Opinion
G056727
01-30-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAMEON DUPREE JEFFERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Johanna R. Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15NF1723) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Patrick Donahue, Judge. Affirmed. Johanna R. Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
At a trial on two cases joined pursuant to Penal Code section 954, a jury convicted defendant Dameon Dupree Jefferson of multiple counts of pimping, multiple counts of pandering, one count of trafficking a minor, and one lesser included offense of attempted pimping. On appeal, Jefferson contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the prosecution's motion to join the charges, that joinder amounted to gross unfairness at trial, and that cumulative evidence regarding a 15-year-old victim was erroneously admitted. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 2015, an Anaheim police officer observed Jefferson drive a sedan and drop off two women—Adriana and Jamaica—at a location known for prostitution. The officer observed the women begin walking along a boulevard and Adriana engage a motorist passing by, in a suspicious manner. The officer alerted a law enforcement human trafficking task force and reestablished surveillance of Jefferson in his sedan at a location near where he had dropped off the women. Responding task force members further surveilled all three individuals and eventually made contact with them. Lawful searches of the individuals and the sedan yielded, among other things, condom packaging with corresponding lot numbers and Jamaica's cell phone. Jefferson was arrested and the Orange County District Attorney's Office filed a complaint charging Jefferson with four felony counts of pandering and attempted pimping (a pair of identical counts regarding Jamaica and Adriana, respectively; the 2015 case).
Jefferson posted bail about two months later. Then, in July 2016, he was arrested again by members of the task force—this time as a result of an undercover investigation for prostitution involving a 15-year-old female, J. Jefferson was observed driving J. in a van and dropping her off near a motel where an undercover task force member, posing as a solicitor of prostitution, had arranged a meeting with J. Upon arriving at the agreed upon motel room, J. was confronted by law enforcement officers and Jefferson was arrested at a nearby parking lot. The arrest yielded several electronic devices, including a cell phone containing photos, communication logs, and other data. Additionally, an identification card of Jamaica's was found in Jefferson's vehicle. The Orange County District Attorney's Office filed a complaint against Jefferson, charging three counts of trafficking, pimping, and pandering a minor, with an enhancement charge for committing a crime while on bail (the 2016 case).
In August 2016, the prosecution moved to join the 2015 and 2016 cases, pursuant to section 954. In opposition, Jefferson conceded the statutory requirements for joinder were satisfied but argued that joining the cases would be unduly prejudicial to him so the prosecution's motion should be denied "in the interests of justice and for good cause shown." (§ 954.) Among other arguments, Jefferson contended the charges regarding the minor, J., would make the jury "go beyond the facts and evidence in the case and poison them to a point where they [couldn't] be objective."
The trial court granted the joinder and cited multiple factors in discussing its ruling. A consolidated complaint was immediately filed in September 2016 and trial proceeded on an amended information in July 2018.
During trial, the prosecution presented testimonies of law enforcement officers and J.'s mother. Physical evidence included photographs, videos, and communication records downloaded from the phones seized in both cases, as well as information about activities on a Web site known for facilitating prostitution activities. During closing arguments, the prosecution discussed the 2015 and 2016 cases separately, except in two instances. (See discussion, post, at pt. II.B.) During his rebuttal, Jefferson's trial counsel conceded that prostitution had occurred but claimed there was a lack of evidence that proved Jefferson's control over it, including asserting the prosecutor had not proven that a phone seized in the 2016 case belonged to Jefferson. Counsel suggested that Jefferson had been a solicitor of J. and not her pimp.
Prior to deliberations, the trial court gave instructions to the jury about its duties as the trier of fact, including CALCRIM No. 3515, which stated: "[E]ach of the counts charged in this case is a separate crime[.] You must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict for each one[.]"
The jury convicted Jefferson of all counts as charged except the pimping charge regarding Adriana (count four), where it found Jefferson guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted pimping. The court sentenced Jefferson to serve 12 years in state prison.
II
DISCUSSION
Jefferson makes three contentions on appeal. First, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting joinder and declining to keep the 2015 and 2016 cases separate "in the interests of justice and for good cause shown." (§ 954.) Second, Jefferson contends that, even if granting the motion was not an abuse of discretion, the joint trial actually resulted in a gross unfairness that violated his right to due process. Finally, Jefferson contends the court also abused its discretion in admitting cumulative evidence regarding J. A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law
With respect to joinder, section 954 permits a trial court to order the joinder of "two or more accusatory pleadings" filed in the same court for "two or more different offenses of the same class." (§ 954.) The court has "discretion [to] order that the different offenses . . . be tried separately" based upon "the interests of justice and for good cause shown." (§ 954.) "The law prefers trying charged offenses together because doing so ordinarily promotes efficiency. [Citation.] [S]ection 954 embodies this preference." (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 388; see People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 781-783 [discussing both case specific and systemic economies gained by joinder].)
Where a criminal defendant claims a trial court should have kept joined offenses separate, we review whether the court reasonably weighed "'the potential prejudice of joinder against the state's strong interest in the efficiency of a joint trial. [Citation.]' [Citation.] To succeed on a claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance or ordering consolidation, the defendant must make a '"clear showing of prejudice"' and establish that the ruling fell '"'"'outside the bounds of reason.'"'"'" (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 37-38.) Under well-established case law, whether a defendant has demonstrated a sufficiently "'clear showing of prejudice'" is determined by assessing the "particular circumstances" that were presented to the trial court at the time of its ruling, under four factors: "(1) whether the evidence relating to the various charges would be cross-admissible in separate trials, (2) whether any of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant, (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or with another weak case, and (4) whether one of the charges is a capital offense or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case." (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 123 (Simon).)
As discussed below, we defer to the court's exercise of discretion applying the above factors and hold that Jefferson has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate "a 'clear showing of prejudice'" or that the court's grant of joinder was outside the bounds of reason. (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 122-123.)
1. Cross-admissibility
Cross-admissibility of evidence is the first and "'crucial factor'" to review because "'[i]f evidence of one crime would be admissible in a separate trial of the other crime, prejudice is usually dispelled.'" (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 299.) Relevant here, it is well-established that evidence of uncharged conduct, although generally inadmissible to prove a defendant's propensity to commit a crime, can be admitted for the purpose of establishing other facts such as intent to commit charged conduct. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) A threshold requirement for admitting such evidence to show intent is that the conduct at issue must be "sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant '"probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance."'" (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.) Relative to other grounds for admitting uncharged conduct evidence, "[t]he least degree of similarity . . . is required in order to prove intent." (Ibid.; see Id. at pp. 402-403 ["A greater degree of similarity is required in order to prove the existence of a common design or plan. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The greatest degree of similarity is required for evidence of uncharged misconduct to be relevant to prove identity"].) In addition to similarity, admissibility of uncharged conduct evidence also depends upon the materiality of the fact at issue, the tendency of the uncharged conduct to prove or disprove the fact, and the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of evidence at issue (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 616-617), including the weight of its "'substantial probative value.'" (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1331.)
In its motion to join, the prosecution argued to the court that cross-admissibility existed under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), "to prove absence of mistake, modus operandi, and intent." Among other things, the prosecutor submitted offers of proof that Jefferson engaged in similar conduct in the 2015 and 2016 cases by transporting females to "the same known prostitution track"—in the 2015 case, by dropping Jamaica and Adriana off on the street and in the 2016 case, by dropping off J. "very close to the motel" immediately before she made contact with an undercover task force member pretending to solicit prostitution. The prosecutor also proffered that expert opinion testimony would show both instances implicated "the same indicia of prostitution occurring," including the fact that Jefferson was "supervising [the females] in the typical manner that a pimp does." In opposition to the motion, Jefferson's trial counsel generally asserted cross-admissibility did not exist "on its face" and that the 2015 and 2016 cases presented "two completely different fact patterns" with different victims. But Jefferson did not specify any actual differences nor dispute the prosecutor's factual representations of conduct.
As testified to at trial by law enforcement, "areas that are known for pimping, prostitution, and sex trafficking" can be called "tracks." --------
Based upon the circumstances presented in the motion, the trial court was not outside the bounds of reason to conclude that evidence would be cross-admissible in the event of separate trials. It was reasonable to conclude that cross-admissibility existed for the purpose of establishing Jefferson's intent to commit pimping or pandering, based upon conclusions that the conduct proffered by the prosecutor was sufficiently similar under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), and its "'substantial probative value'" was not outweighed by countervailing risks under Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1331.)
For the first time in his reply brief on appeal, Jefferson cites to three cases to argue there was insufficient similarity between his conduct in the 2015 and 2016 cases. Even if we entertained his belated argument (see Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764 [defendant's argument raised for the first time on appeal through a reply brief not considered]), we are not persuaded. In all three cases, the California Supreme Court rejected various defense arguments that conduct was insufficiently similar. Indeed, the rationale expressed in one of the cases, People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 16, particularly supports our conclusion that the conduct proffered by the prosecutor supported a conclusion that "[a] jury could rationally infer" Jefferson had twice transported females to known locations of prostitution with an intent to commit the crimes charged and that it was unlikely he had done so out of coincidence.
Our conclusion of reasonable discretion is not changed by Jefferson's claim that the trial court based its cross-admissibility finding upon the erroneous ground of Jamaica's identification being found in Jefferson's vehicle in his arrest for the 2016 case (regarding J.). We are not persuaded "'the court's decision [was] influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion'" (Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 90), when it found cross-admissibility. More importantly, even if Jefferson were correct that the court erroneously based its finding solely on Jefferson's possession of Jamaica's identification, such error would be harmless given there was valid ground to find cross-admissibility based upon other conduct that had been proffered by the prosecutor in her motion for joinder. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113 ["a trial court's ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice"], overruled on another point by People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) As discussed above, both cases presented Jefferson transporting females to locations connected to prostitution activities and then supervising them. In sum, Jefferson has not shown the trial court committed reversible error in concluding that cross-admissibility existed.
2. Remaining secondary factors
Even if this case presented an unusual instance where cross-admissibility alone was insufficient to dispel undue prejudice (see People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775 [cross-admissibility "alone is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court's refusal to sever properly joined charges"]), we would in any case hold that Jefferson has not met his burden to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion. (See § 954.1; see also Soper, at p. 775 [even where cross-admissibility is not found "that determination would not itself establish prejudice or an abuse of discretion by the trial court in declining to sever properly joined charges"].) Specifically, we reject Jefferson's assertions the trial court failed to conduct appropriate analysis under the Simon factors and find the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find "weak charges that might not merit conviction in separate trials" (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 127) or that "'"'strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory crime . . . bolster[ed] a [joined] weak prosecution case.'"'" (Id. at p. 124.)
a. weak cases factor
As to the factor of "whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or with another weak case" (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 123), we weigh the benefits of joinder against any potential spillover effect caused by aggregated evidence (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 782-783) to determine if the factor supports "a 'clear showing of prejudice.'" (Simon, at pp. 122-123.)
In its motion to join, the prosecutor proffered that Jamaica admitted she was a prostitute (but denied that Jefferson was her pimp), and when Jefferson dropped off Jamaica and Adriana at the "track," all three had been wearing matching T-shirts stating "'No Day$ Off.'" The prosecution also represented that both Jamaica and Adriana were found to be in possession of condoms that matched the lot number of a condom box found on Jefferson and that Jamaica's cell phone had contained saved contact information for both Adriana and Jefferson. In opposition, Jefferson's trial counsel generally asserted that the 2015 and 2016 cases were "circumstantial" and "lack[ed] detail[]," but did not dispute the accuracy of the prosecution's factual summaries of the cases. Accordingly, there was sufficient grounds for the trial court to make a reasoned decision that both cases were "sufficiently compelling" in their own right and not weak. (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 127.)
On appeal, Jefferson asserts the 2015 case was "extremely weak" as it related to Adriana, but offers no meaningful analysis as to what was presented to the court at the time of its ruling on this point. In contrast, the Attorney General cites to the circumstances mentioned above, to counterargue the 2015 case was not weak with respect to Adriana. We are not persuaded by Jefferson's citations to case law. For example, Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, is inapt because the weak case found there involved a questionable eye-witness identification of a shooter in a vehicle and, more importantly, that court's entire analysis of the factors discussed here was explicitly based upon a twice-heightened "degree of scrutiny" because the case involved capital punishment triggered by the joinder of the offenses. (Id. at p. 454.)
Accordingly, given substantial benefits manifested by the joinder of the 2015 and 2016 cases, such as common opinion testimony about pimping subculture and a lower burden on the public court system (see, e.g., People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 782 ["'[t]he jury would also have to be educated in both cases regarding facts unique to the transient lifestyle' . . . . [¶] . . . [Also, w]henever properly joined charges are severed, the burden on the public court system of processing the charges is substantially increased"]), Jefferson has not carried his burden on appeal to show the trial court abused its discretion in declining to find "weak charges that might not merit conviction in separate trials." (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 127.)
b. inflammatory charges factor
As to the next Simon factor of "whether any of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant" (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 123), the absence of a weak case just discussed also informs our conclusion as to whether this factor of inflammatory charges outweighed the benefits of joinder (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 782), to support "a 'clear showing of prejudice.'" (Simon, at pp. 122-123.) Although it is well taken "courts have recognized that sex crimes can be quite inflammatory, especially when they involve young victims. . . . [¶] [T]he animating concern underlying this factor is not merely whether evidence from one offense is repulsive, because repulsion alone does not necessarily engender undue prejudice. [Citation.] Rather, the issue is 'whether "'strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak prosecution case' on another crime."' [Citation.] In [People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 850], for instance, [the California Supreme Court] held that joinder of a brutal rape incident with a separate robbery did not unduly inflame the jury against the defendant. [Citation.] [I]n part, because the evidence of the separate robbery was far from weak . . . ." (Id. at p. 124.)
It is well taken that trafficking a minor to sell her body for profit is a repulsive crime. However, it does not follow that the trial court was outside the bounds of reason in implicitly finding that repulsiveness was alone insufficient under the circumstances and rejecting Jefferson's argument for undue prejudice regarding this factor because he had not shown that "'"'strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory crime . . . bolster[ed] a [joined] weak prosecution case.'"'" (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 124.) In sum, the Simon factors do not demonstrate reversible error compelled by "a 'clear showing of prejudice.'" (Id. at pp. 122-123.)
c. capital punishment factor
As to the final Simon factor, in contrast to several of the cases cited to by Jefferson, this case did not implicate capital punishment. (See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 454 [twice-heightened "degree of scrutiny" applied, explicitly based upon capital punishment triggered by the joinder of offenses]; see also Coleman v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 129, 139-140 ["The charge sought to be severed carries the ultimate sanction—death"].) Accordingly, this factor does not "militate[] against the benefits of joinder in the present proceedings." (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 780.) B. Gross Unfairness
Beyond the motion ruling, Jefferson additionally contends his convictions should be reversed because joinder of the 2015 and 2016 cases amounted to "gross unfairness" at his trial, violating his right to due process. Indeed, "[e]ven if we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance pretrial, we must also determine 'whether events after the court's ruling demonstrate that joinder actually resulted in "gross unfairness" amounting to a denial of defendant's constitutional right to fair trial or due process of law.'" (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 129.)
"In determining whether joinder resulted in gross unfairness, we have observed that a judgment will be reversed on this ground only if it is reasonably probable that the jury was influenced by the joinder in its verdict of guilt." (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 129-130.) We make no such finding here. As mentioned above, we note two instances during closing arguments when the prosecutor explicitly discussed both the 2015 and 2016 cases together. The first instance was in discussing Jefferson blocking his caller identification when calling J. Specifically, the prosecutor stated to the jury: "What does that sound similar to? The defendant's actions one year earlier when he is getting frustrated that Jamaica isn't responding. In the same vein, he is taking additional measures now to try and maintain that communication. He is blocking his number to get her [i.e., J.] to pick up." In the second instance, the prosecution stated: "[T]he only purpose [Jefferson] had in going around Orange County with a 15-year-old girl was to sell her body for sex to put money in his pockets. And just as he did that in 2016, ladies and gentlemen, he did the exact same thing in pimping and pandering Jamaica and Adriana in 2015." We also note that during Jefferson's rebuttal, his trial counsel addressed the inflammatory potential of the 2016 case: "And so the district attorney cannot stand up here and say, 'look, she is 15 [years old]. Mr. Jefferson was making her sell herself, and without condoms.' You can say all of that to scare you. And we can use the word 'minor,' 'minor,' and 'minor.' We can use those words. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] But if you use the word consistently enough, 'minor,' and we can scare you about S.T.D.'s - it has no basis or relevance to anything that was here."
Jefferson has not met his "high burden" of demonstrating "gross unfairness." (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 783-784.) Even assuming that the two instances of the prosecutor's argument above amounted to a "conflation of events," case law still supports a conclusion that they would not be, by themselves, sufficient to sustain a finding of "gross unfairness." (See Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 130-131 [contrasting two incidents of "conflation" to another case demonstrating "repeated conflation of events" in concluding "gross unfairness" not shown by defendant].) Cases Jefferson relies on are unpersuasive because those cases found gross unfairness based upon findings of weak cases that were bolstered. (People v. Grant (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 579, 587-588, 593-594; Bean v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1998) 163 F.3d 1073, 1083-1085, and People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372, 401-407, 411), whereas we find neither ground in this case. Indeed, Jefferson's citation to Earle particularly weighs against Jefferson's argument because that case involved blatant and repeated conflation and bolstering by the prosecutor (Earle, at pp. 409-411 ["It is no exaggeration to say that [the prosecutor] mentioned the [extremely strong] indecent exposure at every opportunity, on every conceivable pretext, and for every possible purpose"]), not present in the record here.
We apply the rationale expressed by the California Supreme Court in Simon to conclude gross unfairness has not been demonstrated. As in that case, as well as Jefferson's citation to People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th 759, an appropriate jury instruction was given to consider "[e]ach of the counts charged . . . [as] a separate crime[.]" (See Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 130 ["'Each count charges a distinct crime. You must decide each Count separately'"]; see also Soper, at p. 784, fn. 18 [citing same jury instruction as Simon].) Jefferson does not challenge the presumption that the jury followed its instructions. (People v. O'Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 969-970.) Also, similar to the verdicts in Simon and Soper, the jury's conviction of Jefferson for the lesser included offense of attempted pimping with regard to Adriana (count four) supports a conclusion that the jury weighed the evidence and differentiated between the 2015 and 2016 case charges, further weighing in favor of a conclusion that Jefferson has not shown "gross unfairness." (See Simon, at pp. 129-130 ["What is more, the fact that the jury found Simon guilty of first degree murder in the killings of [two victims], but only second degree murder of [a third victim], 'strongly suggests that the jury was capable of weighing the evidence and differentiating among [the] various charges'"]; see also Soper, at p. 784 [noting the jury convicted defendant of first degree murder as to one victim and second degree murder as to another victim].) C. Cumulative Evidence Claim
Finally, we reject Jefferson's contention that his convictions should be reversed because the "[trial] court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to 'over-prove its case'" with regard to J. (Boldfacing and capitalization omitted.) A trial court "in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (Evid. Code, § 352.)
The prosecutor's theory for the 2016 case was based upon direct evidence, such as Jefferson transporting J. to a prostitution location, coupled with circumstantial evidence, such as text messages and internet activities that sought the drawing of inferences by the jury. Jefferson conceded that J. was engaging in prostitution, but argued the prosecutor had not carried her burden to show Jefferson had controlled J.'s prostitution activities. Indeed, a central point of contention was that the prosecutor had not shown a cell phone—containing photos, communication logs, and other data—found in Jefferson's vehicle belonged to him and not J. Jefferson's trial counsel argued to the jury: "How do we know beyond a reasonable doubt that this is Mr. Jefferson communicating with sex purchasers when we know what has already been found on the phone? [¶] The extraction of the phone. . . . [¶] If this was Mr. Jefferson's phone, where is his personal email like [J.'s] personal email? . . . . [¶] The district attorney wants to make believe that the phone belongs to Mr. Jefferson beyond a reasonable doubt. And the question that I have is: based upon what?"
Given Jefferson's trial contentions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the evidence cited by Jefferson on appeal, emphasizing "the admission of scantily clad and naked pictures" of J., was not substantially outweighed by the countervailing factors under Evidence Code section 352. It was clearly within reason for the prosecutor to offer the challenged evidence so that it could be cross-referenced to infer Jefferson's guilt. Indeed, the record shows the exhibits cited by Jefferson were admitted for different purposes and not repetitious ones, as Jefferson contends. For example, pictures downloaded from the phone that Jefferson's trial counsel disclaimed, were admitted to prove the location of J. at the time the pictures were taken, whereas other pictures captured from a Web site were offered with the testimony of J.'s mother to establish that the female pictured in prostitution advertisements (without a clear shot of her face), was indeed J. In sum, Jefferson has not demonstrated that the court abused its broad discretion in allowing the challenged evidence.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J. GOETHALS, J.