Summary
holding that the defendant's age when an offense was committed did not present an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction because Michigan circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and possess subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases, and because the "[d]efendant's age when the offense was committed does not pertain to the kind or character of the case, but rather constitutes a defendant-specific, particular fact."
Summary of this case from Brainard v. BrainardOpinion
Docket No. 143469. COA No. 295552.
2013-01-18
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Christopher Blayne KIYOSHK, Defendant–Appellee.
Prior report: Mich.App., 2011 WL 2162951.
Order
On October 10, 2012, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the June 2, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and REMAND this case to that court for consideration of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A circuit court's authority to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant charged with a felony committed as a minor constitutes a question of personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction. “Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court's abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending and is not dependent on the particular facts of the case.” People v. Lown, 488 Mich. 242, 268, 794 N.W.2d 9 (2011) (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). The circuit court possessed subject matter jurisdiction here, as “Michigan circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and unquestionably have [subject matter] jurisdiction over felony cases.” Id. Defendant's age when the offense was committed does not pertain to the “kind or character” of the case, but rather constitutes a defendant-specific, “particular fact[ ].” Whether defendant was of an age that made circuit court jurisdiction appropriate is thus a question of personal jurisdiction. See People v. Veling, 443 Mich. 23, 31–32, 504 N.W.2d 456 (1993) (noting that statutory procedures which divested the juvenile court of exclusive jurisdiction over qualifying juveniles who committed certain offenses operated to give “the circuit courts personal jurisdiction over those juveniles”) (emphasis added); accord Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1984) (“The age of the [juvenile] offender ... is merely a restriction on the personal jurisdiction possessed by a criminal court.”); State v. Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 122 (2001), quoting State v. Marks, 186 Ariz. 139, 920 P.2d 19, 22 (1996) (consequence of flawed transfer proceeding from juvenile to adult court is to “deprive the adult division of personal jurisdiction”); Sawyers v. State, 814 S.W.2d 725, 729 (1991) (absence of proper transfer order from juvenile to criminal court “cannot be said to affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction”); State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 537 A.2d 483, 488 (1988) (“[Q]uestions relating to the propriety of the transfer of a juvenile from the docket for Juvenile Matters to the regular criminal docket do not implicate the Superior Court's subject matter jurisdiction.”). “[A] party may stipulate to, waive, or implicitly consent to personal jurisdiction.” Lown, 488 Mich. at 268, 794 N.W.2d 9 (citations omitted). Therefore, by entering a guilty plea in the circuit court, and failing to contest the circuit court's jurisdiction, defendant implicitly consented to that court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.