Opinion
May 22, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Clabby, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment based upon the alleged deprivation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The record establishes that excluding the reasonable delays attributable to the defendant's competency proceedings and his competency status (see, CPL 30.30 [a]; People v Santana, 80 N.Y.2d 92, 101-103; People v Mizell, 138 A.D.2d 527, 528), the defendant was brought to trial within the proscribed period (see, CPL 30.30 [a]). We further find that the approximately 18-month delay from the commencement of the case until trial did not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a speedy trial (see generally, People v Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442).
Moreover, the defendant's sentence was neither harsh nor excessive (see, People v Delgado, 80 N.Y.2d 780; People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or do not warrant reversal. Bracken, J.P., Pizzuto, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.