Opinion
No. 1-15-0901
09-12-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AYOKUNLE JOEL-TAIWO, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 14 CR 6886 Honorable Charles P. Burns, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Neville and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant's conviction for theft affirmed given that toner cartridges belonging to the complainant were found in defendant's storage unit over which he had sole and exclusive control. ¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Ayokunle Joel-Taiwo was convicted of one count of theft and sentenced to 120 days' imprisonment in the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) and two years' felony probation. On appeal, Joel-Taiwo contends that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm. ¶ 3 Joel-Taiwo was charged with four counts of theft of computers and toner cartridges, one count of computer fraud, two counts of wire fraud, and two counts of deceptive practices. At trial, Mark Fehlberg, executive director of payroll procurement and payment services at the University of Chicago, testified regarding several exhibits proffered by the State. First, he addressed People's Exhibit No. 1, a group exhibit of four documents purporting to be purchase orders sent to Integron, Inc. from the University of Chicago. The documents are dated between February and March 2014 and are for varying quantities of toner cartridges and computers. The merchandise costs on the orders are $19,500, $16,945, $47,970, and $54,589.20, respectively, although not all requested items had been shipped. The purchase orders directed that the goods be shipped to "Joseph Moore, UChicago Facilities" at unit number 4042, 2361 S. State Street, in Chicago. ¶ 4 According to Fehlberg, the orders were "fraudulent in nature." Although they had the name "University of Chicago" on them, they also had a former version of the University's logo that was used many years ago and not used in 2014. No one by the name of Joseph Moore was employed by the University of Chicago. Fehlberg did not know Joel-Taiwo, Joel-Taiwo was never employed by the University of Chicago, and Fehlberg never authorized Joel-Taiwo to pick up any items that were being delivered to the University of Chicago. Also, Integron was not a vendor of the University of Chicago and no one from the university had ever made purchases from Integron. ¶ 5 People's Exhibit No. 2 consisted of printouts of several emails, purporting to be from Fehlberg, requesting price quotes and shipping of various computers and toner cartridges. Fehlberg did not write any of the emails nor did he ever contact anyone from Integron to make purchase orders or to request price quotes. Fehlberg noted that the email address used did not conform to the University of Chicago email standard and his correct email address was not listed anywhere in any of the emails. ¶ 6 People's Exhibit No. 3 was a notice of tax exempt status purporting to be from the University of Chicago and signed by Fehlberg. Fehlberg testified that he did not author the document. He stated that it appeared to be a "photoshopped" version of a prior, legitimate document given the outdated tax exemption number, telephone numbers unaffiliated with the University of Chicago, and improper title formatting. On March 28, 2014, Fehlberg was contacted by a representative of Integron, which prompted him to contact University of Chicago police detective Carlton Hughes. ¶ 7 After receiving the call, Hughes and his partner, University of Chicago police investigator Jimmy Valdes, went to a storage facility located at 2361 South State Street. They spoke with the front desk clerk, who identified three packages they were looking for. The packages were addressed to "Joseph Moore, UChicago Facilities" at the storage facility's physical address and unit number 4042. The front desk clerk then made a phone call to the owner of the storage unit. ¶ 8 Valdes and Hughes set up surveillance on the packages. Several hours later, Joel-Taiwo walked into the storage facility, acknowledged the front desk clerk, walked to the packages, and picked one up. Valdes approached Joel-Taiwo and placed him under arrest for theft. Valdes later recovered and opened the packages, which each contained one Getac laptop computer. ¶ 9 Joel-Taiwo was transported to the police station. After being read his Miranda rights, Joel-Taiwo told Valdes and Hughes that he rented storage unit 4042 and was solely responsible for it. Joel-Taiwo indicated that he had items stored in the unit, such as ink cartridges, and said that he owned a business where he stored and reshipped "things." He stated that he had gone to the storage facility that day to pick up the three boxes. ¶ 10 The following day, Valdes obtained a search warrant for storage unit 4042. Upon execution of the warrant, officers recovered lease paperwork for the unit, which contained Joel-Taiwo's ID and signature indicating he was the only person assigned to the unit. Officers also recovered "ten ink cartridges" or "ten toner cartridges" from inside the storage unit. Valdes noted that the ten toner cartridges were valued at approximately $1,300 and that the cartridges recovered from the storage unit were listed on the same purchase order as the computers that Joel-Taiwo was picking up on March 28, 2014. ¶ 11 The court allowed the State's exhibits into evidence over Joel-Taiwo's objection. In addition to the exhibits referenced by Fehlberg, the court admitted photographs of the computers and "proof of loss" documents from Integron showing it suffered a $66,935 "loss" from the theft of computer and toner cartridge shipments. ¶ 12 The trial court granted Joel-Taiwo's motion for a directed verdict on the counts charging computer fraud, wire fraud, and deceptive practices (Counts 5 through 9). It denied the motion as to the theft charges (Counts 1 through 4). ¶ 13 Following closing arguments, the court found Joel-Taiwo guilty of a lesser included offense of theft as alleged in Count 4, finding him guilty of Class 3 theft of property valued between $300 and $10,000 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2014)) for theft of the toner cartridges from Integron. The court stated that "the defendant's statement that he alone had access to [the toner], that no one else had access to it, indicates that he was intending to exert unauthorized control over that particular toner." The court went on to say, "[O]ut of all the storage facilities in the City of Chicago, these items end up in a storage facility of the defendant's." The court found Joel-Taiwo not guilty on the three other theft counts. The court later denied Joel-Taiwo's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to 120 days' imprisonment in CCDOC and two years' felony probation. ¶ 14 On appeal, Joel-Taiwo argues that the evidence was not sufficient to find him guilty of theft. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to provide any evidence that the toner cartridges found in the storage unit leased by him were property of the complainant, Integron. He also argues that the State failed to establish that he had control over the toner cartridges or that he was not authorized to control the toner cartridges and intended to deprive Integron of the use or benefit of that property. ¶ 15 Joel-Taiwo asserts that the facts are not in dispute and we should review his case de novo. See People v. Smith, 191 Ill. 2d 408, 411-13 (2000) (review was de novo where undisputed facts showed that the defendant committed the offense of armed violence within the meaning of the armed violence statute). We disagree. Although the facts are not being disputed, inferences from those facts are, as Joel-Taiwo disputes whether the evidence presented sufficiently proved the elements of theft. Accordingly, we reject the de novo standard of review. ¶ 16 The standard of review when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. The reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues pertaining to the credibility of witnesses or to the weight of the evidence. Id. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, provided that the elements of the crime charged are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 330 (2000). But the trier of fact need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances. Id. It is sufficient if all the evidence taken together proves the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the fact finder's satisfaction. Id. Additionally, the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences that normally flow from the evidence or to seek out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt. People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009). A conviction will be reversed only if the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 225 (2009). ¶ 17 To sustain the conviction for theft, the State had to prove that Joel-Taiwo knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over toner cartridges belonging to Integron and intended to permanently deprive Integron of the use or benefit of the toner cartridges. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2014). The elements of knowledge and intent may be proven indirectly by inferences based upon the facts and circumstances of the case, including a defendant's recent, exclusive, and unexplained possession of recently stolen property. People v. Cameron, 2012 IL App (3d) 110020, ¶ 32; People v. McCracken, 244 Ill. App. 3d 318, 322 (1993). ¶ 18 Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Joel-Taiwo committed theft. Joel-Taiwo was arrested as he was picking up a box containing one of three computers shipped by Integron. The evidence showed Integron had shipped its computers addressed to "Joseph Moore, University of Chicago Facilities" at Joel-Taiwo's storage unit pursuant to fraudulent purchase orders. Joel-Taiwo admitted to Investigator Valdes that he rented the storage unit and was solely responsible for it. Lease paperwork recovered by Valdes confirmed that Joel-Taiwo was the only person assigned to the unit. ¶ 19 Valdes recovered ten toner cartridges from the storage unit. He testified that the toner cartridges were listed on the same purchase order as the laptop computers, leading to the logical inference that the cartridges were Integron's property and had been obtained in the same fraudulent manner as the computers. See Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 281 (noting that the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences that flow normally from the evidence). As the trial court pointed out, "out of all the storage facilities in the City of Chicago, these items end[ed] up in a storage facility of the defendant's." Joel-Taiwo conceded that he had sole and exclusive control over the storage unit where Integron's property was found. His exclusive possession and control over the unit, and thus over the fraudulently procured toner cartridges, together with the fact that he had arrived at the storage facility for the express purpose of picking up the fraudulently procured computers, supports the inference that he knowingly assumed unauthorized control over the toner cartridges with the intention of depriving Integron of that property. See Cameron, 2012 IL App (3d) 110020, ¶ 33 (inferring knowledge and intent from possession of stolen property to support theft charge). ¶ 20 Although the State failed to produce any evidence tying Joel-Taiwo to the fraudulent purchase orders, thus leading to his acquittal on certain charges (computer fraud, wire fraud and deceptive practices), for purposes of the theft charge, the court was entitled to infer that Joel- Taiwo's exercise of exclusive control over shipments of products to the "University of Chicago" directed to his storage unit was circumstantial proof of both Joel-Taiwo's knowledge that the property was stolen and his intent to deprive the owner of its use and benefit. See Cameron, 2012 IL App (3d) 110020, ¶ 32; People v. Mertens, 77 Ill. App. 3d 791, 795-96 (1979) (citing People v. McCormick, 92 Ill. App. 2d 6, 10 (1968) (fact that defendant acquired possession of property "under circumstances that would have aroused the suspicions of an honest man that it was stolen" sufficient to support conviction for theft)). ¶ 21 Joel-Taiwo asserts that the State failed to demonstrate that the toner cartridges were Integron's property as it did not provide any specific information identifying the color, brand of manufacture or model number of the toner cartridges or any documents indicating they were the same toner cartridges Integron allegedly shipped to Joseph Moore at Joel-Taiwo's storage unit. But Valdes testified the toner cartridges found in Joel-Taiwo's storage unit were listed on the same purchase order as the computers, demonstrating that they were the property of Integron. The court was not required to discount the evidence presented or to speculate as to where else the toner cartridges found in Joel-Taiwo's storage unit could have come from. See Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 281 (trier of fact need not search out explanations consistent with the defendant's innocence and raise them to reasonable doubt). We find sufficient evidence linking the toner cartridges recovered from Joel-Taiwo's storage unit to those owned by Integron and shipped pursuant to the fraudulent purchase orders. ¶ 22 Joel-Taiwo argues for the first time on appeal that Valdes's testimony that the toner cartridges were listed on the same purchase order as the computers was inadmissible hearsay because Valdes had no personal knowledge regarding the original toner cartridges shipped by Integron. See People v. Clark, 108 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1081 (1982) (rental car company employee's testimony regarding stolen cars was inadmissible hearsay as it was based on leasing agreements he had not prepared and he had no personal knowledge of the process by which information on the leasing agreements was obtained or verified). Joel-Taiwo also claims Valdes's testimony was without foundation. These arguments are forfeited, as Joel-Taiwo did not object to Valdes's testimony at trial and raise these issues in his written, post-trial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129 (1988) (failure to object to an alleged error during trial and in a posttrial motion results in forfeiture for consideration by a reviewing court). Joel-Taiwo does not invoke the plain-error doctrine and has, therefore, forfeited plain-error review of this issue. See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544-46 (2010) (when a defendant fails to argue for plain-error review, he obviously cannot meet his burden of persuasion and thus forfeits plain-error review). ¶ 23 Joel-Taiwo asserts that his repeated objections to the admissibility of the documents that formed the only basis for Valdes's testimony sufficed to preserve his objection to this testimony on appeal. We disagree. The record shows Joel-Taiwo did not object to Valdes's testimony regarding the purchase orders, let alone argue hearsay or lack of foundation. The fact that Joel-Taiwo objected to admission of the documents underlying Valdes's testimony did not present the trial court with an objection to Valdes's testimony or afford the State an opportunity to address that objection. Accordingly, we reject Joel-Taiwo's argument and find his challenge to Valdes's testimony regarding the purchase orders forfeited. ¶ 24 Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Joel-Taiwo guilty of theft beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. ¶ 26 Affirmed.
Count 4 originally charged defendant with Class 2 theft of property valued between $10,000 and $100,000 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2014)). --------