Opinion
No. 813 KA 20-01088
11-17-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. SHANE JONES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JULIE CIANCA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (CLEA WEISS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT
JULIE CIANCA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (CLEA WEISS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., BANNISTER, GREENWOOD, NOWAK, AND DELCONTE, JJ
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Charles A. Schiano, Jr., J.), rendered January 13, 2020. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree and assault in the second degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his guilty plea, of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]) and assault in the second degree (§ 120.05 [2]). Preliminarily, as defendant contends and as the People correctly concede, the record does not establish that defendant validly waived his right to appeal. Supreme Court's "oral waiver colloquy and the written waiver signed by defendant together 'mischaracterized the nature of the right that defendant was being asked to cede, portraying the waiver as an absolute bar to defendant taking an appeal and the attendant rights to counsel and poor person relief, as well as a bar to all postconviction relief, and there is no clarifying language in either the oral or written waiver indicating that appellate review remained available for certain issues'" (People v Johnson, 192 A.D.3d 1494, 1495 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 965 [2021]; see People v Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 564-566 [2019], cert denied __US __, 140 S.Ct. 2634 [2020]; People v Benjamin-Foster, 215 A.D.3d 1277, 1277 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 927 [2023]). Although we are thus not precluded from reviewing defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence, we nonetheless perceive no basis in the record for the exercise of our authority to reduce the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]).