembled a photo lineup, Justin identified appellant from the lineup as one of the boys involved in the assault and robbery.
Navo first spoke to appellant on February 16 in Navo's office at school. After reading appellant his Miranda rights from a department-issued card, Navo asked him multiple times if he understood his rights and appellant said he did. Appellant also stated that he had been read his rights before. Navo told appellant he did not have to speak with Navo, but appellant elected to do so.
At that point in Navo's testimony, the court allowed defense counsel to voir dire Navo. Navo then testified that he first spoke with appellant alone. However, sometime after he read appellant his rights, the assistant principal walked in. Navo acknowledged that he had tried to mentor appellant and that when appellant lost his bicycle, Navo bought him a new one. Prior to talking about the incident involving Justin, Navo spoke to appellant about school-related topics including a teacher promising to take appellant to lunch if appellant learned his multiplication tables. Navo knew appellant had difficulty with academics but did not think he was "slow." When Navo asked appellant how he was doing in school, appellant replied that he was struggling. At one point, Navo pointed to a recorder, told appellant he was recording some things, and asked him if he knew the reason Navo called him. Appellant replied he did not. A few comments followed before Navo told appellant he was going to Mirandize him, and that appellant knew Navo had always been there for him. Navo read appellant his Miranda rights and appellant stated he understood them.
After defense counsel finished his voir dire examination of Navo, she told the court she wanted to argue the Miranda issue. After some discussion, she asked the court to allow her to call appellant's mother to testify regarding that issue. The court interpreted counsel's comments as a motion to strike appellant's statements to Navo on Miranda grounds and after further discussion, it allowed defense counsel to call appellant's mother to testify.
Appellant's mother testified that although appellant had never been in special education classes, he was currently being tested for that purpose. She spoke to the person conducting the tests and was told appellant had something like ADHD and depression. Appellant's mother further testified that he was "behind or slow in learning" and that he did not always comprehend everything she told him, "he does things over and over," and she has to "explain [things] to him slower." He also always had "special help classes" and was easily distracted. On cross-examination, appellant's mother testified he was able to understand what he was told, and that appellant was not slow at everything. She acknowledged that appellant had been arrested before and read his Miranda rights.
After the mother's testimony, the court deferred hearing argument on the Miranda issue until a later time and eventually the prosecutor resumed his direct examination of Navo. Navo testified that during his interview at school with appellant, he asked him where he had been on February 14. Appellant initially said he boarded a bus after school and made several transfers to get to his girlfriend's house. Defense counsel interposed a relevance objection to Navo's testimony and, at the court's suggestion, counsel made a continuing objection to his testimony on relevance grounds. Navo then testified appellant told him he was not at Jefferson Park that day and that after boarding the bus, he transferred once and had gone home alone.
Appellant subsequently called Navo to apologize and to tell him that he lied to him when they spoke on February 16, and that he had not been on a bus on February 14.
On February 26, Navo spoke to appellant at his residence. Before speaking with him, he again read appellant his Miranda rights, appellant indicated he understood his rights, and he waived them. Navo confirmed that appellant had previously lied to him about not being at Jefferson Park. Appellant stated he went to some benches at the park to "chill" with some people. He saw Justin run away and the other subjects run in the opposite direction and he ran away with the subjects. Appellant further stated that although he lied to Navo before, he was not lying to him then.
Appellant did not testify on his own behalf or present any evidence to challenge the prosecution evidence that he was one of the boys involved in the assault and robbery of Justin.
After the evidentiary portion of the trial concluded, the court heard further argument on the Miranda issue before ruling that appellant's statements to Navo were admissible. At the end of the hearing, the court found true the allegation that appellant committed second degree robbery.
On June 4, the court placed appellant on probation.
DISCUSSION
Appellant's Statements to Officer Navo were Voluntary
Appellant cites In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568 (Elias V.) to contend he was particularly vulnerable because of his age, learning disabilities, mental health issues, and his susceptibility to being influenced by Officer Navo due to Navo's kindness toward him and Navo being his mentor. He further contends that Navo's relationship with him rendered Navo incapable of communicating to appellant that he need not submit to questioning and was free to go. Thus, according to appellant, the court erred when it introduced his February 16 and 26 statements to Navo into evidence over appellant's Miranda objection. We disagree.
" 'The admissibility of a confession depends upon the totality of the circumstances existing at the time the confession was obtained. [Citations.] A minor can effectively waive his constitutional rights [citations] ... but age, intelligence, education and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his confession are factors in that totality of circumstances to be weighed along with other circumstances in determining whether the
confession was a product of free will and an intelligent waiver of the minor's Fifth Amendment rights [citation].' [Citation.]
"The federal and state Constitutions both require the prosecution to show the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.] Voluntariness turns on all the surrounding circumstances, 'both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation' [citation]; it does not depend on whether the confession is trustworthy. [Citation.] While a determination that a confession was involuntary requires a finding of coercive police conduct [citations], ' " 'the exertion of any improper influence' " ' by the police suffices. [Citation.]
"The issue of voluntariness presents ' "a mixed question of law and fact that is nevertheless predominantly legal...." [Citation.] Hence " '[o]n appeal, the determination of a trial court as to the ultimate issue of voluntariness of a confession is reviewed independently.... [¶] The trial court's determinations concerning whether coercive police activity was present, whether certain conduct constituted a promise and, if so, whether it operated as an inducement, are apparently subject to independent review as well.' [Citation.] However, 'the trial court's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession-including "the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation" [citation]-are clearly subject to review for substantial evidence....' " ' " (In re Elias V., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 576-577.)
Prior to speaking with appellant about the robbery, Navo read him his rights and appellant stated he understood them and agreed to speak to Navo about the underlying incident. Appellant was already familiar with his Miranda rights because he previously had been read them, apparently when he was arrested for possessing a weapon on school grounds. Thus, the record supports the court's finding that appellant knowingly waived his rights.
Further, although defense counsel elicited evidence that appellant struggled academically and that he may have suffered from ADHD and depression, there was no evidence presented that this prevented appellant from understanding and knowingly waiving his rights. Nevertheless, appellant contends that his mental state and other circumstances noted above impeded his ability to comprehend the gravity of his conversation with Officer Navo. However, his ability to concoct a sophisticated, blatant falsehood about his whereabouts the day of the robbery demonstrate that he was not as naive and susceptible to being influenced as he contends.
Elias V. does not assist appellant. In Elias V., officers interrogated a 13-year-old boy suspected of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a toddler. (Elias V., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574-577.) The interrogation occurred at school, in a room that accommodated only two people, with the boy, the interrogating officer, another officer, and the school principal in the room as a third officer stood by the doorway. The suspect adamantly and repeatedly rejected an officer's assertions that he had touched the victim in an improper manner. (Id. at pp. 574-575.) At some point, an officer suggested that the suspect might have touched the victim's vagina because he found it exciting or just because he was curious. The suspect rejected the first suggestion but agreed he had touched the victim out of curiosity. (Id. at p. 575.) Elias V. noted that the officer was aggressive and persistent in questioning the juvenile suspect. (Id. at p. 583.) The officer made false representations about the evidence against the suspect, claiming witnesses saw the suspect touch the victim when no such evidence existed. (Ibid.) The officer threatened to subject the suspect to a lie detector test against his will. (Id. at p. 584.)
On appeal, the Elias V. court noted that the use of "false evidence" during police interrogation could cause vulnerable and naïve suspects to give false confessions. (Elias V., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 584.) The use of false evidence is forbidden in Great Britain and many European nations. (Ibid.) An officer may also use a "false choice" strategy to present a suspect with two scenarios, one of which is more morally reprehensible regarding the suspect's actions. (Id. at p. 586.) The Elias V. court determined that the juvenile suspect was motivated to give his inculpatory statements when offered two possible explanations for the sexual touching. The juvenile agreed to the more acceptable alternative that he was merely curious. (Id. at pp. 584-585.) The Elias V. court found that the officer's "accusatory interrogation was dominating, unyielding, and intimidating." (Id. at p. 586.) It found that, notwithstanding that he received Miranda admonitions, the suspect's statements were involuntary based on a combination of his youth, the absence of any evidence corroborating the suspect's statements, and the likelihood that the officer's deception and overbearing tactics would induce involuntary and untrustworthy incriminating admissions. (Id. at pp. 586-587.)
Elias V. is inapposite for many reasons including that appellant was 16 when Navo interrogated him, he was not subjected to any coercive or deceptive interview tactics, and the interview did not occur in a small room where he was surrounded by the school principal and several police officers. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err in admitting appellant's February 16 statements to Navo.
Further, appellant did not object on Miranda grounds to the admission of his February 26 statements to Navo. Appellant contends he was not required to object again because his objection to his February 16 statements to Navo was a "running objection" that encompassed those statements as well. Appellant is wrong.
Even assuming his continuing objection encompassed these statements, his continuing objection was to the relevance of the statements, not to their being admitted in violation of Miranda. Appellant's later statements were clearly relevant and admissible because they were inconsistent with his initial statement and showed a consciousness of guilt. (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1219.) In any case, even if this issue were properly before us, for the reasons discussed above we would find that appellant's February 26 statements to Navo were also voluntary. Thus, we conclude the court did not err in admitting the February 26 statements.
Appellant was not Prejudiced by the Admission of his Statements
Appellant contends he was prejudiced by the admission of his February 16 and 26 statements to Navo because the statements placed him at the scene of the robbery in the company of others who ran away, and his adjudication will have certain negative consequences. There is no merit to these contentions.
The appropriate test for prejudice for Miranda error is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 875, 884.) Under this test, an error is harmless if it is found to be " 'unimportant in relation to everything else the [trier of fact] considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.' " (Ibid.) This "requires consideration of not only the evidence that would support the judgment, but also the impact of the inadmissible evidence on the final outcome." (Ibid.)
It is clear from Gonzalez that only the negative evidentiary impact, not the negative consequences of an adjudication, are considered in determining prejudice.
The record contains other, stronger evidence of appellant's guilt besides his statements to Navo. The victim identified appellant as one of the juveniles who punched him and took his neck chain and backpack. A student who witnessed the assault and robbery corroborated the victim's statement. Appellant did not challenge this evidence through his own testimony or any other evidence. Further, none of appellant's statements during either interview directly implicated him in the robbery. In view of the strength of the evidence of his guilt and the failure of the defense to rebut it, we conclude that any error in admitting any of appellant's statements to Navo was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.