Opinion
01-20-2016
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Ras JOSEPH, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Elizabeth Budnitz of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Diane R. Eisner, and Kahlil C. Williams [Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP], of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Elizabeth Budnitz of counsel), for appellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Diane R. Eisner, and Kahlil C. Williams [Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP], of counsel), for respondent.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (J. Goldberg, J.), rendered January 25, 2013, convicting him of assault in the second degree and unlawful possession of marihuana, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court excused potential jurors based upon hardship without conducting a sufficient inquiry is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Valenko, 126 A.D.3d 1020, 6 N.Y.S.3d 142 ; People v. Boyd, 125 A.D.3d 992, 4 N.Y.S.3d 131 ; People v. Racks, 125 A.D.3d 692, 693, 2 N.Y.S.3d 598 ). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit (see People v. Bruce, 130 A.D.3d 938, 938, 14 N.Y.S.3d 417 ; People v. Johnson, 116 A.D.3d 883, 883, 983 N.Y.S.2d 447 ; People v. Umana, 76 A.D.3d 1111, 1112, 908 N.Y.S.2d 244 ; People v. Toussaint, 40 A.D.3d 1017, 1017–1018, 837 N.Y.S.2d 218 ).
The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence with respect to assault in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ; People v. Vincent, 80 A.D.3d 633, 634, 914 N.Y.S.2d 298 ).
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ; People v. Vincent, 80 A.D.3d at 634, 914 N.Y.S.2d 298 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to that crime was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ; People v. Pelosi, 128 A.D.3d 733, 6 N.Y.S.3d 493 ).