Opinion
G057511
03-24-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TRAN CAM LIU, Defendant and Appellant.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 01CF1723) OPINION Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed. Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Tran Cam Liu was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a).) Liu appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. Because section 1170.95 applies only to murder convictions, the trial court properly denied Liu's petition. Liu's exclusion from section 1170.95 did not violate his right to equal protection. We affirm the court's order.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. --------
FACTS
Liu was an active participant in the Westside Asian Boys gang. In October 2000, Liu and his fellow gang members went to the Block of Orange, where they observed a fight between Westside Asian Boys and rival gang members. After police intervened to stop the fight, Liu and some of his fellow gang members followed rival gang members into a parking lot with the intent to continue fighting. During the parking lot fight, members of Westside Asian Boys stabbed two of the rival gang members, one of whom died. Liu participated in the fight and knew it was reasonably foreseeable that deadly force would be used by his fellow gang members against the rivals.
Liu was initially prosecuted for, among other things, murder. Ultimately, he pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), as a lesser included offense of the murder charge, and one count of street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Liu to a term of six years and eight months in prison.
In 2019, Liu filed a petition under the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437), which was codified as section 1170.95. The trial court denied Liu's petition.
DISCUSSION
Liu asserts that, notwithstanding his plea to voluntary manslaughter, he was prosecuted for murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, and therefore, entitled to a resentencing hearing. We disagree, and affirm the trial court's order denying Liu's petition.
I. Application
A. Underlying Law
S.B. 1437, "amended sections 188 and 189 and added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code, significantly modifying the law relating to accomplice liability for murder." (People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1098-1099), review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175 (Lopez); (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1) [while review pending may rely on for persuasive value]).) Section 1170.95, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part, "A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . ." Section 1170.95 does not mention the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
The Legislature enacted S.B. 1437 for the expressed purpose of "amend[ing] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (§§ 188, 189, as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing under section 1170.95, the court must issue an order to show cause and, absent a waiver and stipulation by the parties, hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the petitioner. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) A prima facie showing under section 1170.95, requires the following: (1) an accusatory pleading was filed against the petitioner allowing the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) he or she was convicted of first or second degree murder following a trial, or accepted a plea offer to first or second degree murder in lieu of trial, at which he or she could have been so convicted; and (3) that he or she could not be convicted of murder due to the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) B. Analysis
Liu argues he made a prima facie showing under section 1170.95 because the statute must be construed to apply to defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter. We are not persuaded.
"When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's purpose in enacting the law." (In re H.W. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1068, 1073.) "We first look to the words of the statute, as they are generally the most reliable indicators of the legislation's purpose." (Ibid.)
By its express terms, section 1170.95, subdivision (a), authorizes only a person "convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated . . . ." (Ibid.) Section 1170.95 does not mention manslaughter but instead repeatedly and exclusively references murder. This makes plain the statute limits relief only to qualifying persons who were convicted of murder. "Manslaughter, while a lesser included offense of murder, is clearly a separate offense . . . ." (People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 946, 960 (Strickland).)
Our colleagues in the Second District addressed a similar issue in Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at 1087. The Lopez court concluded section 1170.95 excluded any relief for individuals not convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory. (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1104-1105.) It noted this conclusion was supported by the statute's plain language and legislative history. (Id. at p. 1105.) In citing section 1170.95's repeated use of the term "murder" and the absence of the use of the term "attempted murder," the court concluded the Legislature's intention to limit relief to those convicted of the completed crime of murder was clear. (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.) We find the Lopez court's reasoning persuasive. Here, like the attempted murder count in Lopez, voluntary manslaughter is not an enumerated crime entitled to resentencing under Section 1170.95. "Section 1170.95, subdivision (a), authorizes only those individuals 'convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory' to petition for relief; and the petition must be directed to 'the petitioner's murder conviction.' Similarly, section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(1), authorizes the court to hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate 'the murder conviction.'" (Ibid.) Section 1170.95, does not reference the crime of voluntary manslaughter and refers exclusively to murder offenses. Because they are separate offenses, the Legislature's inclusion of one and exclusion of the other makes clear only those convicted of murder can petition for resentencing. Section 1170.95's resentencing provisions do not apply to the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
II. Equal Protection
Liu also asserts S.B. 1437 violates his constitutional right to equal protection. He claims it is irrational discrimination to provide section 1170.95 relief for murderers, but to deny it to those convicted of manslaughter. We disagree.
"'Guarantees of equal protection embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution prohibit the state from arbitrarily discriminating among persons subject to its jurisdiction.'" (People v. Chavez (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) "The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law's legitimate purposes must be treated equally. [Citation.] Accordingly, '[t]he first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.' [Citation.] 'This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but "whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.'" [Citation.]" (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 328.)
Generally, "'"[p]ersons convicted of different crimes are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes." [Citations.] "[I]t is one thing to hold . . . that persons convicted of the same crime cannot be treated differently. It is quite another to hold that persons convicted of different crimes must be treated equally." [Citations.]"' (People v. Barrera (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1565.)
Liu was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, which, as discussed above, is an offense separate from murder. (Strickland, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 960.) Liu stands convicted of a different crime than the one to which this ameliorative statute applies. Therefore, he is not similarly situated to individuals who may benefit from it.
Furthermore, even assuming two groups are similarly situated, there is no equal protection violation "provided that the classifications are made with a legitimate goal to be accomplished." (People v. Mora (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1483.) "[T]he Legislature's decision to limit sentencing reform at this time to offenders in cases of murder is certainly rational . . . The Legislature could have reasonably concluded reform in murder cases 'was more crucial or imperative.' [Citation.] . . . Second, the process created in section 1170.95 for those convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing court to vacate that conviction and to be resentenced is not costfree. The staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee estimated, if 10 percent of the inmates eligible for relief under SB 1437 petitioned the courts for resentencing, additional court workload costs would approximate $7.6 million. [Fn. omitted] The Committee's report expressed concern that this increase in workload 'could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources.' [Citation.] Additional expenditures would also be required to transport petitioners in custody to and from court hearings. [Citation.] [¶] In a world of limited resources, it is reasonable for the Legislature to limit the scope of reform measures to maintain the state's financial integrity." (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1111-1112.) We find no equal protection violation.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Liu's section 1170.95 petition.
O'LEARY, P. J. WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J. IKOLA, J.