Opinion
07-25-2024
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Angelo JONES, Appellant.
Craig Meyerson, Peru, for appellant. Elizabeth M. Crawford, District Attorney, Malone (Alyxandra Stanczak of counsel), for respondent.
Craig Meyerson, Peru, for appellant.
Elizabeth M. Crawford, District Attorney, Malone (Alyxandra Stanczak of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Aarons, Lynch and McShan, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Franklin County (Robert G. Main Jr., J.), rendered June 29, 2020, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of assault in the second degree.
Defendant was indicted and charged with attempted assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, stemming from an incident wherein defendant stabbed an individual. Defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree in satisfaction of the indictment with the understanding that the prison sentence imposed would be no longer than seven years, and he waived his right to appeal. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant, as a second felony offender, to six years in prison followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.
We affirm. Initially, we reject defendant’s challenge to the waiver of the right to appeal. The record reflects that County Court advised defendant that a waiver of the right to appeal was a condition of the plea agreement and explained that the right to appeal was separate and distinct from the trial-related rights forfeited by a guilty plea, and defendant affirmed his understanding thereof (see People v. Dobbs, 217 A.D.3d 1275, 1276, 192 N.Y.S.3d 327 [3d Dept. 2023]; People v. Robinson, 213 A.D.3d 1002, 1002-1003, 181 N.Y.S.3d 470 [3d Dept. 2023]). County Court confirmed that defendant had discussed the waiver with counsel and "[a]lthough County Court was imprecise in limiting the rights to appeal retained by defendant after an appeal waiver, we are satisfied that defendant understood that some appellate review survived the waiver" (People v. Cook, 219 A.D.3d 1022, 1022, 192 N.Y.S.3d 804 [3d Dept. 2023] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 1080, 202 N.Y.S.3d 771, 225 N.E.3d 890 [2023]; see People v. Waldron, 208 A.D.3d 1509, 1510–1511, 174 N.Y.S.3d 518 [3d Dept. 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1114,186 N.Y.S.3d 827, 208 N.E.3d 55 [2023]). Accordingly, we find that defendant’s appeal waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary (see People v. Cook, 219 A.D.3d at 1023, 192 N.Y.S.3d 804; People v. Nixon, 206 A.D.3d 1381, 1382, 168 N.Y.S.3d 907 [3d Dept. 2022]; People v. Williams, 189 A.D.3d 1978, 1980, 138 N.Y.S.3d 690 [3d Dept. 2020], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1165, 160 N.Y.S.3d 686, 181 N.E.3d 1114 [2022]). Given defendant’s valid appeal waiver, his challenge to the severity of his sentence is precluded (see People v. Gayle, 221 A.D.3d 1061, 1062, 199 N.Y.S.3d 720 [3d Dept. 2023], lv denied 41 N.Y.3d 1002, 2024 WL 2925173 [2024]; People v. Dobbs, 217 A.D.3d at 1276, 192 N.Y.S.3d 327).
Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Aarons, Lynch and McShan, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.