People v. Jennings

10 Citing cases

  1. People v. Bodely

    95 Cal.App.5th 1193 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 47 times
    In People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1196, a defendant who was fleeing after a robbery hit a man with his car after the man tried to stop him, knocking the man onto the hood of the car.

    First, defendant asserts the record does not establish as a matter of law that he was the actual killer of Andre, because the petition established "the possibility that [defendant] could have been convicted of ‘murder’ based on an accidental death." Defendant cites Court of Appeal decisions in People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 297 Cal.Rptr.3d 806 ( Vang ) and People v. Jennings (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 324, 52 Cal.Rptr. 329 ( Jennings ) to support this argument. Second, defendant contends that "an instruction on producing a death via the ‘natural and probable consequences’ of other acts encouraged the jury to treat the question of causation in the broadest possible terms," thus indicating that defendant may not have been Andre's actual killer as that term is defined.

  2. People v. Earnest

    46 Cal.App.3d 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 5 times
    In People v. Earnest (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 792 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 485], the defendant conspired with Munoz to burn the defendant's house for the insurance proceeds.

    (1) It is settled California law that where, as here, an accomplice in a conspiracy to commit arson for the purpose of defrauding an insurer accidentally burns himself to death, his co-conspirator may not be charged with murder under the felony-murder rule. ( People v. Ferlin (1928) 203 Cal. 587, 595-597 [ 265 P. 230]; Woodruff v. Superior Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 749, 750-752 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 291]; People v. Jennings (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 324, 328-329 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 329].) The last cited of these cases, People v. Jennings, supra, points out that the co-conspirator or accomplice's act of accidentally killing himself does not constitute an "unlawful killing" within the meaning of section 187 of the Penal Code. (243 Cal.App.2d at p. 329.)

  3. People v. Billa

    31 Cal.4th 1064 (Cal. 2003)   Cited 48 times
    Concluding that “felony-murder liability for any death in the course of arson attaches to all accomplices in the felony at least where ... one or more surviving accomplices were present at the scene and active participants in the crime”

    ( Id. at pp. 750-752.) In People v.Jennings (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 324 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 329], three persons, including the defendants, hired another to burn a building for insurance purposes. That person caught fire himself while setting the fire and died later.

  4. Taylor v. Superior Court

    3 Cal.3d 578 (Cal. 1970)   Cited 74 times
    In Taylor v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 578, one of the robbers threatened a storeowner with death and "`chattered insanely.'"

    For lack of that essential element, the murder charge against the defendants in the case at bar should fall.         The cases of People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 597; Woodruff v. Superior Court, 237 Cal.App.2d 749, 750--751, 47 Cal.Rptr. 291, and People v. Jennings, 243 Cal.App.2d 324, 328--329, 52 Cal.Rptr. 329, are not apposite for they simply held that an accomplice cannot be charged with murder when his confederate accidentally kills himself while committing a felony. The courts in those cases were not faced with a situation involving the intentional commission of acts provoking lethal resistance by victims or police officers.

  5. People v. Djordjevic

    230 Mich. App. 459 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 55 times
    Holding that malice may be "inferred from evidence that the defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm"

    Furthermore, decisions in other states are not particularly helpful because our sister states are split on the issue. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500; 113 A.2d 464 (1955), which supports the prosecutors position, and People v. Jennings, 243 Cal.App.2d 324; 52 Cal.Rptr. 329 (1966), which supports defendants position. Furthermore, those cases are distinguishable from the case at bar inasmuch as they were first-degree felony-murder cases. The malice element of second-degree murder is satisfied by showing that the defendant possessed the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with the knowledge that death or great bodily harm would be the probable result.

  6. People v. Teroganesian

    31 Cal.App.4th 1534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 3 times

    ( People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 87 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43].) The accidental killing of oneself does not constitute an unlawful killing within the meaning of Penal Code section 187. ( People v. Jennings (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 324, 329 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 329].) (1c) Similarly, logic would compel the conclusion that the accidental infliction of bodily injury to oneself as a result of the unlawful explosion of a destructive device would not constitute a violation of Penal Code section 12309.

  7. People v. Stamp

    2 Cal.App.3d 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 58 times
    In People v. Stamp, 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 82 Cal.Rptr. 598 (Cal.Ct.App.1969), someone robbed business offices whose 60–year–old manager had a history of heart disease.

    This is true whether the killing is wilfull, deliberate and premeditated, or merely accidental or unintentional, and whether or not the killing is planned as a part of the commission of the robbery. ( People v. Lookadoo, 66 Cal.2d 307, 314 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 608, 425 P.2d 208]; People v. Jennings, 243 Cal.App.2d 324, 328 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 329].) (4a)People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130], merely limits the rule to situations where the killing was committed by the felon or his accomplice acting in furtherance of their common design.

  8. People v. Cline

    270 Cal.App.2d 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 18 times
    In People v. Cline, 75 Cal.Rptr. 459 (Ct.App. 1969), the defendant, while visiting at the residence of the decedent, indicated that he had some phenobarbital tablets.

    (Pen. Code, § 187.) The felony-murder doctrine imputes malice aforethought to the felon who kills another in the commission of one of the felonies enumerated in section 189 of the Penal Code. ( People v. Jennings, 243 Cal.App.2d 324, 327 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 329]; People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 780 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130].) It was enacted to afford the community and its residents protection ( People v. Jennings, supra, p. 328) by acting as a deterrent to those felons who might negligently or accidentally kill.

  9. People v. Vang

    82 Cal.App.5th 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 50 times
    In People v. Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th 64, the defendant coerced his wife into a vehicle and, as he was driving away, his wife opened the door and jumped, resulting in her death.

    This has led to some inconsistency in how the felony-murder rule is applied, particularly in situations where the lethal act was committed by a person other than the defendant or an accomplice acting in furtherance of the underlying felony. (Compare Washington, supra , at p. 781, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 [rule does not apply where accomplice killed by victim because killing was not committed in perpetration of robbery] and People v. Jennings (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 324, 329, 52 Cal.Rptr. 329 [rule does not apply where accomplice accidentally killed self while engaged in arson] with People v. Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209-211, 82 Cal.Rptr. 598 [felony murder applies where there is substantial evidence to prove robbery caused victim's heart attack] (superseded by statute as stated in People v. Flint (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 607, 609, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 522 ), People v. Hernandez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 287, 215 Cal.Rptr. 166 [same], and People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1069-1072, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542 [active participant in arson liable for accidental death of accomplice].)

  10. State v. Williams

    254 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 14 times
    In State v. Williams, 254 So.2d 548, 550 (Fla.2d DCA 1971), it was said that "the obvious ultimate purpose of the felony-murder statute... is, we think, to prevent the death of innocent persons likely to occur during the commission of certain inherently dangerous and particularly grievous felonies."

    We agree with this latter conclusion, but would suggest even a more cogent reason therefore; one which, as the test, would be equally applicable in other felony-murder cases regardless of who did the actual killing, whether a perpetrator, the intended victim or a police officer. See, People v. Ferlin (1928), 203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230; People v. Jennings (1966), 243 Cal.App.2d 324, 52 Cal.Rptr. 329; Woodruff v. Superior Court of County of Los Angeles (1965), 237 Cal.App.2d 749, 47 Cal.Rptr. 291; and People v. La Barbera (1936), 159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y.S. 257. We do not, however, agree with additional reasoning used in those cases to support the result reached, some of which appears unduly to limit the scope of the felony-murder concept.