Opinion
363897
03-21-2024
In re CHRISTIAN AMARI JOHNSON. v. CHRISTIAN AMARI JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2014-517649-DJ
Before: GARRETT, P.J., and RIORDAN and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
At issue in this case is whether the imposition of a delayed sentence violates a juvenile defendant's due-process right to a presumption of innocence where he is only charged-not convicted-with additional crimes in a separate, unrelated case. In 2017, while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system, defendant, Christian Amari Johnson, pleaded guilty to one count of assault with intent to murder (AWIM). The trial court delayed imposing a prison sentence, subject to Johnson complying with the terms of juvenile probation until age 19, later extended to age 21. In 2022, the trial court imposed the delayed sentence of 220 to 330 months' imprisonment after Johnson was charged with open murder, AWIM, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm) in an unrelated Oakland County case. On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court's imposition of his delayed sentence violated his due-process right to be presumed innocent with respect to his new charges. Because Johnson's delayed sentence stemmed from his 2017 guilty plea to AWIM, he was no longer presumed innocent of that charge. Therefore, under MCR 3.956, the trial was permitted to impose the delayed sentence on the AWIM conviction after finding that Johnson's new charges constituted a violation of the terms of his probation. Accordingly, we affirm Johnson's sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Johnson first came under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system in 2014, when he was 13 years old, after he pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Johnson was ordered to participate in juvenile probation in an out-of-home placement. Over the next three years, Johnson successfully completed a myriad of rehabilitative services and was deescalated to in-home probation.
Then, in 2017, while still under the juvenile court's jurisdiction, Johnson was charged with one count of carjacking, two counts of AWIM, one count of armed robbery, and one count of felony-firearm. The trial court explained that this was a "designated case," meaning Johnson would be charged as an adult but the proceedings would take place in juvenile court. Johnson voluntarily entered into a plea agreement; in exchange for dismissal of his other charges, he pleaded guilty to one count of AWIM. The agreement also included a stipulation to place him in a secure program for juvenile detention, followed by a step-down program, with restitution and "other conditions" to be determined by the trial court. The trial court accepted Johnson's plea and entered a judgment of conviction.
At the next hearing, the trial court formulated a sentence of 216 to 360 months' imprisonment for Johnson's conviction. The court, however, delayed imposing the sentence and ordered that Johnson would be subject to juvenile probation in an out-of-home placement until he turned 19 years old. The terms of his probation required, among other conditions, that Johnson "not violate the criminal law of any unit of government." Additionally, the trial court repeatedly informed Johnson that it would have to impose his sentence if he "commit[ted] another crime" or was "charged with an offense" punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.
See MCL 712A.18(1)(o).
Johnson was placed in a secure residential facility, where he received mental health and educational services. By July 2019, he successfully completed programming at two different treatment centers and showed significant progress. At the commitment review hearing, the trial court, without any objection from Johnson, extended its jurisdiction over him from age 19 to 21 pursuant to MCR 3.945(B)(4). The court also entered an order deescalating Johnson to an in-home placement with his sister with continued mental health and educational services.
Over the next several months, Johnson remained compliant with the terms of his probation. This progress ended in June 2021, however, after Johnson was charged with, and bound over on, open murder, AWIM, and two counts of felony-firearm in Oakland County. Johnson's probation officer subsequently filed a petition for violation of probation, claiming that Johnson failed to comply with his probationary conditions by violating state law. The prosecutor also moved for imposition of Johnson's delayed sentence from his 2017 guilty plea for AWIM.
In October 2022, just two weeks before Johnson's 21st birthday, the trial court held a joint probation violation and final probation review hearing. The prosecutor requested that the trial court impose the delayed sentence because Johnson violated the terms of his probation, had not been rehabilitated, and presented a serious risk to public safety. By contrast, Johnson's counsel requested that the trial court close the case and claimed that it was "premature" to find a probation violation because the new charges had not yet been adjudicated. The trial court concluded that Johnson's new criminal charges constituted a violation of the terms of his probation and imposed the delayed sentence. The trial court sentenced Johnson within the "low range" of the sentencing guidelines with credit for time served. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a trial court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v Skinner, 502 Mich. 89, 131; 917 N.W.2d 292 (2018). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes." People v Coleman, 327 Mich.App. 430, 443; 937 N.W.2d 372 (2019) (cleaned up). "An alleged violation of a criminal defendant's due-process rights" is reviewed de novo. People v Horton, 341 Mich.App. 397, 401; 9898 N.W.2d 885 (2022). We also review de novo the interpretation and application of statutes and court rules. People v Parker, 319 Mich.App. 664, 669; 903 N.W.2d 405 (2017). De novo review means that we review an issue independently, without any required deference to the courts below. People v Bruner, 501 Mich. 220, 226; 912 N.W.2d 514 (2018).
III. DELAYED SENTENCE
Johnson argues that the trial court violated his due-process right to the presumption of innocence by imposing a delayed sentence when he was merely charged, not convicted, of additional crimes.
According to publicly available circuit court records, as of March 8, 2024, a jury recently found Johnson guilty as charged in the Oakland County case.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit governmental actions that deprive any person of liberty "without due process of law." U.S. Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. The right to due process includes a presumption of innocence. People v Beck, 504 Mich. 605, 621; 939 N.W.2d 213 (2019). "A defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence as to all charged conduct until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. But a defendant waives that right when they plead guilty. See People v Guyton, 511 Mich. 291, 298; 999 N.W.2d 393 (2023); MCR 6.302(B)(3) (explaining that a trial court must advise a defendant entering a guilty plea that they are giving up the right "to be presumed innocent until proved guilty").
Johnson also argues that the trial court violated his right to the presumption of innocence under Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as adopted by the United Nations. Article 11 states that "[e]veryone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence." Johnson identifies no authority suggesting that the UDHR creates an enforceable set of rights under Michigan law. And the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the UDHR is simply a statement of principles that "does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law" and does not "create obligations enforceable in the federal courts." Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-735; 124 S.Ct. 2739; 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004). Therefore, Johnson's claim of an alleged violation of the UDHR is meritless.
In designated cases in which a juvenile is convicted of a crime, trial courts are permitted to "impose any sentence upon the juvenile that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense for which the juvenile was convicted." MCL 712A.18(1)(o). Trial courts may also opt to enter "an order of disposition delaying imposition of sentence and placing the juvenile on probation upon the terms and conditions it considers appropriate[.]" Id. Under MCR 3.956(B), a trial court can impose a delayed sentence in two ways:
(1) Subsequent Conviction. If a juvenile placed on probation under an order of disposition delaying imposition of sentence is found by the court to have violated probation by being convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, or adjudicated as responsible for an offense that if committed by an adult would be a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, the court shall revoke probation and sentence the juvenile to imprisonment for a term that does not exceed the penalty that could have been imposed for the offense for which the juvenile was originally convicted and placed on probation.
(2) Other Violations of Probation. If a juvenile placed on probation under an order of disposition delaying imposition of sentence is found by the court to have violated probation other than as provided in subrule (B)(1), the court may impose sentence or may order any of the following for the juvenile:
(a) A change in placement.
(b) Community service.
(c) Substance abuse counseling.
(d) Mental health counseling.
(e) Participation in a vocational-technical program.
(f) Incarceration in the county jail for not more than 30 days if the present county jail facility would meet all requirements under federal law and regulations for housing juveniles, and if the court has consulted with the sheriff to determine when the sentence will begin to ensure that space will be available for the juvenile. If the juvenile is under 18 years of age, the juvenile must be placed in a room or ward out of sight and sound from adult prisoners.
(g) Other participation or performance as the court considers necessary. [MCR 3.956(B) (emphasis added)].
Thus, under MCR 3.956(B)(2), it is not necessary that a juvenile be convicted of a new crime in order to impose a delayed sentence. Rather, a trial court may impose a delayed sentence if it finds that a juvenile violated some other condition of their probation.
Additionally, for the trial court to impose a delayed sentence at a final review hearing, the prosecutor must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the juvenile has not been rehabilitated or presents a serious risk to public safety, and that "the best interests of the public would be served by the imposition of a sentence provided by law for an adult offender." MCR 3.956(A)(4)(b). In making this determination, the trial court must consider several factors, including the juvenile's participation in and the effect of treatment, past and present behavior, the potential for violent conduct, and whether the juvenile is likely to be dangerous if released. See MCR 3.956(A)(4)(a) and (b) (listing ten factors the trial court must consider when imposing a delayed sentence).
During the joint probation violation and final probation review hearing, the prosecutor submitted evidence in support of his claim that Johnson violated the terms of probation because he was bound over on charges of open murder, AWIM, and felony-firearm. Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that Johnson violated his probation under MCR 3.956(B)(2). The trial court also held the factors enumerated under MCR 3.956(A)(4)(a) and (b) weighed in favor of imposing the delayed sentence. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Johnson to 220 to 330 months imprisonment. The trial court was not sentencing Johnson on the new charges; it was merely imposing the original sentence connected to the 2017 plea agreement for his AWIM conviction.
As part of its analysis, the trial court noted that because Johnson would soon be turning 21 years old, and thus would no longer be under the court's jurisdiction, many of the alternative options provided by MCR 3.956(B)(2) were inapplicable.
On appeal, Johnson is not challenging the trial court's determination that there was sufficient evidence to prove that he violated the terms of his probation or that the factors under MCR 3.956(A)(4)(a) and (b) weighed in favor of imposing the delayed sentence. Instead, he is generally challenging the trial court's ability to impose the delayed sentence in the absence of a conviction for his new charges. Under the plain language of MCR 3.956(B)(2), a new conviction was not required for the trial court to find that Johnson violated the terms of his probation and to impose a delayed sentence on his underlying guilty plea to AWIM. Johnson's argument to the contrary reflects a misunderstanding of the presumption of innocence. By pleading guilty to AWIM in 2017, he willingly gave up his right to be presumed innocent of that charge. See MCR 6.302(B)(3). The trial court's initial choice to delay imposition of sentence did not change that fact. Nor did it violate Johnson's due-process rights for the court to use new charged offenses, for which Johnson independently retained a presumption of innocence, as a basis for finding a probation violation and imposing the delayed sentence.
We affirm.