Opinion
Submitted November 20, 2000
January 11, 2001.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Orgera, J.), rendered March 18, 1994, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (six counts), burglary in the first degree, robbery in the second degree (six counts), and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (seven counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Arza Rayches Feldman, Roslyn, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Ellen C. Abbot, and Ushir Pandit of counsel), for respondent.
Before: CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, HOWARD MILLER, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by vacating the convictions of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, vacating the sentences imposed thereon, and dismissing those counts of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the comments made by a prosecution witness during his testimony and by the prosecutor during summation, even if viewed cumulatively, do not require reversal (see, People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396; People v. Ortiz, 54 N.Y.2d 288). In addition, the Supreme Court properly imposed a mandatory surcharge on the defendant for each of the six counts of robbery in the first degree, as each count pertained to a separate and distinct act of taking property from a separate victim (see, Penal Law § 60.35; People v. Ochoa, 263 A.D.2d 359).
The defendant's contention that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him, which is raised for the first time on appeal in his supplemental pro se brief, isunpreserved for appellate review and we decline to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Walker, 251 A.D.2d 356). Additionally, the defendant was provided with meaningful representation, and his contentions with respect thereto are either without merit or amount to nothing more than disagreement with trial tactics (see, People v. Hobot, 84 N.Y.2d 1021; People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705).
However, the defendant's convictions of seven counts of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree must be vacated and those counts of the indictment dismissed, as those convictions merged with the convictions on the counts of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree (see, People v. Yong Yu Ye, ___ A.D.2d ___ [Appellate Division Docket No. 1994-03302, decided herewith]; see also, People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146; People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763).