Opinion
1-24-0327B
05-13-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY KASPRZYK, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. No. 24 DV 70752 Honorable William Fahy, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
COGHLAN, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.
¶ 2 Defendant Stanley Kasprzyk appeals from the trial court's order denying his pretrial release pursuant to the recent amendments to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq. (West 2022)), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act or Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See Pub. Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Defendant was arrested on February 3, 2024, and charged with numerous offenses, including unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(7)(i) (West 2022)), violation of an order of protection (720 ILCS 5/12-3.4(a)(1) (West 2022)), and possession of a weapon without a Firearm Owner's Identification Card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1), (2) (West 2022)).
¶ 5 The State filed a petition for pretrial detention under section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1). The State alleged that defendant was charged with the qualifying offense of domestic battery and defendant's pretrial release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, pursuant to subsection (a)(4). (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4)).
¶ 6 A hearing was held on February 4, 2024, before Judge William Fahy, at which the State proffered the following evidence: On January 14, 2024, defendant slammed the door on the foot of his wife, breaking her toe. The next day, defendant's wife obtained an emergency order of protection, but defendant was not served with the order. On January 22, 2024, pursuant to a petition filed by his wife, Judge James Carroll ordered that defendant be involuntarily committed. Judge Carroll also entered a "firearms restraining order requiring the defendant to relinquish all of his firearms."
¶ 7 On January 23, 2024, defendant left a box inside the school building where his wife worked. The police were alerted, and a bomb-sniffing dog was deployed to check for explosives. It was discovered that the box contained a photograph of defendant and his wife, a blanket, and chocolate. As a result of this incident, private security was hired for the school.
¶ 8 When law enforcement officers, including members of a SWAT team, went to defendant's home at 4938 N. Moody Street to detain defendant and retrieve firearms pursuant to Judge Carroll's orders, defendant refused to leave the home, resulting in a 14-hour "standoff." During the standoff, defendant called his wife and stated that "the officer by the tree better hide or he would shoot him." Defendant was eventually arrested, and officers recovered 14 firearms from the home. Defendant did not have a valid FOID card. After being admitted to Chicago Behavioral Hospital the next day, defendant called his wife from the hospital and told her he wanted to "come home."
¶ 9 On January 29, 2024, the emergency order of protection entered on January 15, 2024, was amended to include the address of 4938 N. Moody Street, the home defendant shared with his wife. When law enforcement officers returned to the home, they recovered 11 more firearms and ammunition from a location behind a wall in the basement. Cook County Sheriffs served defendant with the order of protection on January 31, 2024.
¶ 10 While recognizing that defendant had no prior criminal history, the State argued that no "condition or combination of conditions can mitigate [defendant's] risk to the victim or the community" based on the facts proffered. The State also argued that the proof is evident and the presumption great that defendant committed domestic battery, an eligible offense under the Act. The State added that "the victim is here. She did not want to come to the courtroom because she is afraid, but wanted the State's Attorney's Office to know how concerned she is and wants the defendant detained."
¶ 11 Defense counsel responded that there was not "clear and convincing evidence" that the offenses for which the State filed their petition were intentional or that defendant "actually poses a real threat to any person, persons, or the community." While acknowledging "a lot of court and law enforcement intervention" in a short period of time, counsel argued that those facts were not related to the domestic battery and "came before that order of protection was actually served."
¶ 12 The trial court found that the State proved by "clear and convincing" evidence that defendant committed the offense of domestic battery. The court also found that "[t]here is not only the concern with regards to *** the crime of violence that was committed against this particular victim, but I'm also concerned about the safety of others." The court emphasized that when law enforcement arrived at defendant's home "for the purposes of removing firearms *** defendant refused to allow law enforcement access" or obey "simple commands *** to give up his firearms." Defendant also caused a 14-hour standoff with law enforcement while he was in possession of several firearms, including a machine gun *** [and] called the victim during the standoff and made a threat towards one of the police officers who was outside." Finding that defendant "created a very dangerous situation for others" the court concluded that he posed "a real and present threat to the safety of others should he be released, not just the victim in this case."
¶ 13 Based on defendant's failure "to comply with orders issued by the Court" and law enforcement, the court had "zero confidence that he would comply with any orders of release." In considering the lesser restriction of pretrial electronic monitoring, the court noted that "electronic monitoring is far from failsafe" and would not "prevent the defendant from committing crimes *** and possessing firearms." The court ordered that the defendant be detained and have no contact with his wife during the pendency of the proceedings.
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case."
¶ 16 Pursuant to article 110 of the Code, as amended, "[a]ll defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release" and pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e) (West 2022). After filing a timely verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense; defendant's pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or that defendant is a flight risk; and that less restrictive conditions would not mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant's willful flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e), (f) (West 2022).
¶ 17 The State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or combination of conditions" contained within section 110-10(b) of the Code could mitigate "the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community *** [or] the defendant's willful flight." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). If a defendant is detained, at each subsequent pretrial hearing, "the judge must find that the continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons of the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant's willful flight from prosecution." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022).
¶ 18 We review the trial court's ultimate determination regarding pretrial release for an abuse of discretion (People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 10 (citing People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9)), while we review the trial court's factual findings under the manifest weight of the evidence standard (People v. Rodriguez, 2023 IL App (3d) 230450, ¶ 8). See also People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the court's judgment is fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would agree with the court's position. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9. "A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented." People v. Deleon, 227 Ill.2d 322, 332 (2008).
There has been considerable disagreement regarding which standard of review applies to pretrial detention orders. See, e.g., People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 18 (applying only an abuse of discretion standard); People v. Pitts, 2024 IL App (1st) 232336, ¶ 29 (applying exclusively a manifest weight standard); People v. Sorrentino, 2024 IL App (1st) 232363, ¶ 34 (reviewing the denial of pretrial release de novo, but findings of historical fact for manifest error). Our conclusion would be the same under any of these standards.
¶ 19 Section 110-10(a) establishes a number of mandatory conditions that must be imposed for defendants released prior to trial. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(a) (West 2022). Section 110-10(b) provides a number of discretionary conditions that the trial court may impose, which include but are not limited to (1) restrictions on leaving Illinois without leave of court, (2) prohibitions on possessing firearms or other dangerous weapons, and (3) prohibitions on communicating with particular persons or classes of persons. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b)(0.05), (2), (3) (West 2022). Section 110-10(b) also authorizes the trial court to impose "[s]uch other reasonable conditions" if those conditions are individualized and the least restrictive means possible to ensure defendant's appearance in court and compliance with pretrial release rules, court procedures, and criminal statutes. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b)(9) (West 2022).
¶ 20 We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny pretrial release in this case. The State's evidence, which was not contested by defendant, reflected that he slammed a door on his wife's toe, causing her to seek and obtain an emergency order of protection. A week later, the court ordered that defendant be involuntarily committed and restrained from possessing firearms. The next day, defendant left a box at his wife's school, resulting in a bomb scare at the school. A SWAT team subsequently attempted to detain defendant at his home, triggering in a 14-hour "standoff' with law enforcement. During the standoff, defendant threatened to shoot a law enforcement officer. Twenty-five firearms, including a machine gun, were eventually recovered from defendant's home.
¶ 21 The court based its denial of release on "the nature and circumstances of not just this offense, but all of these offenses that are before the Court and the defendant's actions on January 23rd of 2024." The court reasonably found that no condition of release could mitigate the threat posed by defendant or his willful flight because, "If the defendant is not going to comply with orders issued by the Court, if he is not going to comply with simple orders from armed law enforcement, this Court has zero confidence that he would comply with any orders of release." The court explicitly considered the lesser restriction of pretrial electronic monitoring, but concluded that "electronic monitoring is far from failsafe" and would not "prevent the defendant from committing crimes *** and possessing firearms."
¶ 22 We are not convinced by defendant's reliance on People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753. In this case, the trial court was presented with more than just "the bare allegations that defendant has committed a violent offense" found to be insufficient in Stock. See id. ¶ 18. The record in this case establishes that the trial court considered the nature of the allegations along with the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest and his prior behavior before explicitly rejecting pretrial electronic monitoring as a viable condition of release.
¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 25 Affirmed.