Opinion
4-21-0178
12-08-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GAVIN MASTERS, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Adams County No. 15CF362, Honorable Robert K. Adrian, Judge Presiding.
HOLDER WHITE JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HOLDER WHITE JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court reversed and remanded for further postconviction proceedings where the trial court failed to determine whether defendant's amended postconviction petition and supporting documents made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.
¶ 2 In January 2021, defendant, Gavin Masters, filed an amended postconviction petition alleging defendant's aggregate 115-year prison sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him and a record needed to be developed sufficiently to address his claim that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) applied to his particular circumstances. In February 2021, the State filed a motion to dismiss. In March 2021, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss.
¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings where the petition, supported by a report from a doctor, made a substantial showing of a deprivation of defendant's rights under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const., 1970, art. I, § 11). For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In People v. Masters, 2020 IL App (4th) 190714-U, this court reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing defendant's postconviction petition at the first stage of proceedings. In defendant's prior appeal we summarized the relevant background as follows:
"In November 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. The jury further found the State proved the allegation that defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the death of another. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of 70 years' imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction and 45 years' imprisonment on the attempted first degree murder conviction.
In June 2019, defendant filed a postconviction petition. Defendant alleged his aggregate sentence of 115 years' imprisonment violated the eighth amendment because it was a mandatory de facto life sentence. In the petition, defendant acknowledged he was 18 years old at the time of the offense and a facial challenge to his aggregate sentence under the eighth amendment failed. However, defendant alleged a record needed to
be developed sufficiently to address his claim that [Miller] applied to his particular circumstances. The petition alleged defendant was less mature and had an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, was more vulnerable to negative influences and pressures, and his character was less fixed making his actions less likely to be indicative of irretrievable depravity.
In September 2019, the trial court dismissed the postconviction petition. The court found defendant's sentencing claim frivolous and without merit because defendant 'was 18 years of age at the time the offenses were committed [and] a de facto life sentence does not violate the state o[r] federal [constitution.'
Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of his postconviction petition. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. In part, the court pointed out the statutory minimum sentence was a de facto life sentence and reiterated that a de facto life sentence for an 18-year-old did not violate the state or federal constitution." Id. ¶¶ 5-8.
¶ 6 As noted, this court reversed the first-stage dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition and remanded for further proceedings. In January 2021, defendant filed an amended postconviction petition. In relevant part, the amended petition alleged the mandatory minimum sentence of 76 years' imprisonment and defendant's sentence of 115 years' imprisonment were unconstitutional as applied to defendant's particular circumstances in violation of the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const., art. I, § 11). Defendant attached a report from Dr. James Garbarino in support of his claim that Miller applied to his particular circumstances. Defendant requested an evidentiary hearing where he would call Dr. Garbarino as an expert witness to sufficiently develop the record on his as-applied constitutional challenge to his sentence.
¶ 7 Dr. Garbarino's report stated it offered his "developmental analysis in light of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Miller v. Alabama. The Miller ruling requires the courts to consider the adolescent defendant's liabilities when it comes to making good decisions and managing emotions as a function of the special developmental characteristics of being immature." The report stated that, generally, the protections from Miller should be extended to individuals in their mid-20s when brain maturation is complete. According to Dr. Garbarino, defendant's childhood and early adolescence indicated he had a significant experience of psychological maltreatment. Defendant felt alone in his family and "felt emotionally disconnected from his parents." The recurrent theme of disconnection extended into his social and romantic life. Defendant began playing violent video games at the age of 9 and he reported becoming "immersed in imagery from the dark side of human experience, in terms of both violence and sex. He was introduced to the Dark Web by a peer, and came to view acts of horrific violence-beheadings, gruesome accidents, sexual assaults, suicides, etc." Dr. Garbarino opined exposure to such content would be devastating for a youth. The report stated defendant was "drowning in this violent imagery for years." According to Dr. Garbarino, "this soul numbing experience contributed to [defendant's] lack of inhibitions about shooting two people on July 4, 2015."
¶ 8 The report indicated defendant witnessed domestic violence as a child, including assaults by his stepfather against his mother. According to the report, defendant "appreciate[d] that his actions reflected his immaturity of thought ('executive function') and emotional management ('affective regulation')." Dr. Garbarino opined defendant's issues with thinking and feeling reflected his adolescence coupled with the effects of his family environment and traumatic experiences, rather than a personality disorder. According to Dr. Garbarino, defendant had begun to make rehabilitative progress once he entered his early 20s and that process would continue as he matured. The report stated: "As an 18-year-old boy, [defendant] demonstrated immaturity of thought and emotional control, impetuous and impulsive action, and failure to appreciate the full consequences of his criminal behavior. And, perhaps most importantly, the possibility of rehabilitation was present at the time of his crime and sentencing."
¶ 9 In February 2021, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's postconviction petition, arguing defendant was solely responsible for the shooting. Defendant filed a reply, arguing he demonstrated a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Specifically, defendant alleged he was less mature and had an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsive behavior, and risk taking. Defendant further alleged he was vulnerable to negative influences and his character was less fixed. Defendant argued his allegations were supported by Dr. Garbarino's report.
¶ 10 In March 2021, the trial court dismissed defendant's postconviction petition. The court stated nothing about defendant's sentence shocked the moral sense of the community and it found defendant's age was a mitigating factor at sentencing. The court noted it sentenced defendant to 115 years' imprisonment. The court stated it believed defendant deserved the 115-year sentence because of his actions "and because the [c]ourt doesn't believe that there is any law out there that would change what the Illinois Supreme Court has said in quoting the Miller court that 18 is the bright line." Accordingly, the court dismissed the postconviction petition "as far as the claim goes for the unconstitutionality of the de facto life sentence as applied to this[d] efendant."
¶ 11 This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition at the second stage where the petition, supported by a report from a doctor, made a substantial showing of a deprivation of defendant's rights under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11).
¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2020)) provides a collateral means for a defendant to challenge a conviction or sentence for a violation of a federal or state constitutional right. People v. Jones, 211 Ill.2d 140, 143, 809 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (2004). At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the trial court must determine, taking the allegations as true, whether the defendant's petition is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (2) (West 2020). At the second stage of postconviction proceedings, "the State may move to dismiss a petition or an amended petition pending before the court." People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill.2d 458, 472, 861 N.E.2d 999, 1008 (2006). The defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Id. at 473. "At the second stage of proceedings, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true, and, in the event the circuit court dismisses the petition at that stage, we generally review the circuit court's decision using a de novo standard." Id. Once a petition advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing, where the trial court makes findings of fact and credibility determinations, we will reverse a trial court's decision only if it is manifestly erroneous. Id.
¶ 15 Defendant challenges his sentence, arguing that, as applied to his specific circumstances, his 115-year aggregate sentence violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). Defendant argues the trial court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition at the second stage because the court should have advanced the petition to the third stage so defendant could develop a factual record for his as-applied constitutional challenge. In the appeal following the trial court's first-stage dismissal, this court discussed the relevant law as follows:
"In a progression of cases involving juvenile sentencing, the United States Supreme Court has held the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the death sentence for juveniles convicted of murder (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005)), mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses (Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)), and mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of murder (Miller, 567 U.S. at 489). The Supreme Court determined 'that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.' Id. at 471. The Supreme Court identified three principal differences between juveniles and adults. First, a child's
underdeveloped sense of responsibility and lack of maturity led to 'recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.' Id. Second, juveniles are more vulnerable to outside pressure and negative influences. Id. Third, a child's character is less fixed and less likely to demonstrate an inability to be rehabilitated. Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court has taken this line of cases further. In People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, 91 N.E.3d 849, the supreme court held Miller applied to discretionary life sentences without parole for juvenile defendants. And in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40, 137 N.E.3d 763, the supreme court held Miller also applied to de facto life sentences of more than 40 years. Finally, the supreme court has raised the possibility that the rationale in Miller might apply on a case-by-case basis to young adult offenders who were over the age of 18 at the time of the offense. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 37, 53, 120 N.E.3d 900.
As noted above, defendant raises an as-applied challenge to his sentence. The distinction between a facial and as-applied constitutional challenge is crucial. 'A party raising a facial challenge must establish that the statute is unconstitutional under any possible set of facts, while an as-applied challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional as it applies to the specific facts and circumstances of the challenging party.' Id. ¶ 38.
In Harris, the Illinois Supreme Court heard a similar argument from an 18-year-old defendant who challenged his 76-year mandatory minimum sentence under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 35. The defendant argued the sentencing scheme that resulted in a mandatory aggregate sentence of 76 years' imprisonment was unconstitutional as applied to his circumstances. Id. ¶ 36. The defendant argued it shocked the moral sense of the community to impose a mandatory de facto life sentence given the facts of his case, including his youth and other mitigating factors. Id. In support of his argument, the defendant relied on Miller to argue the emerging science showed brain development continued into the early twenties and the reasoning from Miller should be extended to his case because he was just 18 years old at the time of the offense. Id. ¶ 37.
The supreme court determined defendant's as-applied challenge was premature because the record was not sufficiently developed in terms of the defendant's specific facts and circumstances. Id. ¶¶ 39, 46. The supreme court noted Miller did not directly apply to the defendant who, at the age of 18, was no longer a juvenile. Id. ¶ 45. Accordingly, the court concluded,' [t] he record must be developed sufficiently to address [the] defendant's claim that Miller applies to his particular
circumstances.' Id. The court further concluded remand was unnecessary where the defendant could raise his claim in a collateral challenge. Id. ¶ 48. We note that the supreme court, in Harris, determined the defendant could raise an as-applied challenge under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution but it rejected the defendant's facial challenge under the eighth amendment. Id. ¶ 53. The court noted an as-applied challenge under the eighth amendment 'would fail for the same reason as his challenge under the Illinois Constitution failed, because no evidentiary hearing was held and no findings of fact were entered on how Miller applies to him as a young adult.' Id.
In Harris, the court relied upon its earlier analysis of these issues in People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, 43 N.E.3d 984. In Thompson, a 19-year-old defendant attempted to raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to his mandatory life sentence for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of a petition for relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)). Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 1. He argued the eighth amendment considerations addressed in Miller should apply with' "equal force" to individuals between the ages of 18 and 21.' Id. ¶ 21. The defendant relied on the evolving science regarding juvenile maturity and brain development in support of this position. Id. ¶ 38. The court held the defendant's
as-applied challenge under Miller was forfeited because it was not the type of challenge recognized as being exempt from the typical rules of forfeiture. Id. ¶ 39. However, in dicta, the court noted the defendant's as-applied challenge was actually a facial challenge because he relied exclusively on the evolving science of brain development, and the record contained 'nothing about how that science applie[d] to the circumstances of [the] defendant's case, the key showing for an as-applied constitutional challenge.' Id. ¶ 38.
Following Harris and Thompson, Illinois courts have confronted as-applied challenges invoking the Miller rationale in postconviction proceedings. In People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶¶ 17, 23, 142 N.E.3d 756, the appellate court considered the second-stage dismissal of a 19-year-old defendant's postconviction petition, in which he asserted his mandatory life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. [Id. ¶ 23.] After discussing the evolving science regarding brain development and considering our supreme court's decision in Harris, the House court concluded the line demarcating 18 years of age as adulthood for legal purposes was 'somewhat arbitrary.' Id. ¶¶ 55-56. It held the defendant's mandatory life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause and shocked the moral sense of the community because of the 'defendant's age, his family background, his actions as a lookout as opposed to being the actual shooter, and [his] lack
of any prior violent convictions[.]' Id. ¶ 64. The court noted the defendant's age and his relative culpability created questions regarding the 'propriety of a mandatory natural life sentence for a 19-year-old defendant convicted under a theory of accountability.' Id. ¶ 46.
Courts have distinguished House in cases where the defendant played a more active role in the crime or received a discretionary rather than a mandatory sentence. See, e.g., People v. Ramsey, 2019 IL App (3d) 160759, ¶¶ 22-23, 143 N.E.3d 865 (rejecting an 18-year-old defendant's proportionality claim and noting he was the sole actor who committed the offenses); People v. Handy, 2019 IL App (1st) 170213, ¶¶ 1, 41 (finding an 18-year-old defendant was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing because he was an active participant in the crimes and received a discretionary sentence)." Masters, 2020 IL App (4th) 190714-U, ¶¶ 14-21.
¶ 16 The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the State's appeal in House and recently issued its decision in that case. People v. House, 2021 IL 125124. The procedural posture in House began with the second-stage dismissal of the defendant's postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 15. The supreme court reviewed the case's procedural history on review as follows:
"This case comes to us for review following our court's issuance of a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment in House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580. We
specifically directed the appellate court to consider the effect of this court's opinion in Harris, 2018 IL 121932, on the issue of whether petitioner's sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory order)." House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 21.
On remand, the parties filed an agreed motion for summary disposition asking the appellate court to remand the case for further postconviction proceedings. Id. ¶ 22. The appellate court denied the agreed motion and again vacated the defendant's sentence based on its conclusion that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 23. The appellate court concluded Harris, 2018 IL 121932, had no effect on its decision because the defendant raised his proportionate penalties clause argument in a postconviction petition and was not the principal offender. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 23.
¶ 17 The Illinois Supreme Court determined "the appellate court improperly found that petitioner's sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution without a developed evidentiary record on the as-applied constitutional challenge." Id. ¶ 29. The appellate court incorrectly determined that Harris and Thompson were limited to situations where the defendant raised an as-applied challenge on direct review or when the defendant was guilty as a principal rather than as an accomplice. Id. ¶ 30. The supreme court stated:"
[O]ur analysis in Harris focused on development of the record in the trial court, not whether the challenge is raised in a collateral proceeding or on appeal, or whether the petitioner was a principal rather than an accomplice in the crime. We conclude that the
appellate court erroneously held that petitioner's sentence of natural life violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the as-applied constitutional challenge." Id. ¶ 31.
Accordingly, the supreme court stated, "Because we have determined that the record in this case requires further development, we remand the cause to the circuit court for second-stage postconviction proceedings." Id. ¶ 32.
¶ 18 As we previously noted in defendant's appeal following the first-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition, defendant has raised an as-applied constitutional challenge to his sentence. On appeal, we concluded defendant met the low bar of stating a gist of a constitutional challenge and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court proceeded to second-stage postconviction proceedings, and defendant filed an amended postconviction petition and attached Dr. Garbarino's report in support of the petition. The State moved to dismiss the postconviction petition, and the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. We note that defendant's initial postconviction petition that this court determined survived summary dismissal at the first stage of proceedings did not include Dr. Garbarino's report.
¶ 19 Based on our review of the supreme court's recent decision in House, we conclude defendant's as-applied Illinois Constitution proportionate penalties claim remains viable. First, the most recent decision in House precludes distinguishing this case on the basis that defendant was a principal rather than an accomplice where the court outright rejected such an analysis. Id. ¶ 31. Second, the court reaffirmed the suggestion in Harris that a young adult defendant may raise an as-applied challenge pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 27. We note that in Harris, the defendant raised two distinctive claims. One claim alleged his sentence violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. The supreme court unequivocally rejected that claim when it expressed its agreement "with those decisions and our appellate court that, for sentencing purposes, the age of 18 marks the present line between juveniles and adults. As an 18-year-old, defendant falls on the adult side of that line. Accordingly, defendant's facial challenge to his aggregate sentence under the eighth amendment necessarily fails." Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61. In contrast, as to the Illinois Constitution proportionate penalties claim, the supreme court distinguished the Harris defendant from the 17-year-old defendant in Holman, when it stated that unlike the defendant in Holman, "defendant in this case was 18 years old at the time of his offenses. Because defendant was an adult, Miller does not apply directly to his circumstances. The record must be developed sufficiently to address defendant's claim that Miller applies to his particular circumstances." Id. ¶ 45. As it did in Harris, the House court declined to put to rest any notion that an Illinois Constitution proportionate penalties claim based on the Miller rationale lacks viability, when it determined "the appellate court improperly found that petitioner's sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution without a developed evidentiary record on the as-applied constitutional challenge." House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 29.
¶ 20 Here, defendant alleged that, although he was 18 at the time of the offense, he was less mature and had an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsive behavior, and risk taking. Defendant further alleged he was vulnerable to negative influences and his character was less fixed. Defendant urged that his amended petition, coupled with Dr. Garbarino's report, made a substantial showing of a violation of the proportionate penalties clause as applied to his specific circumstances.
¶ 21 Here, unlike the defendant in House, defendant did submit for the trial court's consideration a report from an expert, Dr. Garbarino, relating how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development applied to his specific facts and circumstances. Thus, defendant did provide evidence in an effort to support his position that the Miller principles applied to his specific facts and circumstances. Even so, the trial court dismissed the petition at the second stage.
¶ 22 Regarding the as-applied proportionate penalties claim under the Illinois Constitution, the trial court failed to consider whether the amended petition and the report from Dr. Garbarino made a substantial showing of a violation of defendant's constitutional rights. Instead, the court stated it believed defendant deserved the 115-year sentence because of his actions "and because the [c]ourt doesn't believe that there is any law out there that would change what the Illinois Supreme Court has said in quoting the Miller court that 18 is the bright line." Essentially, the court concluded there was no basis in law for defendant to even make the claim he asserted. As previously explained, Harris and House demonstrate the error in the trial court's analysis. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court erred by dismissing defendant's postconviction petition at the second stage. Given the circumstances, we conclude remand for further proceedings before a different judge is necessary.
¶ 23 Accordingly, we remand for further second-stage proceedings and direct the new trial court to determine whether defendant, through the allegations in his amended petition and the report from Dr. Garbarino, has made a substantial showing of a violation of his constitutional rights. If the trial court determines the required showing has been made, defendant's petition should be advanced to a third-stage hearing. If the trial court determines defendant has failed to make the necessary showing, the petition should be dismissed. In remanding this matter, we express no opinion regarding the merits of defendant's claim.
¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 26 Reversed and remanded.