Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. BF123596-A Michael E. Dellostritto, Judge.
Linda Zachritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and J. Robert Jibson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J. and Franson, J.
A jury convicted appellant, Julius M. Jones, of two counts of receiving a stolen vehicle (counts 1 & 4/Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)) and one count of offering a false or forged instrument to be recorded (count 3/§ 115, subd. (a)). In a separate proceeding Jones admitted a prior conviction enhancement (§ 666.5) in counts 1 and 4 and five prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In another separate proceeding, the court found true an on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1) in counts 1 and 3.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
On November 16, 2009, the court stayed the on-bail enhancement, struck two prior prison term enhancements, and sentenced Jones to an aggregate term of eight years eight months: the upper term of four years on count 1, a consecutive eight-month term on count 3, a consecutive one-year term on count 4, and three one-year prior prison term enhancements.
On appeal, Jones contends: 1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction on count 3; and, alternatively, 2) that his conviction on count 3 is preempted by a more specific misdemeanor statute. We will affirm.
The facts are limited to those underlying count 3 because Jones has not raised any issues as to any other counts.
The evidence at trial established that on November 25, 2007, someone stole Dan Padilla’s Aztec brand flatbed trailer. Padilla reported the theft to the Bakersfield Police Department on December 1, 2007.
On April 16, 2008, the trailer was being hauled by a big rig driven by Ramon Gutierrez when it passed Padilla as he drove on Highway 99. Padilla followed the trailer and called 9-1-1. After a California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer pulled the big rig over, CHP Auto Theft Investigator Art Guerra arrived on the scene. Guerra discovered that the vehicle identification number (VIN) on the trailer began with the letters C-A and had been crudely stamped on.
Guerra testified that trailer VIN numbers are assigned by the manufacturer of the trailer except when the trailer is a special construction vehicle, i.e., a homemade trailer constructed from trailer parts. Special construction vehicles are taken to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) or the CHP and the DMV assigns them a VIN number. VIN numbers assigned to special construction vehicles begin with the letters C-A and are issued on a blue sticker that is affixed to the front of the trailer in a location that is visible to officers. The DMV would not have stamped a VIN number on a special construction vehicle. Guerra further testified that the Aztec trailer was not a special construction vehicle and that the VIN number stamped on that trailer belonged to a special construction vehicle that was registered to Jones on August 10, 2006.
Flavio Solis bought the Aztec trailer for $1,500 from Jones on November 25, 2007. Jones gave Solis the certificate of title for the special construction vehicle Jones registered earlier on August 10, 2006, signed it in front of Solis, and told him that it was for the Aztec trailer.
On December 12, 2007, Solis went to the DMV and used the 2006 certificate of title provided by Jones to register the trailer in his name. Solis sold the trailer on January 17, 2008, to Ramon Gutierrez for $2,000. Gutierrez took a certificate of title, and other paperwork provided by Solis, and registered the trailer in his name with DMV.
DISCUSSION
The Sufficiency of the Evidence
Jones contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for violating section 115 because the record does not contain any evidence that the certificate of title he provided Solis was false or forged. We disagree.
“When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction we apply the substantial evidence standard. Under that standard the reviewing court examines the entire record to determine whether or not there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime has been committed. In reviewing that evidence the appellate court does not make credibility determinations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's decision. We do not weigh the evidence but rather ask whether there is sufficient reasonable credible evidence of solid value that would support the conviction. [Citation.]” (People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 987-988.)
Section 115, subdivision (a) provides:
“Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.”
“[S]ection 115 was designed to prevent the recordation of spurious documents knowingly offered for record. [Citation.]” (Generes v. Justice Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 681-682 (Generes).) “The core purpose of … section 115 is to protect the integrity and reliability of public records.” (People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1061.)
In Generes, the defendant recorded a deed that purported to transfer from herself to herself an easement over land she did not own. After the Redding Justice Court denied the defendant’s demur to a complaint charging her with violating section 115, she petitioned the superior court for a writ of prohibition. The superior court issued a peremptory writ stating:
“It appears from the face of the complaint that Defendant filed a document which was exactly what it purported to be: to wit, a deed from herself to herself granting herself an easement over land she did not own. The court does not rule that this conduct is legal. It merely states now that it is not a violation of … [s]ection 115.” (Generes, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 681.)
The People appealed arguing that the trial court applied an overly narrow construction of the word “false.” (Generes, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 681.)
In reversing the superior court’s order, the Generes court stated:
“Here the lack of an ownership interest in the land goes to the deception itself. If Generes did not own the interest she purported to convey, the instrument she filed was clearly false. Having no right to grant or convey an easement, her recording of a deed transferring an easement would establish a cloud on the title of those persons who lawfully owned interests in the land. A title searcher encountering the spurious document who acted upon it as genuine would of course be materially deceived.” (Generes, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 682.)
In responding to the defendant’s claim that a violation of section 115 required a forged instrument the court stated, in pertinent part,
“[S]ection 115 differentiates between the two categories, clearly proscribing either a false or a forged instrument. Obviously, as in the present case, an instrument may have the effect of defrauding one who acts on it as genuine even though it does not bear a forged signature or otherwise meet the technical requirements of a forged instrument.” (Generes, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 682.)
Here, Jones gave Solis the certificate of title for a special construction vehicle registered in Jones’s name, falsely representing it as the certificate of title for the stolen Aztec trailer he sold Solis, knowing Solis would use it to obtain a certificate of title for the Aztec trailer. Like the defendant in Generes, Jones did not own the interest he purported to convey. Further, even though the certificate of title was genuine and its contents true as to Jones’s special construction vehicle, it was spurious and false as to the stolen Aztec trailer Jones sold to Solis. Moreover, the filing of the certificate of title for the special construction vehicle as the certificate of title for the Aztec trailer put a cloud on the title of the Aztec trailer and materially deceived Solis and Gutierrez who each acted on the certificate of title as if it was genuine. Thus, we conclude that Jones violated section 115 when he gave Solis the certificate of title for his special construction vehicle and falsely represented it as the certificate of title for the Aztec trailer.
Jones contends he did not violate section 115 because the certificate of title he gave Solis was genuine, not false, albeit as to the Aztec trailer. In support of this contention he cites several cases which he contends “support a conclusion that the document in question must itself be forged or falsified to constitute a [violation of section 115].” (See People v. Garfield (1985) 40 Cal.3d 192, 194 [attorney offered for probate a will that he altered without client’s knowledge]; Generes, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 681 [defendant recorded grant deed that purported to transfer interest she did not own from herself to herself]; People v. Garcia (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 297, 300 [defendant wrote bail bonds that were not originally issued by the surety as they should have been, were not reported to the surety, and for which surety was not given a percentage of the premiums collected]; People v. Parks (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 883, 885 [defendant altered restraining order and presented it to the marshal’s office]; People v. Tate (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 663, 665 [defendants submitted community service forms that contained hours that they did not work]; and People v. Wood (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 24, 26 [defendant submitted documents for several cars to DMV which contained false statements regarding dates of sale and non-operation].) However, none of these cases address the issue whether section 115 proscribes the use of a genuine document in a false manner as occurred here. Further, our holding is consistent with the core purpose of section 115 of protecting the “integrity and reliability of public records.” Accordingly, we reject Jones’s sufficiency of the evidence claim.
The Preemption Issue
Jones contends that his conviction for violating section 115 is preempted because the conduct underlying that conviction is subject to a more specific statute, Vehicle Code section 20. We will reject this contention.
Although this issue was accepted for review by the Supreme Court in People v. Murphy (July 7, 2011, S180181) __ Cal.4th __ [2011 Cal. Lexis 6795], the court recently issued an opinion in that case that resolved the appeal without reaching this issue.
“The preemption doctrine provides that a prosecution under a general criminal statute with a greater punishment is prohibited if the Legislature enacted a specific statute covering the same conduct and intended that the specific statute would apply exclusively to the charged conduct. [Citations.] To determine the applicability of this doctrine in a particular case, the courts have developed two alternative tests. Under these tests, a prosecution under the general statute is prohibited if: (1) ‘each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the [specific] statute’; or (2) ‘it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the [specific] statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Jones (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 455, 463.)
“Consideration must be given to the entire context surrounding the ‘special’ statute to determine the true overlap of the statutes and to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.” (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 503.) “The fact that the Legislature has enacted a specific statute covering much the same ground as a more general law is a powerful indication that the Legislature intended the specific provision alone to apply. Indeed, in most instances, an overlap of provisions is determinative of the issue of legislative intent and ‘requires us to give effect to the special provision alone in the face of the dual applicability of the general provision... and the special provision....’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 505–506.)
Vehicle Code section 20 provides that “[i]t is unlawful to use a false or fictitious name, or to knowingly make any false statement or knowingly conceal any material fact in any document filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles [(DMV)] or the [CHP].” (Emphasis added.) There is no jury instruction or published case defining the elements of Vehicle Code section 20. However, it is readily apparent from the statute that those elements would include proof that: (1) the defendant made a false statement or concealed a material fact; (2) did so knowingly; and (3) the statement was included in a document that was filed with the DMV or the CHP.
Here, however, although the certificate of title that Solis filed with DMV was a false document and not genuine as to the Aztec trailer for which it was filed, it did not contain any false statements or material omissions. Therefore, since Jones’s conduct did not violate Vehicle Code section 20, that section could not preempt his prosecution under section 115.
Jones cites People v. Wood, supra, 161 Cal.App.2d 24 in support of his preemption argument. In Wood, a car dealer was convicted of eight counts of violating section 115 by submitting to the DMV a Dealer’s Report of Sale and a Certificate of Non-Operation for four transactions with different buyers. Each of the documents contained a false statement: each Dealer’s Report of Sale contained the wrong sale date, whereas each Certificate of Non-Operation contained a false statement of when the vehicle had been nonoperational. The appellate court, however, reversed the defendant’s convictions finding that his convictions under section 115 were preempted by former Vehicle Code section 131, subdivision (d), (the predecessor of Veh. Code, § 20) which provided: “‘Any person who knowingly makes a false statement or conceals a material fact in any document required to be filed with the department as herein provided shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.’” (People v. Wood, supra, 161 Cal.App.2d at p. 27.)
Wood is easily distinguishable from the instant case because in Wood the defendant’s conduct in filing documents containing false statements with DMV violated section 115 and the predecessor statute of Vehicle Code section 20. Accordingly, we reject Jones’s contention that Vehicle Code section 20 preempted his conviction under section 115.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.