Opinion
2018-04417 Ind. 97/17
06-16-2021
The People, etc., respondent, v. Tyrell Johnson, appellant.
Gary E. Eisenberg, New City, NY, for appellant. William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Anna Katharina Diehn of counsel), for respondent.
Submitted - May 24, 2021
Gary E. Eisenberg, New City, NY, for appellant.
William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Anna Katharina Diehn of counsel), for respondent.
HECTOR D. LASALLE, P.J. MARK C. DILLON ANGELA G. IANNACCI LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Edward T. McLoughlin, J.), rendered April 4, 2018, convicting him of driving while intoxicated, as a felony, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3) and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the conviction of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3) beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to that crime was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633).
However, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the conviction of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree. A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree when that person "intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference" (Penal Law § 195.05). The interference must be "in part at least, physical in nature" (People v Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98, 102), but "criminal responsibility should attach to minimal interference set in motion to frustrate police activity" (Matter of Davan L., 91 N.Y.2d 88, 91; see People v Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d 518, 524). Here, according to the arresting officers' testimony, the defendant was argumentative throughout the traffic stop and arrest-booking process, repeatedly refused to answer the officers' questions, and refused to participate physically in any way in the arrest-booking process, including refusing to stand for a photograph, to provide his fingerprints, or to sign a Miranda form (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436). The People concede that the defendant did not physically resist the officers, but argue that his conduct constituted physical interference because he refused to cooperate physically in the arrest-booking process. However, neither the defendant's conduct during the traffic stop nor his conduct during the arrest-booking process constituted a knowing, physical interference with, and disruption of, the official function being performed by the officers. The defendant did not struggle, physically resist, or do anything to interfere with the officers, and he did not intrude into, or get in the way of, any ongoing police activity (cf. Matter of Davan L., 91 N.Y.2d 88; Matter of Joshua C., 289 A.D.2d 1095). The defendant's passive unwillingness to cooperate with the officers during the traffic stop and arrest-booking process lacked the requisite intentional physical component (see People v Brooks, 171 A.D.3d 778, 780; Matter of Kendell R., 71 A.D.3d 553, 554). Accordingly, we vacate the conviction of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, vacate the sentence imposed thereon, and dismiss that count of the indictment.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court's Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371) reflected an appropriate balancing of the probative value of the defendant's prior convictions against the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant (see People v Beaupre, 170 A.D.3d 1031, 1033; People v Seymour, 77 A.D.3d 976).
The defendant contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. However, on this record, the defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for defense counsel's alleged shortcomings (see People v Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712; People v Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 709; People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court did not err in refusing to permit him to substitute counsel in the midst of trial. The defendant failed to set forth "specific factual allegations of 'serious complaints about counsel, '" so as to trigger the court's duty to make a minimal inquiry (People v Porto, 16 N.Y.3d 93, 100, quoting People v Medina, 44 N.Y.2d 199, 207; see People v Hayes, 179 A.D.3d 835, 835). Nevertheless, the court conducted an inquiry in which it permitted the defendant to "articulate his complaints about defense counsel" (People v Jones, 173 A.D.3d 1628, 1630), following which the court properly denied the defendant's request inasmuch as good cause does not exist where, as here, the defendant makes only generic complaints concerning defense counsel's representation (see People v Larkins, 128 A.D.3d 1436, 1441).
The defendant's contention that the prosecutor made improper remarks during summation is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Cunningham, 171 A.D.3d 1207, 1208). In any event, the challenged remarks were either within the broad bounds of permissible rhetorical comment, responsive to defense counsel's summation, or fair comment upon the evidence (see People v Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 399).
LASALLE, P.J, DILLON, IANNACCI and CHRISTOPHER, JJ, concur