Opinion
4-24-0864 4-24-0865 4-24-0866 4-24-0867
12-05-2024
In re A.H., T.H., Me. F. and Ma. F., Minors v. Marlee C., Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren County Nos. 20JA19 20JA20 20JA21 20JA22 Honorable James Standard, Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Grischow concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
CAVANAGH PRESIDING JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court's finding of unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 In 2024, the State filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Marlee C., to her minor children, A.H. (born May 2013), T.H. (born April 2014), Me. F. (born November 2019), and Ma. F. (born August 2018). Following the fitness and best interest hearings, the trial court granted the State's petitions and terminated respondent's parental rights.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In August 2020, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship for the minors pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)), contending the minors' environment was injurious to their welfare. The petitions alleged respondent had failed to provide adequate food, water, shelter, and care for the minors since May 13, 2019. In August 2021, the State filed amended petitions for adjudication of wardship, alleging, inter alia, that (1) on November 2, 2020, a concerned citizen had observed Ma. F. outside the home, crying and alone, wearing only a "sundress, with no shoes" when the temperature was approximately 35 degrees Fahrenheit; (2) after being told respondent and the minors were in Peoria, Illinois, they were actually discovered hiding in the home, ignoring a caseworker performing a welfare check; and (3) T.H. and A.H. were observed "eating mustard, by itself" in the kitchen that was "covered in household items and garbage," while the refrigerator contained only a "small amount of food." Additionally, respondent was unable to locate "shoes, coats, or clean clothes" for the minors.
¶ 5 On November 9, 2021, respondent stipulated to a finding the minors were neglected. On February 22, 2022, the court entered a dispositional order making the minors wards of the court after finding respondent unfit for reasons other than financial circumstances to properly care for the minors. Custody and guardianship was placed with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and respondent was ordered to cooperate with all directives from DCFS.
¶ 6 On December 15, 2023, the State filed a supplemental petition to terminate respondent's parental rights as to all the minors. The petition alleged respondent had (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the minors' welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022)), (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that caused the minors to be removed during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(i), and (3) failed to make reasonable progress toward the return home of the minors during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). The relevant ninemonth period was defined as March 14, 2022, to December 14, 2022.
¶ 7 A. Fitness Hearing
¶ 8 On February 27, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the State's petition to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondent was not present, and her counsel requested a continuance. Counsel indicated respondent had called his office the morning of the hearing to inform him she was living in Freeport, Illinois, and did not have transportation to attend the hearing. The court denied the motion to continue, noting respondent had advanced notice of the hearing and found it was not in the best interest of the minors to continue the proceedings.
¶ 9 Sharayah Snyder testified on behalf of the State. Snyder was the caseworker for the minors and respondent. Respondent was required to cooperate with DCFS, submit to drug testing, complete a mental health assessment and recommended treatment, attend parenting classes, and attend domestic violence counseling. Respondent had failed to communicate with DCFS regularly. She missed 34 out of 36 drug screenings. Of the two drug tests respondent participated in, she tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. She failed to complete a mental health assessment. She was discharged unsuccessfully from parenting classes for nonattendance, and she failed to attend domestic violence counseling services.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Snyder confirmed respondent had moved to Freeport in June 2022. Respondent attended 33 out of 40 visitations with the minors from March 2022 through December 2022. Snyder stated the distance from Freeport to Galesburg, Illinois, where the visits took place, was approximately a two-hour drive. Snyder described respondent's visits with the minors as "chaotic," and there was "a lot of yelling and crying." Snyder clarified respondent was the one yelling and the minors were crying.
¶ 11 Respondent presented no evidence.
¶ 12 The trial court described the evidence and respondent's conduct as disturbing. The court noted respondent had "not interacted in services [or] done anything other than show up at visits for this long and [having] these children remain in foster placement is greatly disturbing." The court stated the minors deserve permanency, normalcy, and "better, frankly, than what limited effort [respondent] has put forth here." The court reemphasized respondent had not completed any of the ordered services. The court found respondent unfit. The court directed "the State to prepare an order consistent with this ruling finding that the State met [its] burden" and continued the matter for a best interest hearing.
¶ 13 B. Best Interest Hearing
¶ 14 A best interest hearing was conducted on May 6, 2024. Respondent again failed to appear. Respondent's counsel requested a continuance, noting respondent was "on her way" and would arrive "anywhere from a half hour to an hour late." Counsel confirmed respondent was previously made aware of the court date. The trial court noted the minors' cases had been open for 1119 days and denied the continuance request. Four best interest reports, prepared for each minor, respectively, were admitted into evidence without objection.
¶ 15 Snyder was called to testify on behalf of respondent. Snyder stated respondent's visitation with the minors was originally weekly, then it was reduced to biweekly, then reduced again to monthly. Snyder explained respondent's visits were reduced for a "lack of progress and sporadic coming and not coming, not providing food for the [minors]." Respondent had moved to Freeport to live with her mother in summer 2022. However, Snyder stated respondent still lacked stability despite moving to live with her mother. When respondent visits with the minors, she is frustrated and yells a lot. She last visited the minors in April 2024. Respondent's last visit prior to
April was a video visit around Christmas. Regarding respondent's inconsistent visits with the minors, Snyder explained:
"We offer her monthly visits. She confirms for visits the day before. Sometimes she confirms and then still doesn't show up the next day. Sometimes she calls after she confirms and says she can't make it. Sometimes she doesn't call at all to confirm."
¶ 16 On cross-examination, Snyder stated that A.H.'s and T.H.'s needs are being met in their current placement. T.H. has special educational needs that are being addressed. Additionally, Ma. F.'s and Me. F.'s needs are being met in their current placement. Me. F. has medical needs related to tubes in her ears that are being met in her current placement.
¶ 17 Respondent arrived at the hearing after Snyder's testimony concluded.
¶ 18 The trial court noted the minors have "bonded well" in their current placements, which was a "marked and sharp contrast to what they experienced before they went into care." The court stated adoption was the "best solution" for permanence, stability, uniformity, and providing a caring and loving environment for the minors and their needs. The court found the State had met its burden. The court terminated respondent's parental rights.
¶ 19 This appeal followed.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 We begin by noting this case is an accelerated appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). Accordingly, this court is required to issue its decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal unless there has been good cause shown. Ill. S.Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). Here, the notice of appeal was filed on June 6, 2024. Thus, we were required to issue a decision by November 4, 2024. However, the record on appeal was not filed until September 12, 2024, and appellant-respondent's brief was not filed until October 3, 2024. Given the briefing schedule permitted by Rule 311, this case was not submitted for our review until November 4, 2024. Ill. S.Ct. R. 311(7) (eff. July 1, 2018). Therefore, we find there is good cause for issuing our decision after the 150-day deadline.
¶ 22 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred by failing to identify a specific statutory ground for finding her unfit. In support, she cites In re B'Yata I., 2013 IL App (2d) 130558. Respondent does not challenge the court's best interest finding; therefore, we confine our review to the fitness hearing.
¶ 23 In B'Yata I., the trial court stated it had considered" 'all of the evidence, testimony, witness credibility, and arguments of counsel.'" Id. ¶ 34. The court then found the State had met its burden and found the respondent unfit without setting forth a factual basis for its decision. Id. The trial court had found the respondent unfit on three independent grounds as alleged by the State. Id. ¶ 38. The appellate court, therefore, reviewed the evidence from the fitness hearing and applied it to each ground for unfitness as alleged. Id. ¶¶ 39-40. The B'Yata I. court concluded the evidence was not overwhelming or undisputed in the State's favor and that the trial court's failure to make express factual findings impeded the appellate court's ability to determine whether the court's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 41.
¶ 24 In the case sub judice, respondent argues the trial court failed to identify the specific grounds for its finding of unfitness. She claims this inhibits her ability to challenge, on appeal, whether the court's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, respondent requests we remand the matter and order the trial court to apply its factual findings to the specific grounds of unfitness as alleged in the State's petitions.
¶ 25 We disagree with respondent and find this case distinguishable from B'Yata I. In B'Yata I., the trial court identified the source of the evidence it had considered but never made any actual findings of fact for the basis of its determination that the State had met its burden of proving the respondent was an unfit parent. In the instant case, the trial court made several express factual findings to support its determination. Certainly, it would be optimal if the trial court were to identify the facts as they apply to each alleged ground for unfitness. The court's failure to do so in this instance, however, does not impede our ability to conduct a meaningful review of respondent's case.
¶ 26 Pursuant to section 1(D) of the Adoption Act, the State alleged three grounds for unfitness for the period of March 14, 2022, to December 14, 2022: respondent had (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the minors' welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022)), (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that caused the minors to be removed during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(i), and (3) failed to make reasonable progress toward the return home of the minors during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). Parental rights may not be terminated without the parent's consent unless the trial court first determines, by clear and convincing evidence, the parent is unfit under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 354 (2005).
¶ 27 Here, when the trial court granted the State's petitions, the only reasonable interpretation is that it had granted the State's petitions in their entirety; that is, the court had found the State had met its burden on all three of the alleged grounds for unfitness. Therefore, respondent simply needed to apply the facts as expressed by the court to any of the alleged grounds for unfitness. We note, "[a] parent's rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 349. Accordingly, we need not apply the facts of this case to each alleged ground of unfitness for meaningful review.
¶ 28 Pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act, a parent may be found unfit if she fails "to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022). Illinois courts have defined "reasonable progress" as "demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d 1036, 1046 (2007). This court has explained reasonable progress exists when a trial court
"can conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody. The court will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the directives previously given to the parent in order to regain custody of the child." (Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d 444, 461 (1991).
We have also emphasized" 'reasonable progress' is an 'objective standard.'" In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88 (quoting L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d at 461). "A trial court's determination that a parent's unfitness has been established by clear and convincing evidence will not be disturbed on review unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d at 354.
¶ 29 The undisputed evidence showed, during the relevant nine-month period, respondent had failed to complete any of the court-ordered services. She had twice tested positive for illicit substances. While respondent did attend visitation with the minors, the visits were described as chaotic, wherein respondent yelled and the minors cried. The fact is, respondent had not remotely complied with court-ordered services and was not anywhere near regaining custody of the minors in the near future when the trial court made its findings. Therefore, we conclude the trial court's finding that respondent had failed to make reasonable progress toward the return home of the minors is supported by the record and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 32 Affirmed.