Claims of selective enforcement of the laws are appropriately judged according to "ordinary equal protection standards." ( People v. Kail (1986), 150 Ill. App.3d 75, 77, 501 N.E.2d 979, 981, quoting Wayte v. United States (1985), 470 U.S. 598, 608, 84 L.Ed.2d 547, 556, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531.) Absent the involvement of a fundamental right or a suspect class, neither of which is relevant here, a challenged State action is presumed to be valid and will be sustained where the classification is rationally related to a legitimate State interest.

See United States v. Folk, 479 F.2d 616, 624 (7th Cir.1973) (criticizing "the apparently frequent, and often too easy, practice of simply dismissing all allegations of illegal discrimination in the enforcement of criminal laws with a reference to Oyler"). A criminal defendant initially has the burden of coming forward with facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the enforcement of the law in question was nondiscriminatory. City of Collinsville v. Seiber, 82 Ill. App. 3d 719, 726, 403 N.E.2d 90, 95 (1980); People v. Kail, 150 Ill. App. 3d 75, 77, 501 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1986) (in claim of selective enforcement, "challenged State action is presumed to be valid"). If defendant can make the required showing, he is entitled to a hearing on the issue.

We further note that the facts of this case do not rise to the level of selectivity found in cases where convictions have been reversed for selective prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (only persons prosecuted for refusal to answer census questions were those four defendants who vocally opposed the census, while silent offenders were not prosecuted); People v. Kail, 150 Ill.App.3d 75, 103 Ill.Dec. 662, 501 N.E.2d 979 (1986) (alleged prostitute prosecuted for failure to have bell on bicycle). Gilbert has invited our attention to a statement made by the deputy prosecutor at the preliminary hearing: