Opinion
H044996
11-20-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL JAMES MACY, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. ME-43)
Appellant Daniel Macy appeals from a judgment granting the People's petition to commit him as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a warrantless search of materials he had kept in his dormitory room at Coalinga State Hospital (CSH). Appellant contends that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his dormitory area and that the exclusionary rule should have applied in these circumstances. We find no error and will therefore affirm the judgment.
Background
In December 2004 the People filed a petition alleging that appellant qualified for commitment as an SVP under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 based on his prior convictions of sexually violent criminal offenses against two or more children under the age of 14 (two counts occurring in 1987 against two victims and two counts against one victim in 2000), and on the conclusions of two mental health experts that without treatment appellant posed a danger to others based on a diagnosed mental disorder, such that he was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior. After a hearing in June 2005 the court found probable cause to believe that appellant met the criteria for determination as an SVP, and on December 27, 2005 he was admitted to Coalinga State Hospital (CSH).
The details of these offenses are not material to the issues raised on appeal, as appellant does not question either of the first two criteria for adjudication as an SVP—i.e., the fact of his sexually violent convictions and the finding of all the experts who had evaluated him that he had a "diagnosed mental disorder [i.e., pedophilia] that predisposes him to the commission of criminal sexual acts."
In September 2006 appellant filed a motion to dismiss the petition and a demurrer, followed by an amended petition by the People. The superior court denied that motion to dismiss and subsequent motions filed in 2010 and 2011.
On May 31, 2017 appellant filed the suppression motion that is at issue in this appeal. He described the facts giving rise to the motion as follows. In March of that year two inspectors from the Santa Cruz County district attorney's office went to CSH to pick up appellant for a court appearance and saw images of prepubescent boys. Hospital employees secured appellant's possessions while he was absent, but in mid-April the inspectors returned and seized the items removed from appellant's room, pursuant to a court order obtained by the district attorney. The items included multiple DVDs and CDs, hard drives, and other computer equipment, along with numerous folders with legal paperwork, treatment paperwork, and other miscellaneous papers. On the hard drives the inspectors found more than 1000 movies; of the 159 Inspector Corral looked at, some depicted "young boys in various stages of undress," about four or five contained "frontal nudity of boys," and others showed boys (apparently 12 or older) engaging in sexual behavior.
In her declaration in opposition to the motion, the assistant district attorney stated that the inspectors "looked in [appellant's] room with the permission of the [CSH] police."
In his motion appellant argued that the evidence obtained from the warrantless search must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. He compared SVP proceedings to those for the involuntary commitment of narcotics addicts, where in People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674 [overruled on another point by People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 641, fn. 8) the exclusionary rule had been held to apply. Appellant urged the court to reject the holding of People v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1, 19 (Landau), in which the Fourth Appellate District, Division 3, held that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable in SVP commitment proceedings.
The superior court denied the motion to suppress, relying on Landau. On August 23, 2017, the court granted the People's petition to commit appellant as an SVP, and appellant was transported back to CSH. Appellant then filed this timely appeal.
Discussion
Ordinarily, on appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress based on a warrantless search, we review factual determinations of the lower court for substantial evidence while independently considering whether the search was unreasonable so as to violate the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120.) In this case, however, the essential facts are not in dispute; thus, whether the evidence should have been suppressed is a question for our de novo review. (People v. Magee (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 178, 185.)
The Fourth Amendment includes the mandate that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) The judicially created exclusionary rule is " 'designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.' [Citation.]" (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 139-140.) "To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system." (Id. at p. 144; see People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 334 [primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct].) Yet, as Justice Kennard observed, the goal of deterrence "is not relevant in determining whether a particular search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment . . . The exclusionary rule's purpose comes into play only when the inquiry is whether unlawfully obtained evidence must be suppressed." (Sanders, supra, at p. 338, conc. opn. of Kennard, J.)
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that "the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by government action." (Smith v. Maryland (1979) 442 U.S. 735, 740; see also Maryland v. King (2013) 569 U.S. 435, 462 ["The reasonableness of any search must be considered in the context of the person's legitimate expectations of privacy"].) Thus, before suppression can be said to be required, it must be determined that the person challenging the search had a subjective expectation of privacy in the area or item searched and that this expectation is recognized by society as reasonable. (In re Baraka H. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1044 (Baraka H.); see also Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 361, conc. opn. of Harlan, J. [protection of Fourth Amendment in a place requires a subjective expectation of privacy which may be recognized by society as reasonable].) "The reasonableness of a claimed expectation of privacy depends on the totality of circumstances presented in each case. [Citations.] The burden is on the defendant to prove that he or she had a protectible expectation of privacy in the area or item searched. [Citations.]" (Baraka H., supra, at p. 1044; cf. Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 104 [petitioner bore the burden of proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in another person's purse].) Thus, we need not consider the question of whether appellant's property should have been excluded as the product of an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment unless we can first conclude that he had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his room. (Cf. Bond v. United States (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 338.)
As noted, in the court below the parties debated the applicability of Landau to the issue of whether the exclusionary rule would apply in an SVP case. In Landau the court focused on the necessity of exclusion for its deterrent purpose, comparing SVP proceedings with civil forfeiture, narcotics addict commitments, parole revocations, civil deportations, and conservatorship proceedings. In SVP commitment proceedings, the court concluded, "law enforcement officers looking to uncover undetected crimes of an alleged SVP know that should the evidence be obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence and its fruits will be excluded in a criminal trial. That deterrent being present, we conclude the social cost of excluding the same evidence in an SVPA proceeding—exclusion of reliable evidence and exposure of the public to the acts of individuals who suffer from a mental disability, the existence of which adversely affects the person's volitional ability and predisposes the person to committing sexual acts against others, making him or her a danger to the health and safety of others—is not outweighed by the minimal beneficial effect that would result from excluding evidence in an SVPA proceeding." (Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 23.)
As compelling as this rationale may be, we take a different approach to the evidentiary question before us. Instead of posing as the "initial inquiry" whether the exclusionary rule applies in an SVP proceeding, as did the Landau court (Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 19), thus bypassing the question of the individual's expectation of privacy, we follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court by first asking whether an individual facing commitment as an SVP has a reasonable expectation of privacy while confined at CSH during the pendency of the commitment proceedings. (Cf. People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830-831 [addressing "threshold" questions of whether defendant had a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy when police looked through his window late at night]; see also California v. Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207, 211 ["The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy' "].)
Addressing appellant's circumstances in light of those authorities, we conclude that any expectation of privacy he may have had in his dormitory room at CSH would not have been reasonable. We find persuasive People v. Golden (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 905 (Golden), a decision filed shortly after the trial court denied appellant's motion. There the defendant, having already been adjudicated an SVP and committed to CSH, was convicted of possession of child pornography by a registered sex offender and sentenced to prison. On appeal he challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized by the CSH police from his dormitory section, electronic evidence that, upon examination, revealed child pornography. The trial court had denied the motion on the grounds that the defendant had a "significant reduction in any expectation of privacy" and that the officers had probable cause to search for the items based on disclosures by a fellow patient. (Id. at p. 909.)
On appeal, the Fifth District upheld the ruling, resolving the threshold question by stating, "we do not believe defendant's expectation of privacy in his area of the CSH dormitory 'is the kind of expectation that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " [Citation.]' " (Golden, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 911.) The court quoted extensively from Hudson v. Palmer (1984) 468 U.S. 517, in which the United States Supreme Court had held that a prison inmate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her prison cell. The SVP's involuntary confinement in a secured facility like CSH, the Golden court reasoned, was "sufficiently analogous" to the prisoner's incarceration. The court further noted the obligation of hospital staff to " 'take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the [patients]' and [to] '. . . be ever alert to attempts to introduce . . . contraband into the premises . . . .' [Citation.] Because treatment and rehabilitation of SVP's is the purpose of SVPA commitments, it is especially critical for CSH staff to prevent these individuals from procuring child pornography and other illicit material." (Golden, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 912.)
In its analysis the Golden court made an effort to balance "the defendant's interest in privacy within his area of the CSH dormitory and society's interests in both the security and order of a maximum-security psychiatric hospital and the treatment and rehabilitation of SVP's." (Golden, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 912.) Confinement at CSH, where "various signs throughout the facility warn patients they are subject to such searches," " ' "shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home." ' " (Ibid.) Noting that CSH patients have no place other than their dormitories in which to conceal contraband, the court pointed out that "[a] recognition of privacy rights for SVP's in their dormitories would hamper CSH staff from accessing the dormitories and ferreting out child pornography, the possession of which has become widespread, has incited violence among the patients, and clearly undermines the rehabilitation objective." (Ibid.) Consequently, CSH staff must be given the flexibility to promote society's concerns for safety and security at the hospital and the continuing objective of rehabilitation of the patients. (Ibid.)
We agree with the reasoning in Golden and thus reach the same conclusion in this case. Any expectation of privacy appellant may have had in his dormitory area at CSH was not reasonable in light of society's objective of maintaining the safety of its occupants and promoting rehabilitation of the patients confined there.
Golden is not distinguishable merely because appellant had not yet been adjudicated an SVP (even after nearly 12 years confined there), or because he "was not discovered in . . . possession of child pornography." There is no reason he should be exempt from the security measures that were in place to enable hospital personnel to further the objectives of the facility. It is also irrelevant to this determination that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the investigators' search of the materials in his room, that the search was not prompted by evidence of criminal behavior, or that the investigators actually expressed no motive relating to institutional security or rehabilitation.
Appellant offers no sound reason to resort to pre-Proposition 8 California cases applying the exclusionary rule; neither People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 nor Moore [overruled with respect to the standard of proof in Thomas, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 641, fn. 8] undermines the current application of federal exclusionary standards to SVP proceedings. And more significantly, neither answers the threshold question posed by appellant— that is, "whether appellant had a privacy interest that is recognized under California law." (Cf. Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 31-33 [reviewing earlier Supreme Court decisions finding no reasonable expectation of privacy of jail inmates]; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 ["Except only insofar as concerns consultation with his attorney in a room designated for that purpose, a prisoner has no right of privacy in a jail."].) We conclude that he did not have such an interest, whether under federal or state authority; consequently, he cannot overcome the showing that is a prerequisite to the Fourth Amendment analysis of the admissibility of the evidence. Because appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his dormitory area from which the challenged items were removed, no error occurred when the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence derived from the search of that evidence.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
GROVER, J. /s/_________
DANNER, J.