Opinion
E070404
09-17-2018
In re J.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.L., Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Matthew Mulford, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J272591) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Pamela P. King, Judge. Affirmed. Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Matthew Mulford, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 28, 2017, a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged that defendant and appellant J.L. (minor) committed petty theft under Penal Code section 488 (count 1). On September 19, 2017, minor stipulated to, and received a grant of informal probation.
On November 28, 2017, an amended petition realleged that minor committed petty theft under Penal Code section 488 (count 1), and receiving stolen property under Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a) (count 2). Minor admitted receiving stolen property as alleged in count 2. In exchange, the juvenile court dismissed count 1 and reduced count 2 to a misdemeanor. At the disposition hearing on January 5, 2018, the court found that minor was a ward of the court, and granted him probation in his mother's custody.
Three weeks later, on January 24, 2018, the People filed a petition alleging that minor, who had turned 16, violated three terms of his probation. The next day, the court accepted minor's admission that he violated one term of his probation—failing to attend a required drug and alcohol counseling session, and the court ordered that he serve 14 days in juvenile custody while continuing on probation.
On March 23, 2018, the People filed a petition alleging that minor had violated four terms of his probation. Minor was removed from his mother's care and placed in juvenile hall. Minor later admitted violating a curfew provision of his probation, and the court dismissed the remaining probation violation allegations.
On April 17, 2018, at the contested dispositional hearing, the court ordered that minor continue on probation in juvenile hall while awaiting placement in foster care.
On April 25, 2018, minor filed a timely appeal of the disposition order.
B. FACTUAL HISTORY
Minor admitted that he received a stolen car. He later admitted violating the terms of his probation.
DISCUSSION
A. THE JUVENILE COURT PROPERLY PLACED MINOR IN FOSTER CARE
Minor contends that the juvenile court erred in ordering minor placed in foster care rather than referring him to an inpatient drug rehabilitation facility. We disagree.
1. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The purpose of the juvenile court law is 'to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public.' " (In re Oscar A. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 750, 756, (Oscar A.) quoting Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a).)
If a minor is adjudged a ward of the court under section 602, then "[i]t is the responsibility . . . of the probation agency to determine the appropriate placement for the ward once the court issues a placement order." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 727, subd. (a)(4).) That placement determination is subject to the court's approval. (Id. at subd. (e).)
On appeal, we "review a juvenile court's commitment decision for abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support its decision." (Oscar A., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.) We find abuse whenever a court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. We "will not disturb the juvenile court's findings when there is substantial evidence to support them." (Ibid.) A placement is not an abuse of discretion where the evidence " 'demonstrate[s] probable benefit to the minor' " and "less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate." (In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556, overruled on another ground in People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 374, fn. 6.)
2. ADDITIONAL FACTS
At the April 2018 disposition hearing, defense counsel took testimony from the probation officer detailing minor's history. Thereafter, counsel requested that minor be released into his mother's care because he had been on probation less than a year, had only been on formal probation for two and a half months, and there had been no referral to inpatient drug treatment. The juvenile court observed that minor had refused to attend a drug and alcohol class, and that he had been involved with home disturbances that required police response due to the threat "he's posing to other members of the household."
Defense counsel stated that minor had already been removed from the home and believed that an inpatient program might allow him to cope with his drug problems so that he could return to his home after completing the program. The court said, "arguably that is the case." The court then added that inpatient care could be seen as "more restrictive" than foster placement, which minor had not yet received, and to which he might be receptive. Defense counsel did not disagree with the court's points about the amount of structure and restrictions, but still argued that minor should not be placed in foster care.
The prosecutor argued that the probation officer had appropriately listed the services that had already been offered to minor. Acknowledging that foster care was "an extreme step," the prosecutor argued that it was necessary because minor had been unable to obey the terms of his probation despite multiple opportunities that included his refusal to attend drug counseling. Moreover, the prosecutor stated that minor had displayed dangerous behavior in his mother's home toward his mother and siblings.
The court reviewed all the probation reports concerning minor and held that he had been unable to comply with school rules or rules from his mother, that he was committing crimes, and that he had verbally abused his mother and physically and verbally abused his girlfriend. Despite numerous opportunities to change, the court said no one was able to get through to minor because his behavior continued to get worse.
The court then explained that a structured environment would help "influence you to accept the fact that it is time you follow somebody else's rules," that it would curb his reliance on drugs, and provide the tools to control himself. The court acknowledged the responsibility to place minor in the least restrictive environment, and found that this was in the community, but outside the mother's home.
3. ANALYSIS
A primary objective of juvenile law is rehabilitation, and "the statutory scheme contemplates a progressively more restrictive and punitive series of dispositions starting with home placement under supervision, and progressing to foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility, and finally placement at the [Division of Juvenile Justice]." (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250, citing In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576-577.)
In this case, the record reflects that the juvenile court was aware of the circumstances of minor's case, understood the range of placement options, and appropriately selected foster care. Although the court acknowledged that the removal from home was not the least restrictive environment, the record and the court's findings demonstrate that this was necessary for minor and his family due to his previous failures to comply with the terms of his probation, and due to the risk of increasingly serious criminal behavior. Moreover, the court understood the differences between foster care and an inpatient drug facility. When defense counsel reminded the court that it had the authority to order minor to a more restrictive placement, "to an inpatient rehabilitation center . . . and then once he does well there, to transition him back in the home," the court responded: "And arguably that is the case. But then you could also say perhaps that is more restrictive than placement in terms of he hasn't had a placement opportunity yet to be successful in. And perhaps that structure he would be responsive to, before he's taken not only out of the home but in a very structure inpatient treatment program." The court weighed the option of placing minor in an inpatient facility. However, the court determined, based on the facts of the case, that placing minor in a structured foster care facility would be the best next step, prior to placing minor in an inpatient program.
In his reply brief, minor argues that "there is no evidence, however, that the more restrictive placement in an inpatient Drug Rehabilitation Center would not have accomplished those goals and provided a drug counseling program as well." Although minor had a preference for a more restrictive placement, there was substantial evidence to support the court's decision to place minor in a foster care facility. On appeal, we "will not disturb the juvenile court's findings when there is substantial evidence to support them." (Oscar A., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 755-756.) Here, the court placed minor in foster care because minor had yet to be placed outside his home. The court believed that minor could benefit from the structure and programs provided in foster care, prior to being placed in a restrictive drug treatment facility. Under the circumstances of this case, which the juvenile court carefully considered, we discern no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's placement order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting P. J. CODRINGTON
J.