Opinion
G061579
07-19-2023
In re J.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. J.J., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and Colette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 22DL0377, Antony C. Ufland, Judge.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and Colette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
SANCHEZ, J.
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor, J.J., had committed assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm upon two victims as alleged in the petition (allegations 1 &2). The court declared J.J. to be a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. In this appeal, J.J. contends the juvenile court erred by receiving into evidence prearrest statements he had made to police officers on the ground those statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
We conclude J.J.'s prearrest statements were inadmissible because they were made during a custodial interrogation and J.J. was not administered Miranda warnings. The error in admitting the statements was not prejudicial with respect to the court's decision on allegation 1 but was prejudicial with respect to the court's decision on allegation 2. We therefore affirm the true finding on allegation 1, reverse the true finding on allegation 2, and remand for the consideration of a new dispositional order.
FACTS
On April 22, 2022, J.J., who was then 12 years old, sent threatening text messages to 14-year-old M.A., who went by A.M. In one message, J.J. said he wanted to fight A.M. A.M. agreed to fight J.J. The fight was to take place at an apartment complex in Garden Grove.
On the evening of April 22, A.M. was at the apartment complex with his friends P.C., Pa.C., C.W., and O.G. J.J. joined them at around 8:00 p.m. He appeared to be angry. After a while, J.J. became aggressive and cussed at A.M. and C.W. J.J. and A.M. walked to the side of the apartment building. They argued and wrestled. J.J. pushed A.M. into a bush. J.J. started pushing C.W. A.M. got up from the bush, and the pushing and arguing continued. A.M. looked away for a second and heard C.W. scream. J.J. pushed A.M. and A.M. pushed him back. In the scuffle, J.J. cut A.M. with a knife. J.J. ran off toward his apartment. A.M. had a cut on the side of his abdomen. The cut was deep and bleeding a lot.
A.M. went to Pa.C.'s home, where he cleaned his wound and called his mother to pick him up. C.W. suffered a laceration or scratch on his abdomen.
At about 10:00 p.m., Garden Grove Police Officers Ryan Rodriguez and Taylor Macy arrived at the apartment complex in response to a report of a stabbing. After speaking with C.W., the officers went to J.J.'s apartment to speak with him. A third officer also was present. J.J. appeared to be nervous and stuttered as he spoke. J.J. said he had been in a fight with A.M. that evening. During the questioning, which lasted about 15 minutes, J.J. admitted he had stabbed A.M. and had attempted to stab C.W. Officer Rodriguez asked J.J. if he had a knife. J.J. replied "yes" and that the knife was in his room. Officer Rodriguez retrieved the knife, which had been painted blue and had a three-inch blade. The knife had been in J.J.'s room for about three days. J.J. never said whether or not he had used the knife to stab A.M. J.J. also said he believed A.M. had a gun that night.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged J.J. committed assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (a knife) in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) on three victims. The alleged victims for each allegation were: allegation 1-A.M., allegation 2-C.W., and allegation 3-P.C.
A jurisdictional hearing was conducted over several days in May and June of 2022. At the close of the People's case-in-chief, J.J. brought a motion to dismiss pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1 (section 701.1). As to allegation 2, J.J. argued there was no evidence to corroborate his admission and, as to allegations 1 and 3, the People had not proven the truth of the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. The juvenile court denied the motion.
The juvenile court found allegations 1 and 2 to be true beyond a reasonable doubt and allegation 3 to be not true. At the dispositional hearing, the court declared J.J. a ward of the court and confined him to 41 days in custody, with 41 days of credit for time served, and placed him on supervised probation. J.J. appealed.
A minor may appeal a judgment in a section 602 proceeding "in the same manner as any final judgment." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800, subd. (a).) "A dispositional order is appealable, and review on appeal encompasses the court's jurisdictional findings." (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1126.)
DISCUSSION
I. Background
A. Motion in Limine
In advance of trial, J.J. filed a motion in limine to exclude statements he made during the police interrogation at his home. He argued the statements were unlawfully obtained in violation of Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 because the interrogation was custodial and the police officers did not advise him of his constitutional rights.
The juvenile court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing on J.J.'s motion in limine. Officers Rodriguez and Macy testified. Officer Rodriguez testified that on April 22, 2022, at about 10:00 p.m., he was dispatched to investigate a claim that someone had been stabbed. After interviewing a witness, Officer Rodriguez believed J.J. might have been the stabber and went to J.J.'s apartment to ask him questions. Officer Rodriguez knew J.J. was 11 or 12 years old. Officer Rodriguez considered J.J. to be a suspect in the stabbing and intended to interview him as a suspect.
J.J. lived in an apartment on the second floor of the apartment complex. Officer Rodriguez arrived at J.J.'s apartment at about 10:22 p.m. J.J.'s mother opened the door and Officer Rodriguez told her he needed to speak with J.J. J.J. appeared and, during questioning, stood on the landing outside of the apartment. His mother stood next to J.J., and Officer Rodriguez stood at the top of a staircase about five or six feet away. Officer Rodriguez was accompanied by Officer Macy, who stood next to him, and Sergeant Tessier, who stood at the bottom of the staircase. All the officers were in police uniform, and Officer Rodriguez wore a utility belt carrying a baton, taser, pepper spray, handcuffs, and a firearm, all of which were visible. For safety reasons, Officer Rodriguez told J.J. to keep his hands out of his pockets.
Officer Rodriguez testified that he did not ask J.J. if he was willing to talk to him and never advised J.J. he had a choice in whether to speak with him. Officer Rodriguez never told J.J. he was not free to leave, however, he never told J.J. he was free to terminate the conversation and leave at any time. Officer Rodriguez testified J.J. was, in fact, not free to leave once he stepped out of the apartment. Officer Rodriguez did not tell J.J. he was under arrest. J.J. never indicated he did not want to answer questions and was forthcoming in answering them. Officer Rodriguez never drew his weapon.
Officer Rodriguez asked J.J. if he had stabbed anyone. After asking that question, Officer Rodriguez continued to ask J.J. questions in an attempt to get him to provide more incriminating information. J.J. offered to bring the officers the knife which was in the apartment. For safety reasons, Officer Rodriguez said, "No, we'll follow you in." J.J. was not allowed to go back into the apartment alone. At the end of the interrogation, J.J. was placed under arrest.
Officer Macy testified that at about 10:00 p.m., on April 22, 2022, she was dispatched to an apartment complex in Garden Grove to investigate a stabbing. J.J. was the sole suspect. She knew before making contact with J.J. that he was 11 or 12 years old and that he might have learning disabilities. She testified J.J. was not read his Miranda rights because he was not being interrogated custodially. Officer Macy wore a utility belt holding a firearm that was visible. She never told J.J. he was free to terminate the conversation. When J.J. asked if he could go get his sandals, Officer Macy asked his mother to get them. Officer Macy testified that when she and the other officers went to the apartment to interview J.J., they had eyewitness accounts that J.J. stabbed someone. J.J. was the sole suspect-no other suspect was under investigation for the stabbing.
Officer Macy testified that J.J.'s mother was present and participated in the conversation. J.J.'s mother also asked J.J. questions, never asked the officers to stop asking questions, and never told J.J. to stop answering questions.
Officer Macy testified she accompanied Officer Rodriguez into J.J.'s bedroom. Officer Tessier also was in the apartment. At some point a fourth officer joined them.
Both Officer Rodriguez and Macy wore body cameras during the interrogation. The video cameras recorded part of the interrogation, and the video recordings were played in court. CDs of the video recordings were received into evidence respectively as exhibits A and exhibit B. After hearing argument from counsel, the juvenile court denied J.J.'s motion in limine.
On the record, the court addressed In re Matthew W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 392 (Matthew W.) at length and found similarities and dissimilarities between that case and the matter at hand. The juvenile court found: (1) the officers initiated contact with J.J.; (2) the purpose of the contact was to question J.J. as a suspect; (3) the officers did not tell J.J. he was a suspect; (4) the officers did not handcuff J.J. or draw their guns; (5) the officers' "questions were not specifically designed to elicit incriminating responses"; (6) the interrogation of J.J. was conducted at night when it was dark; (7) the officers never asked J.J. if they could talk to him; (8) the interrogation occurred at J.J.'s home; (9) J.J. voluntarily came to the door and was awake; (10) J.J. was not searched or directed to stay in a particular spot; (11) the officers never told J.J. he could terminate the interview if he wanted to, (12) J.J.'s mother was permitted to be present during the interrogation; and (13) J.J. was 11 or 12 years old. The court found, based on the totality of circumstances, the interrogation was not custodial and therefore the officers were not required under Miranda to advise J.J. of his constitutional rights.
B. Voluntariness Objection
During the jurisdictional hearing, Officer Rodriguez testified he had asked J.J. whether he had stabbed someone. When Officer Rodriguez was asked what J.J. said in response, J.J.'s counsel objected on the ground that J.J.'s statements were involuntarily made. J.J.'s counsel was permitted to conduct voir dire examination of Officer Rodriguez on the issue of voluntariness.
Although we do not address the issue of voluntariness, Officer Rodriguez's voir dire testimony is relevant to whether the interrogation was custodial.
We therefore do not address whether J.J.'s statements to the police officers were voluntarily made. (See Reyes v. Lewis (9th Cir. 2016) 833 F.3d 1001, 1026 ["Miranda and later cases thus clearly establish that the voluntariness of an unwarned statement during a custodial interrogation is not sufficient to establish the statement's admissibility"].)
During voir dire examination, Officer Rodriguez testified as follows: The officers knew J.J. was 11 or 12 years old. When he arrived at the apartment, Officer Rodriguez had a "sufficient amount of information regarding the incident ...." J.J. was the only suspect, and he was interviewed as a suspect. The Officers told J.J.'s mother that J.J. was involved in an altercation and they needed to speak with him. Once J.J. walked outside the apartment he was not free to leave. J.J. appeared to be nervous. The officers never told J.J. he did not have to speak with them or that he could terminate the conversation at any time. The officers never asked for his consent to speak with them. Both Officer Rodriguez and Macy asked questions, but Officer Rodriguez primarily did the questioning. All three officers carried firearms on their utility belts and those firearms were visible. J.J. was never told he was a suspect; he was told he had been involved in an altercation. J.J. had no choice but to speak with the officers; if J.J. had tried to go back inside the apartment, the officers likely would have stopped him. The officers never drew their weapons or threatened J.J., made no promises to J.J. to induce him to make statements, did not use deceptive tactics, and never told him they would continue to interview him until they received the answers they wanted. The interrogation lasted about 15 minutes.
After hearing argument from counsel, the juvenile court found J.J.'s statements made during the police interrogation had been voluntarily. Officer Rodriguez then testified that J.J. admitted he stabbed A.M. and had attempted to stab C.W. Outside of voir dire, Officer Rodriguez testified he never asked J.J. whether he had acted in self-defense. J.J. was never given the opportunity to explain whether he had been attacked since he was interviewed as a suspect.
II. Standard of Review
Review of a court's ruling on a custody determination presents a mixed question of fact and law. (Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 112-113.) The appellate court applies the substantial evidence standard to review the lower court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395.) The court reviews de novo the question whether, under those circumstances, a reasonable person in the minor's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave. (Ibid.)
III. The Juvenile Court Erred by Admitting J.J.'s Statements Made During the Police Interrogation
A. Applicable Law
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects persons accused of crimes from being compelled to incriminate themselves. The landmark case, Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 arose out of problems applying the Fifth Amendment privilege to individuals subject to out-of-court custodial police interrogation. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that, in all criminal proceedings, prosecutors are precluded from using the statements of a defendant made during a "custodial interrogation" unless prosecutors showed the use of procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. (Id. at p. 444.) These safeguards, devised to inform accused persons of their right to silence, their right to the presence of an attorney or to have one appointed for them, and to provide warning that any statement made may be used as evidence against them, are collectively known as the Miranda rights (also referred to as a Miranda warning or Miranda advisement). (Ibid.)
Law enforcement officers are not required to issue Miranda warnings to every person whom they question. (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495.) Miranda warnings are only required when a person is subject to "'custodial interrogation'" by law enforcement officers. (Oregon, at p. 494.) An interrogation is custodial when a person has been taken into custody or has been "'otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 394-395 citing Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 at p. 444.) "'[I]nterrogation'" refers not only to express questioning, but to words and actions by police which officers should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301.) "Custody consists of a formal arrest or a restraint on [an individual's] freedom of movement [in] the degree associated with a formal arrest. (Moore, at p. 395; see Oregon at p. 495 [explaining a person is effectively rendered "in custody" when there has been a restriction on the person's freedom].)
"'Custody determinations are resolved by an objective standard: Would a reasonable person interpret the restraints used by the police as tantamount to a formal arrest? [Citations.] The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be considered as a whole.'" (In re I.F. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 735, 759.) Two discrete subinquiries are essential to a custody determination: (1) the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and (2) whether, under those circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 270.)
In addition to the subinquiries, courts have identified a more expansive set of factors and circumstances to be considered in making a custody determination. (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 759.) The factors and circumstances include: "'[1] whether contact with law enforcement was initiated by the police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily agreed to an interview; [2] whether the express purpose of the interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect; [3] where the interview took place; [4] whether police informed the person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; [5] whether they informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time and/or whether the person's conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; [6] whether there were restrictions on the person's freedom of movement during the interview; [7] how long the interrogation lasted; [8] how many police officers participated; [9] whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation; [10] whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; [11] whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory; [12] whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and [13] whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.'" (Ibid.) We consider "'the interplay [between] and combined effect of all the [factors] and circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest.'" (Ibid.)
The overarching issue in determining "whether a person is in custody for purposes of applying Miranda is . . . whether, in light of the '"objective circumstances of the interrogation," [citation], a "reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave."'" (People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 455, quoting Howes v. Fields (2012) 565 U.S. 499, 509.) These same issues, factors, and circumstances apply in juvenile cases but with the added consideration of the child's age. (Matthew W., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 405-406.) In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, supra, 564 U.S. 261, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a child's age, though not necessarily determinative, may be considered in the application of the Miranda custody rule "so long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer." (Id. at p. 277.) The court recognized children "'generally are less mature and responsible than adults,'" and "'often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.'" (Id. at p. 272.) Thus, "a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go" (ibid.) and "[n]either officers nor courts can reasonably evaluate the effect of objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children without accounting for the age of the child subjected to those circumstances" (id. at p. 276).
B. The Police Interrogation of J.J. Was Custodial
We conclude, based on our consideration of the totality of circumstances, that J.J. was in custody when he was interrogated. Law enforcement initiated the contact. The police went to J.J.'s apartment to interrogate him. Officers Rodriguez and Macy testified their intent was to interrogate J.J. as the sole suspect.
An interrogation conducted inside a defendant's home is less likely to be considered custodial. (U.S. v. Craighead (9th Cir. 2008) 539 F.3d 1073, 1083.) However, J.J. was not interrogated in the comfort and safety of his home but outside the apartment on the landing. (See ibid. [police presence may turn home into police-dominated environment].) The interrogation took place at 10:00 p.m. when it was dark. (See Matthew W., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 403 [interrogation conducted at 6:00 a.m. while still dark is indication it was custodial].)
The officers did not tell J.J. he was under arrest. They also did not tell J.J. that he was free to leave and could terminate the questioning at any time. (See In re Anthony L. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 438, 446.) The officers never asked permission to speak with J.J.-they told his mother they "needed to speak" with him-and they never told J.J. that he had a choice in whether or not to speak with them.
One of the most significant factors showing a custodial interrogation in this case was the restrictions placed on J.J.'s movement. There were four circumstances demonstrating that J.J. was not free to leave. First, when J.J. walked out the door of the apartment, he was faced by two armed police officers in uniform. A third uniformed, armed officer stood at the bottom of the stairs. A 12-year old could not reasonably believe he would be free to walk past two armed police officers, down the stairs, and past a third and, for a time, a fourth armed police officer and depart into the outside world. Second, when J.J. walked out of the apartment, he was asked to remove his hands from his pockets. The officers testified that was for safety reasons. That reason was not communicated to J.J. When J.J. put his hands back in his pockets, he was asked a second time to remove them. Third, when J.J. asked if could go inside and get his sandals, Officer Macy asked his mother to get them. This fact confirms that J.J. was not free to go back into the apartment. (See Matthew W., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 408 [minor requested a blanket, an officer brought one to him instead of allowing him to retrieve it].) Fourth, when J.J. offered to retrieve the knife, he was told by the officers they would accompany him. That too, according to the officers, was for safety reasons, but whatever the reason, the fact remains J.J. was not allowed to go back into the apartment alone. All these circumstances would have reasonably demonstrated to J.J. that he was not free either to leave the apartment or go back inside it.
The number of police officers present during J.J.'s interrogation strongly suggests it was custodial. Three uniformed officers, fully armed, were employed to interrogate a 12-year-old. Officer Macy recalled that an additional officer was present at the bottom of the staircase at one point and another officer was present when the officers were inside the apartment. That would be an intimidating police presence for an adult. The officers did not flash their firearms or place their hands on them in J.J.'s presence; nonetheless, the firearms were visible.
At the end of the interrogation, J.J. was arrested. (See Matthew W., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 409.) We consider this to be a significant factor because J.J. was being interrogated as the sole suspect after the officers had gained information, implicating J.J., from the victims. (See In re I.F. supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 759.)
Lastly, we have J.J.'s age to consider. J.J. was 12 years old at the time of his interrogation and living with his mother. Officers Rodriguez and Macy knew J.J. was 11 or 12 years old. Officer Rodriguez also had been informed that J.J. might have a learning disability. J.J.'s age is significant for several reasons. J.J. was far less mature than an adult, and much more likely to lack the judgment to avoid choices that could be detrimental to him, and more likely to feel pressure to talk to police officers. (J.D.B. v. North Carolina, supra, 564 U.S. at pp. 272-273.) It is commonly understood and expected that children are taught to respect and cooperate with law enforcement officers and not to walk away from them. It is highly unlikely that J.J., or any 12 year old, would understand he had the right not to speak to uniformed police officers and the right to terminate the interrogation and walk away-particularly if, as here, the officers never told him he had those rights. At age 12, J.J. was not quite a young child, but "[his] age of [12] would certainly have intensified the effect of the factors just discussed in causing him to feel 'pressured to submit' to the police interrogation." (Matthew W., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 409.)
There are circumstances suggesting the interrogation was noncustodial. The officers did not entirely dominate and control the course of the interrogation and allowed J.J.'s mother to ask J.J. questions. The officers did not flash their weapons or handcuff J.J. The officers did not manifest a belief that J.J. was culpable or claim they had evidence to prove his culpability. They simply asked J.J. whether he had stabbed somebody. The officers were not aggressive, their demeanor was pleasant, and they used 3 calm and professional tones of voices.
The length of the interrogation does not really cut one way or the other. The interrogation was about 15 minutes in length; neither mercifully short nor oppressively long. "The case law provides no bright-line rules regarding how long an interrogation must proceed before its duration is more consistent with custody than not." (People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 463.)
But we consider "'interplay and combined effect'" of all of the circumstances of the interrogation in this case (In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 759), and in consideration of the objective circumstances of J.J.'s interrogation we conclude a reasonable 12-year-old juvenile would not have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. A failure to give Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion that is irrebuttable for purposes of the People's case-in-chief. (Oregon v. Elstad, (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 307.)4 The juvenile court therefore erred by admitting statements made by J.J. during the prearrest interrogation.
Although the subjective views of the interrogating officers cannot be considered in making a determination of custody (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 323), it is worth noting that both Officer Rodriguez and Macy testified J.J. was in fact not free to terminate the questioning and leave and had he attempted to leave or tried to go back inside the apartment he likely would have been stopped. Their testimony confirms our conclusion that J.J. was in custody is an accurate reflection of the subjective reality of the situation.
C. Matthew W.
In concluding the interrogation was noncustodial, the juvenile court discussed Matthew W. at length. The parties likewise devote a great deal of attention to that case and to arguing it is analogous to or distinguishable from the present matter. In Matthew W., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th 392, the Court of Appeal found that a minor's prearrest statements to police about a stabbing, which were not preceded by Miranda warnings, were made during a custodial interrogation. In Matthew W., five police officers arrived at the minor's home at 6:00 a.m., while it was still dark. (Id. at p. 403.) One officer, Keown, was wearing a marked police vest and cargo pants while the other four officers were wearing police uniforms. All five officers were armed. (Ibid.) The minor's mother allowed the officers to enter the home, at which point, Officer Keown released one or two of the officers. (Ibid.) The officers asked the minor if they could pat him down to search for weapons, and he consented. The officers had the minor turn around and spread his legs, and they conducted a patdown search. (Ibid.)
Officer Keown or one of the officers asked the minor to sit down at the kitchen table. (Matthew W., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 403-404.) Officer Keown sat at the other side of the table and another officer stood about 10 to 15 feet away. (Id. at p. 404.) "A third officer stood beside the front door of the home, which was next to the kitchen." (Ibid.) Officer Keown denied a request by the minor's mother to be present during the questioning and told her he wanted to talk to the minor "'privately.'" (Ibid.) The mother's movement in the home was not otherwise restricted. (Ibid.) During the interrogation, she walked back and forth and could hear the conversation. (Ibid.)
The minor was scared and cold and, after sitting down at the kitchen table, asked Officer Keown for a blanket. (Matthew W., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) Officer Keown grabbed a blanket from a nearby sofa and gave it to the minor, who wrapped himself in it. (Ibid.) The minor asked if he was in trouble. (Id. at p. 404, fn. 6.) Officer Keown said no, he just he wanted to talk to the minor about what had happened that night. (Id. at p. 404.) Officer Keown did not tell the minor he was a suspect or under arrest and did not give him a Miranda advisement. Officer Keown told the minor he was not under arrest and Officer Keown was there to ask him some questions. (Matthew W., at p. 404.) No officer ever drew a gun or handcuffed the minor. (Ibid.) At the time of the interrogation, Officer Keown had already interviewed a witness who said he had seen the minor stab the victim. (Ibid.) The minor was arrested at the conclusion of the interrogation. (Id. at p. 409.)
In concluding the interrogation was custodial, the Court of Appeal presumed Officer Keown's tone of voice was calm and professional, and that the interrogation was not particularly lengthy. (Matthew W., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.) The minor was not told at the start of the interview he was under arrest and the police officers did not handcuff him or unholster their weapons. (Id. at pp. 406-407.) But the court found many other circumstances supported a finding that the interrogation was custodial. (Ibid.) The interrogation was initiated by the police officers. (Id. at p. 407.) The officers interrogated the minor as a suspect after having already interviewed a witness who said the minor had stabbed the victim, and the purpose of the interrogation was to get the minor to make incriminating statements. (Ibid.) The officers arrived at the minor's home at 6:00 a.m., while it was still dark. (Ibid.) The officers never asked for the minor's consent to be interrogated but directed him to sit at the kitchen table after pat searching him for weapons. (Id. at pp. 407-408.) At least three police officers were present in the home during the investigation. Two were uniformed, one wore a police vest, and all were armed. The officers stood in strategic positions to prevent the minor from leaving the kitchen. (Id. at p. 408.) When the minor requested a blanket, Officer Keown did not permit the minor to go retrieve one but grabbed a blanket from the living room sofa. (Ibid.) The minor was never told he was free to terminate the interrogation or leave at any time. (Ibid.) The minor was 17 years old and the officers were aware or should have been aware that he was a minor. (Id. at pp. 408-409.) The minor's mother was expressly prohibited from being in the kitchen during the interrogation. (Id. at p. 409.) The minor was arrested at the conclusion of the interrogation. (Ibid.)
Nearly all the factors and circumstances which the Matthew W. court found to support a finding the interrogation was custodial were present in the interrogation of J.J. There are distinctions between Matthew W. and the present case. As the Attorney General points out, J.J. was not patsearched, he was awake when the officers arrived, his mother was allowed to be present during the interrogation, only three police officers instead of five were present, no police officers stood behind J.J. to block his entry into the apartment, and the police investigation in Matthew W. was at a more advanced stage than the investigation in the present case at the time of the interrogation. The latter three distinctions are of no consequence. Whether five police officers or three (and here, at times there were four) are present, the fact is the police presence here was daunting indeed. No police officer stood behind J.J., but, regardless, he was not permitted to go back inside the apartment. At the time of the interrogation in the present case, the police officers investigated at least one witness who claimed J.J. had stabbed someone. Officer Rodriguez testified he already had a "sufficient amount of information" regarding the incident.
Whatever the distinctions between Matthew W. and the present case might be, those distinctions are outweighed by similarities. The circumstances here in some respects more strongly support a finding of a custodial interrogation than in Matthew W. J.J. was 12 years old at the time of interrogation-five years younger than the minor in Matthew W. The minor in Matthew W. did not directly ask for a blanket; J.J. asked if he could go get his sandals and the police officers directed his mother to get them. The interrogation here was not conducted inside the apartment; instead, J.J. stood outside on the landing.
IV. The Error Was Harmless as to Allegation 1 and Prejudicial as to Allegation 2
Having concluded the juvenile court erred in admitting evidence of J.J.'s prearrest statements, we now determine whether the error was prejudicial. "[E]rroneous admission of a defendant's statements obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed for prejudice under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18." (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542.) "That test requires the People here 'to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" (Ibid., quoting Chapman, at p. 24.) "Under this test, the appropriate inquiry is 'not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.'" (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 621; see In re I.F., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 781 ["'To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the [trier of fact] considered on the issue in question'"].) The prosecution bears the burden of proving the error was harmless under Chapman. (In re I.F., at p. 781.)
We conclude the juvenile court's true finding on allegation 1 was unattributable to the error in the admission of J.J.'s prearrest statements to the police. The evidence supporting allegation 1 was strong. The victim in allegation 1-A.M.- testified at trial. A.M. testified J.J. had sent him text messages threatening to shoot him. A.M. agreed to fight J.J. A.M. testified J.J. was scared and aggressive on the night of the fight. A.M. testified J.J. pushed him; A.M. looked away for a second and heard C.W. "sort of scream," J.J. pushed A.M. again. A.M. testified that when he pushed J.J. back, J.J. "got me with a" knife and "cut me." A resident of the apartment complex testified he saw two boys wanting to fight a third boy. The resident did not see the boys fight but did hear one boy say, "he stabbed me."
A.M. testified he was cut in the abdomen. A photograph of the injury was received into evidence. Pa.C. testified he saw a cut on A.M. and described it as "deep" and "bleeding a lot."
Although A.M. never saw J.J. cut him with a knife, A.M. testified he did not have a weapon that night and he did not see P.C. or C.W. with a knife. P.C. testified he did not have a weapon that night and did not see J.J., A.M., or C.W. with a weapon. P.C. testified he saw something in J.J.'s hands and assumed it was a knife. A kitchen knife was recovered from J.J.'s bedroom. Evidence of the knife was admissible. "Any such violation of defendant's rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, and Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. 477, would not, however, taint the admissibility of any physical evidence derived from those confessions." (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 598.)
In relation to this evidence, J.J.'s admission to the police that he had stabbed A.M. was unimportant to the juvenile court's decision. Perhaps most telling, in denying J.J.'s motion to dismiss under section 701.1, the juvenile court did not rely on J.J.'s prearrest statements but relied on A.M.'s testimony to find that sufficient evidence supported allegation 1. In addition, we note, J.J.'s statement to the police that he believed A.M. had a gun that night supported J.J.'s claim of self-defense.
But as to allegation 2, the error in admitting evidence of J.J.'s statements made during the custodial interrogation was prejudicial. The evidence regarding allegation 2 was quite different from and much weaker than the evidence regarding allegation 1. C.W., the victim in allegation 2, did not testify. Although A.M. testified that he heard C.W. "sort of scream," he also testified he saw nothing in J.J.'s hand while J.J. was pushing C.W. No witness at the adjudication testified to seeing J.J. take a swipe at C.W. that night. P.C. testified he did not see J.J. swipe at C.W. Other than himself, A.M. did not see J.J. use a weapon against or move against anyone else.
C.W. and J.J. did not agree to fight. There was no text messages between C.W. and J.J., and J.J. did not threaten C.W.
Officer Rodriguez testified he saw "a laceration or scratch that went [a]cross [C.W.'s] abdomen area"; however, a laceration or scratch is not a cut. Officer Rodriguez did not see any cuts or tears on C.W.'s shirt. Pa.C. did not see an injury on C.W. There was no photographic evidence of any injury to C.W.
The juvenile court's denial of J.J.'s motion to dismiss allegation 2 demonstrates the paucity of evidence supporting that allegation. In moving to dismiss allegation 2 under section 701.1, J.J.'s counsel argued, based on the corpus delicti rule, that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of corroborating J.J.'s admission that he had attempted to stab C.W. (See People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 317 [corpus delicti rule "'requires corroboration of the defendant's extrajudicial utterances insofar as they indicate a crime was committed, and forces the People to supply, as part of their burden of proof in every criminal prosecution, some evidence of the corpus delicti aside from, or in addition to, such statements'"].) The juvenile court commented that J.J.'s motion to dismiss under section 701.1 was strongest on allegation 2. The court denied the motion to dismiss but identified only A.M.'s testimony "describing the conduct" as providing corroboration "to support that charge." As the amount of independent evidence required to satisfy the corpus delicti rule is small (Krebs, at p. 317), and A.M.'s testimony relevant to allegation 2 is rather weak, the juvenile court's denial of Joshua's motion to dismiss allegation 2 strongly suggests the court relied on J.J.'s prearrest statements to make a true finding on the allegations.
The juvenile court's not true finding on allegation 3 also suggests it relied on J.J.'s prearrest statements in making a true finding on allegation 2. The state of the evidence as to allegation 3 (victim P.C.) was similar in nature to the evidence regarding allegation 2. No witness, including P.C. himself, testified to seeing J.J. take a swipe at P.C. There was no evidence that P.C. had suffered any cuts or wounds. The court found allegation 3 to be not true. During the custodial interrogation, J.J. admitted he had tried to stab C.W. but did not say anything regarding P.C. It is possible J.J.'s admission explains the difference between the outcomes in allegations 2 and 3, considering the weakness of the evidence on both allegations. We cannot say the true finding on allegation 2 was, beyond a reasonable doubt, unattributable the error in admitting J.J.'s prearrest statements.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's true finding on allegation 2 is reversed. The court's true finding on allegation 1 is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to consider whether a new dispositional order is necessary, or appropriate, in light of our disposition.
WE CONCUR: GOETHALS, ACTING P. J. DELANEY, J.