Opinion
F085203
09-08-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER MAITIA, Defendant and Appellant.
Rex Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, and Jesica Y. Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. DF016755C. David Wolf, Judge.
Rex Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, and Jesica Y. Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
Defendant Christopher Maitia contends on appeal that (1) the trial court's order that defendant pay direct victim restitution must be stricken because there is insufficient evidence that the victim suffered a loss as a result of defendant's criminal conduct, and, alternatively, (2) if we affirm the court's order, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the exact amount of restitution ordered. The People agree that the court's order must be stricken but contend that remand is appropriate for the trial court to determine what amount of restitution, if any, is appropriate for loss the victim suffered based on defendant's conduct. We agree that the order must be stricken but conclude remand is inappropriate.
We strike the trial court's order finding defendant jointly and severally liable for victim restitution to the Employment Development Department (EDD). In all other respects, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On March 23, 2022, the Kern County District Attorney filed a complaint charging defendant with making a false statement to obtain unemployment benefits (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2101, subdivision (a); count 1); and conspiracy to commit the crime of making a false statement to obtain unemployment benefits with codefendant Lacci L. (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a); count 4). As to counts 1 and 4, the complaint further alleged factors in aggravation within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421. It was also alleged that defendant had a prior felony conviction (§ 667), a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and a prior serious or violent felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
Defendant's codefendants Lacci L. and Justin J. were charged with grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a); count 2) and conspiring with each other to make false statements to obtain unemployment benefits (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2101, subd. (a); count 3).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
On June 22, 2022, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to count 1 and the trial court dismissed count 4. The court admitted defendant's prior strike conviction pursuant to section 667, subdivision (e).
On July 26, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to 32 months in state prison, to be served consecutively to any other term defendant was then serving. The court also ordered defendant jointly and severally liable for victim restitution pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f) to the (EDD) in the amount of $23,292. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) The court continued the matter for a Cervantes hearing on the issue of victim restitution to determine whether defendant could be held jointly and severally liable for victim restitution to the EDD with his codefendants.
People v. Cervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353.
On September 1, 2022, following a Cervantes hearing, the trial court determined the total loss to the EDD was between $22,284 and $23,292. The court again continued the matter to decide whether defendant would be held jointly and severally liable for the victim restitution to the EDD.
On October 19, 2022, the trial court found defendant jointly and severally liable for restitution to the EDD with his codefendants and ordered him to pay victim restitution in the amount of $23,046.
During this hearing, the court adjusted the final amount of restitution.
On October 31, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the victim restitution order.
Because defendant entered a plea, the facts are summarized from the probation officer's report. The factual basis for defendant's plea consisted of a probable cause statement and the reports in discovery.
Defendant, an inmate at Shafter Modified Community Correctional Facility, conspired with Lacci, a civilian, and Justin, another inmate, to fraudulently obtain unemployment benefits from the EDD. Defendant submitted an EDD claim, but it was disqualified before any payment was issued.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court's order that defendant pay direct victim restitution to the EDD must be stricken because there is no substantial evidence that EDD suffered any economic loss as a result of defendant's criminal conduct. Respondent agrees that the order must be stricken but contends remand is required to allow the trial court to determine what, if any, loss the EDD suffered based on defendant's conduct for processing his disqualified EDD claim. We agree with the parties that the order must be stricken, but conclude remand is inappropriate.
A. Background
Defendant pled guilty to making a false statement to obtain unemployment insurance benefits (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2101, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior strike conviction, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 32 months in prison and the dismissal of a charge of conspiracy to commit the offense. The EDD did not submit a claim for restitution based on defendant's offense.
The trial court held several restitution hearings. Defense counsel argued that defendant should not be ordered to pay restitution for the loss caused by his codefendants because defendant did not receive any payment or benefit from the EDD because defendant's EDD application was disqualified before any payment was issued.
The prosecution countered that defendant should be jointly and severally liable for the full restitution amount with his codefendants. They argued that defendant was involved in the loss caused by his codefendants.
During the Cervantes hearing, the court found that defendant's codefendant, Justin, also submitted an EDD claim, for which Justin received $23,292 from EDD.
Defense counsel asserted that defendant was not involved in the conspiracy between his codefendants and that the loss the EDD suffered was solely from Justin's EDD claim.
The probation officer's report stated defendant conspired to fraudulently obtain unemployment benefits with his codefendants and that defendant was jointly and severally liable for victim restitution in favor of the EDD.
After considering the probation officer's report and hearing arguments from both counsel, the trial court found defendant jointly and severally liable for $23,046 in victim restitution, stating defendant "voluntarily, knowing[ly], [and] intelligently ... joined an ongoing conspiracy to get the benefit of that expertise," making his actions "equivalent [to that] of his codefendants" and that "his actions include those of his co-conspirators."
B. Law
Section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1) states it is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant where (1) an economic loss is suffered by a victim; (2) the loss is a result of the commission of a crime; and (3) the defendant was convicted of that crime. (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).)
The definition of a "victim" in section 1202.4 includes a governmental agency" 'when that entity is a direct victim of a crime.'" (People v. Ozkan (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1076.) "[P]ublic agencies are not directly 'victimized' for purposes of restitution under . . . section 1202.4 merely because they spend money to investigate crimes or apprehend criminals." (Id. at p. 1077.)
The restitution order "shall identify each victim and each loss to which it pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct[.]" (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) The court must find that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the injury. (In re A.M. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 668, 672-674; People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418, 425-427.) The substantial factor standard requires"' "only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical." '" (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 13211332.) A defendant is entitled to a hearing to dispute the determination of the amount of restitution. The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is preponderance of evidence. (Id. at p. 1319.)
A trial court's restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Walker v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 651, 655.) We review a challenge on appeal to the sufficiency of evidence to support a factual finding necessary to a victim restitution order under the substantial evidence test. (In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661-662.) We "must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) "When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court." (People v. Dalvito (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 557, 562; Walker v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 651, 655.) Under this standard, a trial court need only employ a method that is rationally designed to determine the victim's economic loss. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663.)
Unemployment Insurance Code section 2101, subdivision (a) states:
"It is a violation of this chapter to willfully make a false statement or representation, to knowingly fail to disclose a material fact, or to use a false name, false social security number, or other false identification to obtain, increase, reduce, or defeat any benefit or payment, whether for the maker or for any other person, under any of the following statutes administered by the department:
"(1) The provisions of this division. "(2) The provisions of any unemployment insurance law of the federal government. "(3) The provisions of any training allowance law of the federal government. "(4) The provisions of any trade readjustment allowance law of the federal government.
"(5) The provisions of any other allowance law of the federal government." (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2101, subd. (a).)
C. Analysis
Here, the record does not show EDD's loss was incurred because of the commission of a crime for which defendant was convicted, as required by section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1). Defendant's EDD claim was disqualified, and he received no payment from EDD for it. Defendant was convicted only of the offense of making a false statement to obtain unemployment benefits (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2101, subd. (a)) based on his failed EDD claim.
EDD's loss was incurred as a result of defendant's codefendant, Justin's, EDD claim. However, defendant was not convicted of conspiring with either of his codefendants, Justin or Lacci. Defendant was never charged with conspiring with Justin, and although defendant was charged with conspiring to make a false statement to obtain unemployment benefits with Lacci (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2101, subd. (a); count 4), he did not plead to the conspiracy charge, and it was dismissed in consideration of his plea.
Lacci and Justin were charged separately with conspiring with each other to make a false statement to obtain unemployment benefits (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2101, subd. (a); count 3), and grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a); count 2) based on Justin's EDD claim, which resulted in EDD's loss for which restitution was ordered.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in ordering defendant jointly and severally liable for victim restitution to EDD because EDD's economic loss cannot be attributed to defendant's conduct for which he was convicted. (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1)); See People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 786 ["A defendant may be held jointly and severally liable for losses for which a codefendant bears more culpability [citation], but the criminal conduct of which the defendant was convicted must be at least a substantial factor in causing the victim's loss."].)
As we conclude defendant is not liable for EDD's loss, we need not address the second issue raised in defendant's opening brief requesting we correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the exact amount of restitution ordered.
The remaining question is whether this is an appropriate case for remand. The People assert remand is appropriate to give the prosecution an opportunity to present evidence, if any, of any loss EDD suffered based on defendant's own conduct, including resources used by EDD to process or investigate his claim.
Remand is inappropriate, however, because, as discussed above, there is not substantial evidence that EDD was a direct victim of defendant's offense of making a false statement to obtain unemployment benefits because EDD disqualified defendant's claim and he did not receive any money from EDD for it. Investigative or other costs associated with EDD's disqualification of defendant's EDD claim do not qualify for restitution for a direct economic loss under section 1202.4. (§ 1202.4; see People v. Ozkan, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at 1077 [Investigative costs incurred by a public agency for the purpose of preventing cheating are not a direct economic loss resulting from defendant's criminal conduct, and thus not subject to restitution pursuant to section 1202.4.].) As investigative costs are not considered a loss to a public agency such as EDD, EDD did not suffer a loss based on the filing of defendant's failed EDD claim.
Accordingly, the trial court's order that defendant is jointly and severally liable for victim restitution to EDD must be stricken and remand is inappropriate.
DISPOSITION
We strike the trial court's victim restitution order. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
[*] Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and DeSantos, J.