While defense counsel recognized the restrictions imposed on the court in response to COVID-19, counsel argued that, in the instant case there were unrelated COVID-19 issues that were more dispositive. Relying on People v Lown, 488 Mich. 242; 794 N.W.2d 9 (2011), defense counsel asserted that the prosecution's action of filing the initial writ without further follow up did not constitute good-faith action under the 180-day rule. Defense counsel explained that within the 180-day period, defendant was not arraigned, "was not held to answer for these charges," and there no requests by defendant to adjourn or reschedule.

In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in [MCL 780.131], action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. [Emphasis added.] In People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 246; 794 NW2d 9 (2011), our Supreme Court undertook to reaffirm and "clarify the correct interpretation of the 180-day rule." The relevant issue in Lown was whether the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the charge against him based on violation of the 180-day rule was properly denied.

A prosecutor satisfies the 180-day rule by commencing the action within the 180 days following the notice letter, "unless the prosecutor's initial steps are followed by inexcusable delay beyond the 180-day period and [there is] an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly . . . ." [People v Lown, 488 Mich. 242; 794 N.W.2d 9 (2011)] at 247 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Generally, prisoners within Michigan correctional facilities who have pending criminal charges " 'shall be brought to trial within 180 days after' " the Department of Corrections (DOC) provides the prosecutor with a written notice of the imprisonment. People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 255; 794 NW2d 9 (2011), quoting MCL 780.131(1). This Court reviews a ruling on a motion to dismiss for violation of the 180-day rule de novo.

Consequently, subject-matter jurisdiction "concerns a court's abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending and is not dependent on the particular facts of the case." People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 268; 794 NW2d 9 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis removed). A defendant who is arraigned on a felony charge is entitled to a preliminary examination before a magistrate in district court.

This authority is "not dependent on the particular facts of the case" but, instead, is dependent on the character or class of the case pending. People v Lown , 488 Mich. 242, 268, 794 N.W.2d 9 (2011) (quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted). The courts do not have inherent subject-matter jurisdiction; it is derived instead from our constitutional and statutory provisions.

This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 254; 794 NW2d 9 (2011). Statutes must be interpreted to "ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature as manifested in the plain language of the statute."

The trial court agreed with the prosecution that at the time the DOC letter was sent, there were no charges pending against defendant. However, the trial court found that [People v Lown, 488 Mich 242; 749 NW2d 9 (2011)], "appears to contemplate that the DOC notice could be valid even if provided prior to the commencement of the criminal litigation. So the court cannot conclude that the DOC's May notice is a nullity.

The 180-day rule provides procedures that must be followed when criminal charges are brought against a defendant incarcerated in a state correctional facility. See People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 254; 794 NW2d 9 (2011). If the rule is violated, the trial court loses personal jurisdiction over the defendant and must dismiss the charges against him with prejudice. Id. at 267-270; MCL 780.133.

In assessing this factor, reviewing courts "may consider which portions of the delay were attributable to each party when determining whether a defendant's speedy trial rights have been violated and may attribute unexplained delays-or inexcusable delays caused by the court-to the prosecution." People v Lown, 488 Mich. 242, 261-262; 794 N.W.2d 9 (2011) (cleaned up).