Opinion
G061399
02-27-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SEAN RICHARD LOEFFLER, Defendant and Appellant.
Siri Shetty under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 19HF1221 Edward W. Hall, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Siri Shetty under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
Sean Richard Loeffler appeals after the trial court ordered him to pay $13,114.48 in restitution to the California Victim Compensation Board (the board) pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f). He contends the trial court erred by ordering him to pay this amount because the documents the board submitted to support the restitution claim were "overly redacted." Loeffler asserts "[t]he result was insubstantial evidence to support portions of the award as well as a violation of [his] right to due process with respect to the entire award." We disagree and affirm the restitution order.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2019, shortly after Loeffler and Jane Doe began an intimate dating relationship, Loeffler twice elbowed Doe in the face and choked her while they were in a car. Doe suffered two black eyes, one of which was swollen shut, fat lips, a bump below her lip, and multiple bruises on her left arm. He also "busted" Doe's left cheek implant, requiring her to have surgery to get two new cheek implants.
In March 2021, Loeffler pleaded guilty to one count of domestic battery with corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on three years formal probation.
Doe incurred medical expenses, mental health expenses, income loss, and residential security expenses. The board compensated Doe for her expenses, paying her: $4,817.51 for income loss, $8,005 for medical expenses, $185.41 for mental health expenses, and $106.56 for residential security, totaling $13,114.48. The board requested $13,114.48 in restitution for the assistance it provided to Doe. Pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(B), the board provided to the district attorney's office a certified bill packet showing the amount of assistance it had provided Doe and the services for which the payments were made, with redactions to the bills and documents provided.
Loeffler disagreed with the amount of restitution and requested a court hearing. In preparation for the hearing, the prosecution provided Loeffler's counsel with the board's certified redacted bill packet.
In December 2021 and again in January 2022, Loeffler served a subpoena duces tecum on the board, requesting: "Any and all non-redacted records including copies of any and all receipts and requested expenses pertaining to [Doe's] Restitution Application ...." Loeffler contended "the nexus between the claims and the conduct in the case [was] unclear because the basis of the payments to [Doe] has not been provided" and "non-redacted documents, expenses, receipts and records [were] necessary for counsel and the Court's evaluation of whether the restitution claimed and paid was legally supported." In January 2022, the board objected to the first subpoena duces tecum but provided to the court responsive redacted documents for an in camera review. After the second subpoena duces tecum, the board moved to quash the subpoenas on the grounds they were "vague and ambiguous, infringe[d] on statutory and constitutional privileges, and impermissibly bypasse[d] Penal Code section 1202.4." The court granted the motion to quash the subpoenas.
At the restitution hearing, the prosecution submitted the certified redacted bill packet provided by the board. The defense objected on the grounds of hearsay and foundation, and the court overruled these objections. Loeffler renewed his request the court order the board to provide "non-redacted" or "lesser-redacted copies" of the same records, asserting it was "very difficult, if not impossible to really address these records without knowing what it is or what losses are being claimed." He explained the records appeared to indicate Doe had received some medical treatment and received some prescription medications but because of the redactions he was unable to determine where the treatment occurred and what type of medication Doe received. He argued the redactions were overbroad and he had a due process right under the state and federal constitutions to be informed of the bases for the restitution requested. The court denied Loeffler's request, stating: "The defendant has offered no evidence that any of these expenditures were not related to his conduct. And what the defense position seems to be is a wholesale attack on the statutory process, saying in essence, we want every bill, we want every receipt, we want to look at everything. [¶] And the statutory process doesn't require that. It puts the burden on the defense to show that these expenditures were not related to the defendant's conduct. And there's been no showing whatsoever about that."
The court considered and rejected Loffler's additional arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence provided in the certified redacted bill packet. The court found the board investigated Doe's requests for compensation for her economic loss and "[t]hose were categorized, as required by law, into an income loss, medical loss, mental health loss, residential security, and [the] totaled amounts that were paid out by the Board [were] $13,114.48." The court ordered Loeffler to pay $13,114.48 in restitution to the board to reimburse it for payments made to Doe. Loeffler timely appealed from the restitution order.
DISCUSSION
Loeffler seeks a reversal of the restitution order and a remand for "a hearing to address the propriety of the redactions to the bill receipt package prepared by [the board] pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(B)." He contends the certified redacted bill packet admitted into evidence to support the restitution order "was overly redacted" and therefore did not comply with section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(B). We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
"'The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion. "A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed." [Citation.] "'When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.'" [Citations.]' [Citation.] However, a restitution order 'resting upon a "'demonstrable error of law'" constitutes an abuse of the court's discretion. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence [to support a factual finding], the "'power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,' to support the trial court's findings." [Citations.] Further, the standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] "If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court's] findings," the judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact.'" (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26.)
B. Victim Restitution
"Under the California Constitution, a victim is entitled to restitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13).)" (People v. Lockwood (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 91, 95.) With limited exceptions not relevant here, section 1202.4 requires the court to order "full restitution" in every case "in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) Under section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3), the court must determine the "dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct," including medical expenses, mental health counseling expenses, and lost wages. The statute further entitles a victim in a case "related to a violation of Section 273.5" to restitution for expenses for the installation or enhancement of residential security. (Id., subd. (f)(3)(J).) A defendant is entitled to a hearing to dispute the amount of restitution. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).)
Crime victims may apply to the board to obtain compensation from the state restitution fund for the "pecuniary losses they suffer as a direct result of criminal acts." (Gov. Code, § 13950, subds. (a), (b); accord, People v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1452.) "[S]ection 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4) includes special provisions that apply when state funds are used to provide assistance to or on behalf of a victim." (People v. Lockwood, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 96.) Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4) provides:
"(A) If, as a result of the defendant's conduct, the Restitution Fund has provided assistance to . . . a victim . . ., the amount of assistance provided shall be presumed to be a direct result of the defendant's criminal conduct and shall be included in the amount of the restitution ordered.
"(B) The amount of assistance provided by the Restitution Fund shall be established by copies of bills submitted to [the board] reflecting the amount paid by the board and whether the services for which payment was made were for medical or dental expenses, funeral or burial expenses, mental health counseling, wage or support losses, or rehabilitation. Certified copies of these bills provided by the board and redacted to protect the privacy and safety of the victim or any legal privilege, together with a statement made under penalty of perjury by the custodian of records that those bills were submitted to and were paid by the board, shall be sufficient to meet this requirement.
"(C) If the defendant offers evidence to rebut the presumption established by this paragraph, the court may release additional information contained in the records of the board to the defendant only after reviewing that information in camera and finding that the information is necessary for the defendant to dispute the amount of the restitution order."
It is undisputed the board provided assistance to Doe totaling $13,114.48. This was done pursuant to the statutes governing the procedure by which crime victims may obtain compensation from the state restitution fund through the board. (Gov. Code, § 13950 et seq.) "Under those statutes, a victim or derivative victim is only eligible for compensation if, insofar as is relevant here, the injury was a direct result of a crime. (Gov. Code, § 13955, subds. (a), (e)(1) & (f).) The application for compensation must be verified under penalty of perjury by the person seeking compensation." (In re S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795, 810.) The board may reimburse the amount of medical-related expenses or mental health counseling-related expenses incurred by the victim that were "necessary as a direct result of the crime." (Gov. Code, § 13957, subds. (a)(1), (2).) The board may also reimburse the victim for "the expense of installing or increasing residential security." (Id., subd. (a)(5).) "Before payment can be made, the board 'shall verify with hospitals, physicians, law enforcement officials, or other interested parties involved, the treatment of the victim or derivative victim, circumstances of the crime, amounts paid or received by or for the victim or derivative victim, and any other pertinent information deemed necessary by the board.'" (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 810, quoting Gov. Code, § 13954, subd. (a).)
"In addition, administrative regulations, which were adopted by the board for the purpose of enforcing and implementing the code sections, and which have the force and effect of law [citation], require applicants for assistance to submit a complete statement of losses directly related to the crime ...." (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 810-811.) Under these regulations, applicants for assistance must provide "the date or dates that medical, mental health or other professional services were provided to the victim . . . and a description of the services provided along with a statement that the services were in fact received and that such services were required as a direct result of the qualifying crime and for no other reason." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 649.7, subd. (a)(5).) "If medical or mental health expenses are claimed to have been incurred as a direct result of the qualifying crime," the applicant must also provide "an itemized statement from the professional provider for all medical or mental health expenses incurred as of the date of the application including the license number of the professional certificate issued by the State of California or other jurisdiction to the medical or mental health practitioner providing the service as well as his or her business address and telephone number." (Id., subd. (b)(1).) The board may "require the submission of mental health treatment session or progress notes in order to determine whether the treatment will best aid the victim . . . and is necessary as a direct result of the qualifying crime." (Ibid.) Pursuant to the regulation, "[i]f loss of income is claimed to have occurred as a direct result of the qualifying crime, the applicant shall produce evidence of income loss as well as a statement of disability from the treating medical or mental health provider." (Id., subd. (b)(2).) The application and any supplemental claims must be certified under penalty of perjury. (Id., subd. (d).)
C. The Trial Court Properly Admitted the Certified Redacted Bill Packet
The redacted bill packet from the board, which was admitted at the restitution hearing, included a certification the attached bills were submitted to and paid by the board on behalf of Doe in the amounts indicated. The certification further provided: "Pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4(f)(4)(B), these bills were redacted to protect the privacy and safety of the victims or may have been redacted consistent with any legal privilege. The California Victim's Bill of Rights Act of 2008 guarantees crime victims the right to prevent disclosure of 'confidential communications made in the course of medical or counseling treatment, or which are otherwise privileged or confidential by law.' In addition, pursuant to California Government Code section 13954(d), communications made during the course of a crime victim's application and verification process with the [board] are confidential."
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Loeffler to pay $13,114.48 in restitution. Contrary to Loeffler's contention, the redactions the board made to the documents were not overly broad. The receipts and other documents in the certified redacted bill packet indicated the dates services were provided, the amounts paid, and included other information identifying the category of assistance it fell within. The board was required to redact the bills and other documents "to protect the privacy and safety of the victim or any legal privilege." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(4)(B).)
In the trial court, Loeffler asserted because of the "overly broad" redactions he was unable to determine where Doe received medical treatment and what medication she was prescribed and therefore he was unable to challenge the amount of restitution claimed. He was not entitled to this information, which had been properly redacted, absent him offering some "evidence to rebut the presumption established" by section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A). (Id., subd. (f)(4)(C).) This he did not do. Therefore, the court was not required to order the board to release additional information to Loeffler or conduct an in camera hearing.
The certified redacted bill packet provided a factual basis for the restitution ordered by the court. The trial court could rely on the board's certified redacted bill packet as evidence of the amounts paid and as prima facie evidence Doe's economic losses were directly related to Loeffler's criminal conduct. (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 811.) Accordingly, the restitution order was supported by substantial evidence and Loeffler suffered no due process violation.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: DELANEY, J. GOODING, J.