Opinion
June 18, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Golia, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was jointly tried with his codefendant Martin White and convicted after a jury trial of murder and criminal possession of a weapon in connection with the fatal shooting of his sister's boyfriend Richard Matias. The circumstantial evidence submitted by the People at the joint trial is set forth in our decision on the appeal of the codefendant White (see, People v. White, 162 A.D.2d 646 [decided herewith]). Viewing that evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant either shot Matias or shared a "community of purpose" with his codefendant to do so (see, People v. Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830; People v. Whatley, 69 N.Y.2d 784; People v. Herring, 149 A.D.2d 731, 734). The inference of the defendant's guilt is consistent with, and flows naturally and logically from the facts proved (see, People v. Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196, 202, rearg dismissed 48 N.Y.2d 635, 656; People v Benzinger, 36 N.Y.2d 29, 32).
The defendant challenges as improper the admission of the nontestifying codefendant's statements as testified to by a third party. As a threshold matter, we note that contrary to the People's contention, the issue was properly preserved for appellate review by defense counsel's pretrial severance motion and his objections both prior to and during the trial to the admission of the codefendant's statements (see, People v Brister, 149 A.D.2d 520; People v. Ayala, 142 A.D.2d 147, 166). The codefendant's statement was redacted to avoid any references to the defendant and, thus, was not facially incriminating (see, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200; People v. Kern, 149 A.D.2d 187, 238, affd 75 N.Y.2d 638). The statement could be deemed to be incriminating only when linked with evidence introduced at a later stage of the trial. The United States Supreme Court recognized in Richardson v. Marsh (supra) that the necessity of such linkage minimized the probability that the jury would be unable to disregard incriminating inferences thereby overcoming the concern expressed by the Bruton court (Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123). In addition, on two occasions during the trial the trial court gave proper limiting instructions to the jury concerning the use of the codefendant's statement (see, Richardson v. Marsh, supra; People v. Kern, supra; People v. Marcus, 137 A.D.2d 723). Accordingly, the admission of the redacted statement does not warrant reversal.
Furthermore, assuming that the redacted statement should not have been admitted, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the overwhelming independent evidence of the defendant's guilt (see, People v. Hamlin, 71 N.Y.2d 750; People v Brister, supra). The defendant was fully implicated in the crime by the testimony of his sister concerning his altercation with the decedent as well as by the testimony of other witnesses to the events leading to the shooting. Therefore, even if the codefendant's statement had not been introduced at trial, we find that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different result (see, People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237; see also, People v. Brister, supra; People v. Marcus, supra).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find that they are either unpreserved for appellate review as a matter of law or without merit. Thompson, J.P., Brown, Eiber and Miller, JJ., concur.