Opinion
753 KA 16-01233
12-23-2020
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Shain MALDONADO, Defendant-Appellant.
BRIDGET L. FIELD, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SHAIN MALDONADO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
BRIDGET L. FIELD, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SHAIN MALDONADO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of manslaughter in the first degree ( Penal Law § 125.20 [1] ) and assault in the first degree (§ 120.10 [1]). The conviction arises from an incident in which defendant, having earlier been asked to leave a gathering due to his behavior by the host and her boyfriend, returned a few hours later with an associate and initiated a melee on the porch and in front of the apartment during which the boyfriend was fatally stabbed and another guest sustained a serious physical injury from being stabbed. We affirm.
Defendant contends in his main and pro se supplemental briefs that Supreme Court erred in granting the People's request to charge the jury on manslaughter in the first degree as a lesser included offense of murder in the second degree ( Penal Law § 125.25 [1] ). We reject that contention inasmuch as there is "a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that ... defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater" ( People v. Van Norstrand , 85 N.Y.2d 131, 135, 623 N.Y.S.2d 767, 647 N.E.2d 1275 [1995] ; see CPL 300.50 [1] ), i.e., that during the chaotic struggle between defendant and the boyfriend on the porch, defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to the boyfriend rather than to kill him (see People v. Velasco , 160 A.D.2d 170, 170-171, 553 N.Y.S.2d 331 [1st Dept. 1990], affd 77 N.Y.2d 469, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721, 570 N.E.2d 1070 [1991] ; People v. Straker , 301 A.D.2d 667, 668, 754 N.Y.S.2d 339 [2d Dept. 2003], lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 587, 764 N.Y.S.2d 398, 796 N.E.2d 490 [2003] ).
Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant preserved for our review his contention in his main brief that the conviction of manslaughter in the first degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence (see generally People v. Gray , 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919 [1995] ), we conclude that it lacks merit. "Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, and giving them the benefit of every reasonable inference" ( People v. Bay , 67 N.Y.2d 787, 788, 501 N.Y.S.2d 19, 492 N.E.2d 127 [1986] ; see People v. Delamota , 18 N.Y.3d 107, 113, 936 N.Y.S.2d 614, 960 N.E.2d 383 [2011] ), we conclude with respect to defendant's principal liability for that crime that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that defendant stabbed the boyfriend (see People v. McGhee , 4 A.D.3d 485, 486, 772 N.Y.S.2d 344 [2d Dept. 2004], lv denied 2 N.Y.3d 803, 781 N.Y.S.2d 302, 814 N.E.2d 474 [2004] ). We further conclude in that respect that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to the boyfriend (see People v. Collins , 43 A.D.3d 1338, 1338, 842 N.Y.S.2d 624 [4th Dept. 2007], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 1005, 850 N.Y.S.2d 393, 880 N.E.2d 879 [2007] ; see generally People v. Ramos , 19 N.Y.3d 133, 136-137, 946 N.Y.S.2d 83, 969 N.E.2d 199 [2012] ). Contrary to defendant's contention, even if the proof had demonstrated that the associate stabbed the boyfriend during the melee, the evidence is legally sufficient to establish defendant's liability as an accessory. "There is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to conclude that defendant and the [associate] shared a community of purpose to cause serious physical injury to the [boyfriend]" ( People v. Bursey , 155 A.D.3d 1513, 1514, 64 N.Y.S.3d 418 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1114, 77 N.Y.S.3d 339, 101 N.E.3d 980 [2018] ) and that defendant "solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided the [associate] in the commission of the crime" ( People v. Bello , 92 N.Y.2d 523, 526, 683 N.Y.S.2d 168, 705 N.E.2d 1209 [1998] ; see Penal Law § 20.00 ).
Although defendant correctly notes that there is no evidence that he stabbed the other guest to establish his liability as a principal for assault in the first degree, defendant did not preserve for our review his further contention that the evidence with respect to that crime is legally insufficient to establish his liability as an accomplice, including the requisite mental culpability, inasmuch as his motion for a trial order of dismissal was not specifically directed at the alleged error urged on appeal (see People v. Carncross , 14 N.Y.3d 319, 324, 901 N.Y.S.2d 112, 927 N.E.2d 532 [2010] ; People v. Grimes , 174 A.D.3d 1341, 1341, 103 N.Y.S.3d 241 [4th Dept. 2019], lv dismissed 34 N.Y.3d 932, 109 N.Y.S.3d 754, 133 N.E.3d 461 [2019] ). In any event, we reject that contention. The evidence established that defendant solicited or intentionally aided the associate in assaulting the people at the gathering, including interveners who would prevent the primary attack on the boyfriend (see People v. Haire , 96 A.D.2d 1110, 1111, 467 N.Y.S.2d 703 [3d Dept. 1983] ). Indeed, defendant brought the associate back to the apartment, and they jointly approached the apartment both armed with a knife and concealing their hands. After the host answered the door and stood in front of the boyfriend, defendant pushed the host, both defendant and the associate then grabbed the boyfriend pulling him through the doorway while dragging the host onto the porch as well, and both defendant and the associate engaged in a fight with the boyfriend before the guest intervened in the melee and was stabbed by the associate (see id. ). There is also evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that defendant shared the associate's intent to cause serious physical injury to the guest (see generally Penal Law § 120.10 [1] ). The jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant was aware of the associate's possession of and intent to use a knife and that, upon the guest's intervention in an attempt to help the boyfriend, the associate's actions in preventing the guest from rendering such assistance and stabbing him "were not ‘spontaneous’ or unanticipated by [defendant], but that [defendant and the associate] together had a ‘concerted or planned use of [their] weapon[s]’ " against interveners such as the guest ( People v. Cabassa , 79 N.Y.2d 722, 728, 586 N.Y.S.2d 234, 598 N.E.2d 1 [1992], cert denied 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Ed.2d 563 [1992] ; see Matter of Tatiana N. , 73 A.D.3d 186, 191, 899 N.Y.S.2d 21 [1st Dept. 2010] ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention in his main brief, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson , 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley , 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). The testimony of the People's witnesses was not "incredible as a matter of law, i.e., it was not impossible of belief because it is manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory" ( People v. Resto , 147 A.D.3d 1331, 1334, 47 N.Y.S.3d 522 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1000, 57 N.Y.S.3d 722, 80 N.E.3d 415 [2017], reconsideration denied 29 N.Y.3d 1094, 63 N.Y.S.3d 10, 85 N.E.3d 105 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]). " ‘Where, as here, witness credibility is of paramount importance to the determination of guilt or innocence,’ we must afford great deference to the fact-finder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony and observe their demeanor" ( People v. Friello , 147 A.D.3d 1519, 1520, 47 N.Y.S.3d 620 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1031, 62 N.Y.S.3d 300, 84 N.E.3d 972 [2017] ). We conclude that the jury properly considered the issues of credibility, including the inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony, and there is no basis for disturbing its determinations (see People v. Rogers , 70 A.D.3d 1340, 1340, 894 N.Y.S.2d 313 [4th Dept. 2010], lv denied 14 N.Y.3d 892, 903 N.Y.S.2d 780, 929 N.E.2d 1015 [2010], cert denied 562 U.S. 969, 131 S.Ct. 475, 178 L.Ed.2d 302 [2010] ).
We reject defendant's contention in his main brief that the court committed reversible error by admitting certain evidence at trial. "Trial courts are accorded wide discretion in making evidentiary rulings and, absent an abuse of discretion, those rulings should not be disturbed on appeal" ( People v. Carroll , 95 N.Y.2d 375, 385, 718 N.Y.S.2d 10, 740 N.E.2d 1084 [2000] ). Here, the court's rulings did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Defendant also contends in his main brief that he was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant preserved that contention for our review with respect to only one alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct and, in any event, we conclude that "[t]he prosecutor's comments on summation did not shift the burden of proof to defendant, and they constituted either fair comment on the evidence or a fair response to defense counsel's summation" ( People v. Coleman , 32 A.D.3d 1239, 1240, 821 N.Y.S.2d 316 [4th Dept. 2006], lv denied 8 N.Y.3d 844, 830 N.Y.S.2d 703, 862 N.E.2d 795 [2007] ; see People v. Bailey , 181 A.D.3d 1172, 1175, 118 N.Y.S.3d 351 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1025, 126 N.Y.S.3d 21, 149 N.E.3d 859 [2020] ). Contrary to defendant's related contention in his main and pro se supplemental briefs, inasmuch as the prosecutor's comments on summation were not improper, defense counsel's failure to object thereto did not deprive defendant of effective assistance of counsel (see People v. Brooks , 183 A.D.3d 1231, 1232, 123 N.Y.S.3d 358 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1043, 127 N.Y.S.3d 848, 151 N.E.3d 529 [2020] ).
Defendant further contends in his main brief that he was deprived of effective assistance by defense counsel's failure to consult with him before declining to consent to the jury's request for written copies of the statutory text of certain crimes (see CPL 310.30 ). We reject that contention inasmuch as defendant has failed " ‘to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations’ for [defense] counsel's alleged shortcoming[ ]" ( People v. Benevento , 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 [1998] ).
Contrary to defendant's contention in his main brief, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Finally, we have considered the remaining contentions in defendant's pro se supplemental brief and conclude that none warrants reversal or modification of the judgment.