Opinion
1-18-2086
09-30-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DERRICK LEE, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 14 CR 06038 Honorable Luciano Panici, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Connors concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
CUNNINGHAM, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The defendant's convictions are affirmed, as the State proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated kidnapping; and the defendant's arguments concerning his Krankel hearing are rejected.
¶ 2 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant-appellant, Derrick Lee, was found guilty of three counts each of: home invasion, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery, as well as one count of residential burglary. The circuit court merged each of the three identical guilty counts into one count for each offense. The circuit court then sentenced Mr. Lee to 21 years' imprisonment for each offense of home invasion, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery, and 6 years' imprisonment for residential burglary. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. On appeal, Mr. Lee contends that the circuit court erred in finding him guilty of aggravated kidnapping because any temporary confinement of the victims was incidental to the other crimes, and that he was deprived of his constitutional rights because the circuit court conducted an unnecessary Krankel hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Mr. Lee was charged with home invasion, aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, residential burglary, and aggravated unlawful restraint for an incident that occurred on January 21, 2014. His case proceeded to a bench trial in which the following evidence was adduced.
¶ 5 On January 21, 2014, 30-year-old Chauntalayne Hawkins, her 6-year-old daughter, Chanel, and her mother, Euraina Hawkins, all lived together in an apartment at 4557 Imperial Drive in Richton Park, Illinois. On that day, Euraina's other granddaughter, a newborn baby, was also in the apartment and was napping with Euraina in the front room. Euraina testified that at about 4 p.m., she was awakened by Chauntalayne, who was about to leave the apartment to warm up her car prior to going shopping.
¶ 6 Chauntalayne testified that as she opened the back door to go outside, she saw someone standing at the door with a gun. She identified the person at the door with the gun as Mr. Lee. Both Chauntalayne and Euraina had known Mr. Lee for many years. Chauntalayne testified that she had dated Mr. Lee several years earlier, but at the time of the incident, they no longer had a romantic relationship and were just friends.
¶ 7 According to Chauntalayne, when she opened the back door and saw Mr. Lee, he asked her whether she had any money, and he pushed his way into the apartment. Euraina testified that she heard Mr. Lee and Chauntalayne arguing at the back door. She then saw Mr. Lee force Chauntalayne back into the apartment at gunpoint. Mr. Lee ordered the women to be quiet so as not to alert others in the apartment building. He then herded the entire family into Chauntalayne's bedroom at gunpoint, with Euraina holding the newborn baby. He again told them not to make any noise. Euraina testified that she was familiar with firearms because of her prior employment experience as a security guard. She recognized the weapon that Mr. Lee brandished as a Glock. Mr. Lee continued demanding money while pointing the gun at Chauntalayne's head. Chauntalayne, Euraina, and Chanel sat on the floor with Euraina still holding the newborn baby. Chauntalayne testified that Mr. Lee threatened to kill them all if they did not give him money.
¶ 8 Eventually, Mr. Lee exited the bedroom and left the door slightly ajar. Chauntalayne was able to see through the cracked door that he was rummaging through Euraina's bedroom. Mr. Lee admonished the women not to leave Chauntalayne's bedroom or make any noise. Both Chauntalayne and Euraina testified that they heard sounds of items being thrown about as Mr. Lee searched through their things in the other rooms. Chauntalayne testified that eventually, Mr. Lee returned to her bedroom and took both of her cell phones, as well as her keys. Mr. Lee then left the apartment. When Chauntalayne heard the apartment door close and thought he was gone, she looked out of the window and saw Mr. Lee walking away. Chauntalayne told Euraina to call the police. Euraina eventually found her cell phone and called 911. Chauntalayne also called 911 from a neighbor's telephone. After Mr. Lee left, Chauntalayne noticed that three or four computers were missing and Euraina's suitcase was also gone.
¶ 9 At trial, Richton Park Police Sergeant Matthew Young testified that, in the course of investigating the incident, Mr. Lee's mother, Felicia Lee-Walker, turned over a large garbage bag containing several electronic items including laptop computers, a 20-inch rolling suitcase, a computer case, and a couple of computer battery chargers. Sergeant Young stated that Ms. Walker had retrieved the items and brought them to the police station at Mr. Lee's request while he was in custody. Chauntalayne identified the items as her belongings and the suitcase as Euraina's. Chauntalayne told the police that her cell phones which Mr. Lee had taken were not among the retrieved items.
¶ 10 At the close of the State's evidence, Mr. Lee moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. Mr. Lee declined to testify.
¶ 11 On June 21, 2016, the trial court found Mr. Lee guilty of three counts of home invasion, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery, as to each of the three victims, Euraina, Chauntalayne and Chanel. The court merged the guilty findings into one count for each offense. Additionally, the court found Mr. Lee guilty of one count of residential burglary.
¶ 12 The case was continued to August 2, 2016, for sentencing. However, on July 21, 2016, Mr. Lee filed a pro se motion claiming that his defense counsel was ineffective for: failing to investigate the facts of the case; failing to visit Mr. Lee in jail to discuss the case; failing to file a motion to quash and suppress arrest; and failing to get telephone records to bolster Mr. Lee's theory of defense. Mr. Lee made a number of other assertions, including the claim that he and Chauntalayne were a couple and their relationship continued after the incident which had resulted in the charges against him. He expressed general dissatisfaction with his defense counsel's representation. Mr. Lee informed the trial court that he intended to retain new counsel, and the trial court granted his defense counsel leave to withdraw at that time. Mr. Lee told the court that he needed a month to retain new counsel.
¶ 13 On August 1, 2016, Mr. Lee filed a pro se motion seeking a Krankel hearing, appointment of new counsel, a new trial, or in the alternative, a finding of a lesser included offense. Mr. Lee's motion contained similar complaints regarding the ineffectiveness of his defense counsel as voiced previously in his prior motion. Mr. Lee also expanded his criticism of his defense counsel to include: the failure to interview and call witnesses; the failure to show that Mr. Lee had keys to the apartment where the incident occurred; the failure to properly impeach Chauntalayne as a witness; and dissuading Mr. Lee from testifying by telling him that the State "would eat him alive" if he testified.
¶ 14 On September 2, 2016, new posttrial counsel appeared on Mr. Lee's behalf and requested a continuance so that he could obtain a transcript of the trial. On November 15, 2016, posttrial counsel filed a motion for a new trial. On December 19, 2017, posttrial counsel refiled Mr. Lee's pro se Krankel motion, with leave of court, because posttrial counsel suggested to the court that he and the State were both unaware of the previously filed -- and apparently still pending -- Krankel motion. The trial court acknowledged that a copy of the pro se Krankel'motion was not in the court file. After the Krankel'motion was refiled, the trial court asked the parties whether they wanted the matter "set for a hearing or status." The State responded that the motion should be set for a hearing. On the next court date, posttrial counsel informed the trial court that Mr. Lee's prior defense counsel was unable to be present. The trial court said that since the matter was a Krankel hearing, defense counsel's presence was essential. The court then continued the matter "for [a] "Krankel hearing."
¶ 15 On March 21, 2018, with posttrial counsel present, the trial court conducted a hearing on Mr. Lee's Krankel motion which he originally filed pro se on July 21, 2016, and which was refiled by posttrial counsel on December 19, 2017, alleging ineffectiveness of defense counsel. In response to inquiries from the court, posttrial counsel declined to amend the pro se motion. Although present, posttrial counsel declined to participate in the hearing. Instead, he asked the court to conduct all of the questioning of both Mr. Lee and prior defense counsel.
¶ 16 When questioned by the trial court regarding why he thought his defense counsel was ineffective, Mr. Lee reiterated all of his complaints. Additionally, he claimed, inter alia, that defense counsel had aggressively demanded money from Mr. Lee's family, treated Mr. Lee's mother disrespectfully, did not gather the evidence necessary for his defense, and generally did not have a trial strategy. Mr. Lee also made much of the fact that his defense counsel failed to obtain bank and school records. The trial court asked for clarification as to how those records would prove his innocence. Mr. Lee asserted that the records would show that he actually lived at Chauntalayne's apartment at the time of the incident.
¶ 17 When the trial court questioned defense counsel, counsel denied all of Mr. Lee's allegations. He defended the manner in which he prepared and presented Mr. Lee's defense. Defense counsel also disagreed with Mr. Lee's claim that he never investigated Mr. Lee's school and bank records, which Mr. Lee claimed could have exonerated him.
¶ 18 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Mr. Lee's Krankel motion. In so ruling, the trial court stated that although Mr. Lee claimed to the contrary, he was clearly not living at Chauntalayne's apartment when the crimes occurred. Therefore, the court concluded that none of the records which Mr. Lee claimed his defense counsel failed to acquire, would have exonerated him from the charges.
¶ 19 On May 31, 2018, posttrial counsel filed an amended motion for a new trial, and on June 11, 2018, posttrial counsel amended that motion for a second time. Following a hearing on the second amended motion for a new trial, the trial court denied the motion on August 27, 2018.
¶ 20 On September 26, 2018, the case proceeded to sentencing. The trial court sentenced Mr. Lee to 21 years' imprisonment for the one merged count of armed robbery, 21 years' imprisonment for the one merged count of home invasion, 21 years' imprisonment for the one merged count of aggravated kidnapping, and 6 years' imprisonment for the residential burglary. All sentences were to be served concurrently.
¶ 21 Mr. Lee's motion to reconsider sentence was denied. He subsequently filed a notice of appeal.
¶ 22 ANALYSIS
¶ 23 We note that we have jurisdiction to consider this matter, as Mr. Lee filed a timely notice of appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); R. 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021).
¶ 24 Mr. Lee presents the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the State proved him guilty of aggravated kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether the trial court erroneously conducted an "unnecessary" Krankel hearing; and (3) whether the trial court erred in not appointing Mr. Lee new counsel and in ruling against Mr. Lee in the Krankel hearing.
¶ 25 Mr. Lee first argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated kidnapping. He claims that the aggravated kidnapping conviction cannot stand because the kidnaping was incidental to the other crimes of armed robbery and residential burglary. Specifically, Mr. Lee asserts that the detention of the victims was brief and "could not have been more than 53 seconds," and that the detention was only for the purpose of committing the other offenses, which created no independent danger to the victims. He asks this court to reverse his conviction for aggravated kidnapping.
¶ 26 The State has the burden of proving each element of an offense, beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the proper standard of review is; whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. A criminal conviction will not be reversed for insufficient evidence unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Id.
¶ 27 The operative offense in this case is aggravated kidnapping pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/10- 2(a)(3) (West 2020). "A person commits the offense of kidnapping when he or she knowingly: (1) and secretly confines another against his or her will; (2) by force or threat of imminent force carries another from one place to another with intent secretly to confine that other person against his or her will; or (3) by deceit or enticement induces another to go from one place to another with intent secretly to confine that other person against his or her will." 720 ILCS 5/10-1(a) (West 2020) And a person commits the offense of aggravated kidnaping when he "commits kidnapping and *** inflicts great bodily harm, other than by the discharge of a firearm, or commits another felony upon his or her victim." 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a) (3) (West 2020).
¶ 28 A defendant should not be convicted of kidnapping where the asportation or confinement of the victim was merely incidental to another crime. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill.2d 173, 199 (1989). This court has established four factors to consider when determining whether an asportation or confinement is merely ancillary to another offense, or whether it rises to the level of an independent crime of kidnapping. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill.2d 213, 225-26 (2009). These factors include: (1) the duration of the asportation or confinement; (2) whether the asportation or confinement occurred during the commission of a separate offense; (3) whether the asportation or confinement is inherent in the separate offense; and (4) whether the asportation or confinement created a significant danger to the victim independent of that posed by the separate offense. Id. The question of whether an asportation was incidental to another crime "challenges incriminating inferences that may have been drawn by the trier of fact from the evidence," and so the correct standard of review is that which applies to a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Sumler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123381, ¶ 53.
¶ 29 We begin our analysis with the first factor, the duration of the asportation or confinement. Although Mr. Lee asserts that the detention of Chauntalayne, Euraina, and Chanel was only 53 seconds, the actual time that they were confined in Chauntalayne's bedroom is in dispute. Notwithstanding, "it is well settled that a kidnaping conviction is not precluded by the brevity of the asportation." People v. Jackson, 331 Ill.App.3d 279, 294 (2002). In fact, this court has consistently upheld kidnapping convictions where the asportation lasted just a few minutes. See Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill.2d at 226.
¶ 30 Looking at the second factor, whether the asportation or confinement occurred during the commission of a separate offense, it weighs against Mr. Lee because the asportation occurred prior to, in addition to, and during, the robbery and burglary. Before Mr. Lee began going through the apartment and taking items, he forced Chauntalayne back inside the apartment as she was trying to leave, and then used a gun to force all the victims into the bedroom. Although Mr. Lee immediately began demanding money, he did not start rummaging through the apartment and taking items until after all the victims were confined to Chauntalayne's bedroom. Even after Mr. Lee was done taking items and exited the apartment, he left the victims inside the bedroom. Chauntalayne did not know that he had left until she saw him through the window, walking away.
¶ 31 The third factor, whether the asportation or confinement is inherent in the separate offense, also weighs against Mr. Lee. In order for asportation or confinement to be inherent in a separate offense, it must constitute an element of that offense. Sumler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123381, ¶ 59. And asportation and confinement are not elements of armed robbery and residential burglary.
¶ 32 Finally, we consider the fourth factor, whether the asportation or confinement created a significant danger to the victims independent of that posed by the separate offenses. Here, Mr. Lee forced the victims into the bedroom and confined them there by threatening them with a gun, which was unnecessary to burglarize the apartment. The fact that the victims in this case might have been shot if they did not obey Mr. Lee and remain quiet in the bedroom per Mr. Lee's demands, undoubtedly created a danger to them that was independent of the other offenses. Not to mention that the victims were confined inside their private residence where passersby were unlikely to hear and help them. Further, they were admonished by Mr. Lee to refrain from calling out, lest they attract attention. "The danger arose from the potential for more serious activity due to the privacy" of the location. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill.2d at 226.
¶ 33 Thus, after weighing all four factors, it is clear that the aggravated kidnapping offense was separate from the armed robbery and residential burglary offenses. We accordingly affirm Mr. Lee's aggravated kidnapping conviction.
¶ 34 Next, Mr. Lee argues that the trial court conducted an "unnecessary" Krankel hearing. He avers that, by the time the Krankel hearing was conducted, his defense counsel had already withdrawn and new posttrial counsel had been retained, which is "the whole point of conducting a Krankel inquiry." He thus claims that "[t]he trial court erred in using a process in which it proceeded as though [Mr.] Lee was unrepresented in order to conduct a Krankel hearing that was no longer necessary." In the alternative, Mr. Lee argues that the trial court deprived him of counsel at the hearing and erroneously concluded that he had not established a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Lee asks this court to remand the case, on either ground, for new posttrial proceedings to address his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
¶ 35 A pro se posttrial claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the common-law procedure developed by our supreme court in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (1984). The trial court is not required to automatically appoint new counsel when a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. People v. Lawson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180452, ¶ 40. Instead, when a defendant brings a pro se posttrial claim that trial counsel was ineffective, the trial court must conduct some type of inquiry, known as a Krankel inquiry, into the underlying factual basis of the claim. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11. If, based on the Krankel inquiry, the trial court determines that the defendant's claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. Id. However, if the defendant's allegations show possible neglect of the case, the trial court should appoint new counsel to argue the defendant's claim. People v. Boose, 2014 IL App (2d) 130810, ¶ 27. We review de novo whether the trial court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry. People v. Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 133741, ¶ 68.
¶ 36 Here, Mr. Lee claims that the trial court conducted a Krankel hearing that was "unnecessary" since his defense counsel had withdrawn and he already had new posttrial counsel. Interestingly, and in direct conflict to his other argument, Mr. Lee asserts that because the Krankel hearing was unnecessary, this court should remand this case back to the trial court for further posttrial proceedings on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In other words, although Mr. Lee has already received the relief he sought by filing a Krankel motion, he is now seeking other relief. It remains unclear what specific relief Mr. Lee is seeking or is available. It would be nonsensical for this court to remand the case for a new Krankel hearing based on the fact that the trial court already conducted a Krankel hearing and made a finding that defense counsel's work was not deficient.
¶ 37 Further, even though Mr. Lee claims that the Krankel hearing was unnecessary, he also argues that the trial court deprived him of counsel during the Krankel hearing by not appointing new counsel to represent him. We note that his posttrial counsel was present but chose not to participate in the hearing. However, as already discussed, the trial court first makes an inquiry to determine the merits of a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Only when the trial court determines that there was possible neglect in the defendant's case is it required to appoint counsel. See Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11. Since the trial court here determined that Mr. Lee's claims were unfounded, it appropriately did not appoint new counsel to argue those claims. Notably, even if the trial court had determined that new counsel was warranted to investigate Mr. Lee's claims, it would not have needed to appoint new counsel considering that Mr. Lee had, by then, retained new counsel.
¶ 38 Mr. Lee additionally claims that the trial court erroneously concluded that he failed to show possible neglect by defense counsel in his case. Yet, the record reflects that the trial court carefully considered Mr. Lee's allegations before rejecting them. In particular, the trial court questioned both Mr. Lee and his defense counsel about the evidence concerning where Mr. Lee lived at the time of the incident. The court noted, as do we, that his place of residence at the time of the incident, underpinned much of Mr. Lee's claims. The court made a sufficient inquiry to determine that Mr. Lee's Krankel allegations were baseless, and the record supports that determination. See People v. Moore, 207 Ill.2d 68, 78 (2003) (a brief discussion between the trial court and the defendant may be sufficient for a Krankel inquiry).
¶ 39 In sum, we reject Mr. Lee's arguments that his conviction for aggravated kidnapping was in error and that he's entitled to a new Krankel hearing. We accordingly affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 40 CONCLUSION
¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 42 Affirmed.