Opinion
July 6, 1970
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 2, 1968, convicting him of robbery in the third degree and grand larceny in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. On cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor was permitted to impeach defendant by eliciting the fact that he had been dishonorably discharged from the United States Army after having been convicted of grand larceny by an Army court-martial. We are of the opinion that no error was thus committed. It has been held that a court-martial conviction for an act which, if committed in this State, would be a felony, may be used as a predicate for second-felony offender treatment ( People ex rel. Fajen v. Fay, 8 A.D.2d 745; People ex rel. Stewart v. Wilson, 257 App. Div. 555). Accordingly, it would seem logical that such a conviction may also be used to impeach a defendant's credibility in the same manner as a prior State conviction (former Penal Law, § 2444; CPLR 4513; Code Crim. Pro., § 392). Christ, P.J., Rabin, Hopkins, Munder and Martuscello, JJ., concur.