Opinion
A122474
7-15-2009
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER MAGUDDATO, Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of attempted voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, §§ 664/192, subd. (a)), first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), with associated enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and infliction of great bodily injury upon the victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subd. (e)). The trial court imposed a sentence of five years and six months for the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, which was doubled pursuant to section 667, subdivision (e), a consecutive one-year term for the weapon enhancement, a consecutive three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement, and a concurrent six-year term for the burglary conviction.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In this appeal defendant asserts that the trial court violated section 654 by imposing the concurrent six-year sentence for burglary. We conclude that the imposition of a concurrent term for burglary was permissible under section 654, and affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant began serving a sentence in San Francisco County Jail in August of 2006. While defendant was incarcerated, his wife Alexandria Maguddato lived with their son and daughter at 1401 Sturgeon Street, Apartment A, on Treasure Island. Alexandria visited defendant in jail until January or February of 2007, when she informed him by telephone and letter that she "wanted to end the relationship." Alexandria also told defendant that she had commenced a romantic relationship with the victim in the present case, Lloyd Martin. Defendant expressed to Alexandria that he was "not happy with that and wanted to try to work things out" with her. In addition, defendant said that he "was going to hurt [Martin] and, you know, kick his ass." By February of 2007, Alexandria ended her relationship with defendant and no longer contacted him.
For the sake of clarity and convenience we will refer to Alexandria Maguddato by her first name.
On the afternoon of April 7, 2007, Alexandria returned to her residence to find a handwritten note to her from defendant attached to the front door that read, "I came to reclaim my castle. Ill be back later. I love you hella much."
The next evening, around 8:00, Alexandria was at home with her two children and Martin when she heard a knock on the front door. When Alexandria "looked through the peephole" she observed a man she did not recognize, but whom she identified at trial as Troy Bridges. Alexandria asked Bridges, "What do you want?" Bridges replied that "he had a message for `Alexandria.
"Alexandria decided to open the door, but before she did so she "grabbed a knife" and her son. She "put the chain on top of the door" and opened it slightly, whereupon defendant forced his way through the door and into the residence. Alexandria pushed her son out of the way and stood between defendant and Martin. Defendant yelled to Martin "something like, get out of my house." Alexandria noticed that she had been stabbed in the left forearm as defendant came through the door. She grabbed her two children and ran out of the apartment.
Alexandria did not see defendant cut her, but was sure she did not cut herself with the knife she was holding.
Alexandria placed her children behind the car parked in the driveway, then "ran back in the house to see what was going on." As she reached the front door she noticed that Bridges was bleeding from "his chest area." Bridges exclaimed, "I didnt come here for this."
When Alexandria entered the apartment Martin was against the wall, with blood on his chest or upper shoulder, "being slapped and stabbed" by defendant. Alexandria observed that defendant made several downward stabbing motions, and Martin had "something getting run up in him."
Martin testified that after hearing a "loud noise" at the front door he proceeded to the hallway where he "saw somebody running at" him. Martin then felt that he was "hit" in the chest by someone he could not identify. The blow took "all the breath out" of him and he "got weak." He noticed considerable blood on the left side of his chest. As Martin struggled with the man he "kept getting hit," a total of six to eight times. According to Martins testimony, another "big dude" then came into the house, grabbed "the other dude" and said, "I didnt come here for this."
After Martin fell to the floor near the front door, defendant ended the assault and left the apartment. Martin told Alexandria, "I am hit and I cannot breath[e]." Martin gradually "faded out" and ultimately crawled to the couch in the living room where he "passed out."
Alexandria ran to the fire station about four blocks away to get help. When she returned to her apartment the police were already there. She and Martin were taken to the hospital for treatment of their wounds.
Martin suffered multiple serious stab wounds to the left shoulder, back and chest, along with defensive wounds to his hands. The wounds to his chest caused a collapsed lung. Alexandria received sutures for a "stab wound of the left forearm," and suffered a "superficial wound of the abdomen."
After the police arrived, a search of the apartment was conducted. Three knives were discovered: a large kitchen knife just inside the front door that was covered with blood; an open silver and wood folding lock-back knife in the hallway that had blood on the blade and handle; and a closed lock-back knife on the master bed with no apparent blood on it. No fingerprints were found on any of the knives. Blood drops, smears and swipes were observed in the front door area, the floor and wall of the hallway, the living room, and the master bathroom sink. A trail of blood was also visible between the curb and the front door.
Defendant was arrested the next morning on Market Street in San Francisco. He had lacerations on his hands, and a folding knife was found in his pocket. He told various stories about the cause of the wounds to his hands: he told nurses that he fell or "was stabbed;" to the arresting officer he claimed that he was in Golden Gate Park "throwing stones."
Recordings of telephone conversations defendant had with his friends while he was incarcerated after his arrest were played for the jury. In those conversations defendant said that was "gonna kill" Martin for convincing Alexandria to "press charges" on him. He threatened to shoot Alexandria unless she managed to have the charges against him dropped or refused to testify against him. Defendant also stated that if he "cant have" Alexandria then "cant nobody have her."
Defendant testified in his defense that while he was in jail he spoke to Martin on the telephone during a conversation with Alexandria. Martin threatened to "cut" defendants daughter if he came to the apartment after his release. Defendant was released from jail the morning of April 7, 2007. Later the same day he went to the apartment on Sturgeon Street, but no one was there. He left a note to Alexandria in which he mentioned that he "came back to reclaim [his] castle."
The next evening defendant returned to the apartment to see his wife and children. He did not expect Martin to be present at the apartment. Defendant denied that he had a knife in his possession when he visited the apartment. He asked his friend Bridges to "come over" to the apartment to tell Alexandria that defendant needed "to talk to her," or to be a "witness" in the event she tried to "stab" him or "call the police." When Bridges arrived defendant directed him to knock on the front door and tell Alexandria "he had a message for her."
Defendant testified that Alexandria had stabbed him in the past.
As Bridges went to the door defendant ran around to the side of the house, looked through the window, and observed Alexandria pull a knife out of the cupboard. He also saw Martin inside the apartment with a "knife in his hand," looking "real hella nervous." Martin then chased defendants daughter down the hall. Defendant thought Martin "was going to cut her. He was going to live up to his word and cut her, like he said he was."
Without thinking further, defendant ran to the front door, kicked it open, and forced his way inside past Bridges. In the hallway, defendant ran into Martin, who had a "knife in his hand." As they struggled, defendant hit Martin and attempted to push the knife away. Bridges then grabbed defendant by the armpits and pulled him away from Martin. Defendant testified that he never had possession of a knife and did not realize Martin had been stabbed. Defendant left the apartment as soon as he looked around and determined his daughter "was fine." His hands were cut and bleeding, and blood was on his clothing.
The next day defendant bought bandages for his hands and a pocket knife to protect himself from Martin or his friends. Defendant testified that he "made up" the story about "throwing rocks or something" as the cause of his hand injuries to "cover" for Alexandria, who had stabbed him on a prior occasion.
Bridges testified for the defense that on April 7, 2007, defendant asked him to "talk to his wife to try to get them back together." Bridges met defendant at the Sturgeon Street apartment. Defendant told him to go to the front door and "give her the message" that they should get "back together," then return to him on the sidewalk with an answer. Bridges knocked on the door and announced that he had a "message for Alexandria." He heard "two people behind the door" talking for a couple of minutes. According to Bridges, after Alexandria partially opened the chained door, "it got kicked open." Bridges testified that his only reason for appearing at Alexandrias residence was to induce her to talk to defendant.
DISCUSSION
The sole contention made by defendant in this appeal is that the trial court erred by imposing a concurrent term for the burglary conviction charged in Count 2. Defendant claims that all of the offenses were part of an otherwise "indivisible transaction," "pursuant to a single intent and objective," and thus imposition of multiple sentences was prohibited by section 654.
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and section 654 forbid multiple punishment for the same offense. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 670.) Section 654 provides in pertinent part that "An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision." (See also People v. Kramer (2002) 29 Cal.4th 720, 722; People v. Hall (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1088.) The proscription against double punishment in section 654 is applicable where the defendants course of conduct violated more than one statute but nevertheless comprised a single act or indivisible transaction. (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551; People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1583; People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1473; People v. Barker (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 921, 941.) "On the other hand, section 654 does not apply when the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives independent of each other. In that case, `the trial court may impose punishment for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. [Citations.] . . . [Citation.]" (In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 469.)
"The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the defendant. If all the offenses are incidental to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them, but not for more than one. On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the trial court may impose punishment for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. [Citations.] The principal inquiry in each case is whether the defendants criminal intent and objective were single or multiple. Each case must be determined on its own facts." (People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1135.)
"`The question of whether the acts of which defendant has been convicted constitute an indivisible course of conduct is primarily a factual determination, made by the trial court on the basis of its findings concerning the defendants intent and objective in committing the acts. This determination will not be reversed on appeal unless unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. [Citation.]" (People v. Nichols (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1651, 1657; see also People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162; People v. Avalos, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1583; People v. Williams, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1473.) "We review the trial courts findings `in a light most favorable to the respondent and presume in support of the order the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [Citation.]" (People v. Green (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1085.)
The evidence definitively shows that the burglary and assault were parts of a single, continuous course of conduct. "The determinative issue is whether appellant had multiple, independent objectives." (People v. Perry (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1526.) We do not dispute defendants position that his unlawful entry into the apartment was effectuated to commit the assault upon Martin. The evidence establishes that defendant was angry over his wifes relationship with the victim and her announced decision to end their marriage. He expressed his intent to reclaim his relationship as Alexandrias husband and end her association with Martin. He also explicitly announced that he would harm the victim. We have no doubt that the reason defendant came to the apartment and kicked in the door was to assault Martin, and in fact he did so immediately upon entry into the residence.
We also recognize that section 654 bars separate punishment for burglary committed for the sole purpose of assaulting a victim inside the residence and the assault itself. (SeePeople v. Pena (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1311-1312.) "Burglary consists of entry into a house or other specified structure with the intent to commit a felony. (Pen. Code, § 459.) Thus, ordinarily, if the defendant commits both burglary and the underlying intended felony, Penal Code section 654 will permit punishment for one or the other but not for both." (People v. Centers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 98-99; see also People v. McElrath (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 178, 191.)
We perceive a second, distinct objective associated with the burglary in the present case, however: that defendant intended to coerce and intimidate Alexandria. Martin was not the only victim of the offenses committed by defendant. A second victim of the burglary, both as charged in the information and proved by the evidence presented, was the primary occupant of the residence, Alexandria. (People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 720-722; People v. Centers, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 101.) The evidence supports the inference that defendant intended not only to physically assault Martin, but also to frighten Alexandria to discourage her from continuing her relationship with Martin — or anyone other than defendant, for that matter. Alexandria was also stabbed during defendants violent, chaotic entry into the apartment.
As corroborated by defendants statements after he was incarcerated.
"Under established case law," exceptions to the scope of the ban on multiple punishment are found if the crimes serve "separate criminal objectives," or "when multiple victims are targeted by a single episode of violent criminal conduct, the perpetrator may be punished separately for the crimes committed against each victim." (People v. Davey (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 384, 390; see also People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208, 1212; People v. Martin (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 776, 781-782; People v. Douglas (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1393-1394; People v. Nelson (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 634, 638-639.) To ensure that punishment will be commensurate with criminal liability, it has long been held that "`the limitations of section 654 do not apply to crimes of violence against multiple victims." (People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1063, citing People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 78.) "`"This distinction between an act of violence against the person that violates more than one statute and such an act that harms more than one person is well settled. Section 654 is not `applicable where . . . one act has two results, each of which is an act of violence against the person of a separate individual. [Citations.]" [Citation.] . . . [Citation.]" (People v. Bragg (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1402.)
Burglary is considered a violent crime for purposes of the multiple victim exception where the defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the offense. (People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 886; People v. Le (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 925, 931-932; People v. Centers, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 99; People v. Robinson (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 674, 679-681.) Here, the evidence indicates that defendant stabbed the two victims of the burglary during the course of that offense, and inflicted great bodily injury upon Martin in the commission of the attempted manslaughter. That defendant entertained the dual objectives of assaulting Martin and frightening Alexandria when he forcibly entered the residence is also an inference supported by substantial evidence. Multiple punishment "may be imposed where the defendant commits two crimes in pursuit of two independent, even if simultaneous, objectives." (People v. Douglas, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1393.) Martin was the victim of the attempted manslaughter; both he and Alexandria were victims of the violent burglary offense. (See People v. Miller, supra, at pp. 881-882; People v. Centers, supra, at pp. 101-102.) Imposition of the concurrent six-year term for burglary is certainly commensurate with the extreme violence and gravity of the offenses. We conclude that the trial court did not violate section 654 by imposing separate and unstayed sentences for attempted voluntary manslaughter and burglary.
Even if defendant did not purposefully harm Alexandria, to justify imposition of separate punishment for the separate violent offenses there is no requirement that the evidence shows the defendant intended harm to each victim by his wrongdoing. (People v. Pantoja (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1, 15-16; see also People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 456.)
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Marchiano, P. J.
Margulies, J.