Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA302813. Ruth A. Kwan, Judge.
Jonathan B. Steiner and Richard L. Fitzer, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Kenneth J. Kao, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Mohammed Johnson appeals from the judgment entered following his no contest plea to vandalism causing damage in excess of $400, a felony. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a).) Imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on formal probation for three years under certain terms and conditions, including that he obey all laws and submit his person and property to search or seizure at any time of the day or night with or without a warrant. He contends the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the search and seizure condition as part of the terms of his grant of probation. For reasons stated in the opinion, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The probation report states that on May 16, 2006, appellant “did maliciously . . . destroy . . . property; to wit, a Los Angeles Police Department patrol car window, belonging to the City of Los Angeles and said damage being over $400.” It also states while officers were conducting a battery investigation, “they heard the sound of exploding glass. The officers observed glass on the ground directly beneath the rear passenger window. . . .”
Appellant objected to the search and seizure term, arguing it was not rationally related to the offense to which he pled. Appellant argued this was “not a case where the alleged vandalism was done by means of paint or any other device. It was after [appellant] was detained in a police car that he allegedly kicked out a window.” In response, the court stated it was “still going to impose it.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the search and seizure condition as part of the terms of appellant’s grant of probation. We disagree. “The sentencing court has broad discretion to determine whether an eligible defendant is suitable for probation and what conditions should be imposed. [Citations.] Some probation conditions--particularly those involving confinement in county jail or payment of restitution and other fines and costs--are statutorily mandated or recommended in certain cases. [Citations.] Most conditions, however, stem from the sentencing court’s general authority to impose any ‘reasonable’ condition that it ‘may determine’ is ‘fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done . . . .’ [Citation.] [¶] [Our Supreme Court has] said that probation conditions which regulate conduct ‘not itself criminal’ must be ‘reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.’ [Citation.] As with any exercise of discretion, the sentencing court violates this standard when its determination is arbitrary or capricious or ‘“exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233-234.)
“‘The court may impose and require . . . [such] reasonable conditions[] as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)
“The classic formulation of a trial court’s power to impose probation conditions is taken from People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 . . . where our Supreme Court stated: ‘A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .” [Citation.]’” (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65, fn. omitted.)
While appellant cites People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827 as an example of a case where the Court of Appeal reversed a search condition as unreasonable, that same court subsequently declined to follow Keller as “inconsistent with subsequent case authority from both the United States and California Supreme Courts.” (People v. Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 68.) The court in Balestra observed, “[a]s our Supreme Court has . . . made clear, a warrantless search condition is intended to ensure that the subject thereof is obeying the fundamental condition of all grants of probation, that is, the usual requirement (as here) that a probationer ‘obey all laws.’ Thus, warrantless search conditions serve a valid rehabilitative purpose, and because such a search condition is necessarily justified by its rehabilitative purpose, it is of no moment whether the underlying offense is reasonably related to theft, narcotics, or firearms: ‘The threat of a suspicionless search is fully consistent with the deterrent purposes of the search condition.’ The purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked search of defendant is to ascertain whether [the probationer] is complying with the terms of [probation]; to determine not only whether he disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law. Information obtained under such circumstances would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision given the defendant . . . .’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 67, fn. omitted.)
Here the probation report indicates a woman accused appellant of hitting her and while officers were detaining him pending a battery investigation, he became belligerent and broke the patrol vehicle’s window. The probation officer reports that although appellant appeared to have no criminal record, “the circumstances of the current offense raise[] concern for community safety. The defendant exhibits a lack of anger management as he hurls derogatory comments at officers and further jeopardizes their safety[] and his own by breaking the window of the police vehicle. Further, the defendant was uncooperative and his behavior was viewed as threatening. It is unknown the source of defendant’s anger.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the warrantless search and seizure condition as it serves the purpose of deterring future offenses by appellant and allows law enforcement to ascertain whether appellant is complying with the terms of his probation.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MANELLA, J., SUZUKAWA, J.