People v. Lugo

Full title: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUBEN LUGO, Defendant and…

Court: California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division

Date published: Jun 22, 2021

No. B304392 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 22, 2021)

Opinion

B304392

06-22-2021

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUBEN LUGO, Defendant and Appellant.

William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SEGAL, J.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. GA005201, Teri Schwartz, Judge. Reversed with directions.

William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SEGAL, J.

In 1992 a jury convicted Ruben Lugo of first degree murder, attempted murder, and assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Lugo, who was 23 years old when he committed the crimes, to a prison term of 40 years to life.

In December 2019 Lugo filed a motion under Penal Code section 1203.01 for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 to put on the record information relevant to a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. (Franklin, at p. 284; see Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (a)(1) [any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger at the time of the controlling offense is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing]; In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 458 [for inmates “who seek to preserve evidence following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion” in the superior court under section 1203.01].) The superior court denied the motion. Lugo argues, the People concede, and we agree the court erred: Lugo is entitled to a Franklin hearing. Therefore, the order denying Lugo's motion is reversed, and the superior court is directed to conduct a Franklin proceeding. (See Cook, at p. 449, fn. 3 [“Franklin processes are more properly called ‘proceedings' rather than ‘hearings.'”].) The motion for judicial notice is denied as unnecessary.

We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., FEUER, J.