Opinion
A157470
08-05-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THOMAS JAMES JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR946553)
Thomas James Jackson pled no contest to battery with serious bodily injury under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d), a serious felony. (Pen. Code, § 1192.7 subd. (c).) He was sentenced to four years in state prison. He contends he should have been sentenced to county jail. We affirm.
All references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
BACKGROUND
Jackson pled no contest to a single count of battery with serious bodily injury under section 243, subdivision (d) ("Section 243(d)"), after he struck a man at a bar and knocked out his tooth. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Jackson on three years' probation.
Months later, his probation was summarily revoked after he was arrested for driving on a suspended license, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of a stun gun. He admitted violating probation.
The trial court terminated Jackson's probation and imposed the aggravated term of four years in state prison for his Section 243(d) conviction. He now appeals the sentence.
DISCUSSION
Jackson contends the trial court erred when it sentenced him to state prison because a Section 243(b) conviction only authorizes commitment to county jail. We disagree.
Jackson's claim raises an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (People v. LaDuke (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 95, 100.) "Our fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs." (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272.)
Section 243(d) states: "When a battery is committed against any person and serious bodily injury is inflicted on the person, the battery is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, three, or four years." (§ 243, subd. (d).)
Subject to certain exceptions, Section 1170, subdivision (h) ("Section 1170(h)") provides for commitment to county jail for certain felonies, rather than state prison. (§ 1170, subd. (h); People v. Griffis (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 956, 961-962.) Subdivision (h)(1) ("Section 1170(h)(1)") states: "Except as provided in paragraph (3), a felony punishable pursuant to this subdivision where the term is not specified in the underlying offense shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment in a county jail for 16 months, or two or three years." (§ 1170, subd. (h)(1), italics added.) Subdivision (h)(2) ("Section 1170(h)(2)") states: "Except as provided in paragraph (3), a felony punishable pursuant to this subdivision shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for the term described in the underlying offense." (§ 1170, subd. (h)(2), italics added.)
Accordingly, Section 1170, subdivision (h)(3) ("Section 1170(h)(3)") sets forth the exceptions. (See § 1170, subd. (h)(3).) It reads: "Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), where the defendant . . . has a prior or current felony conviction for a serious felony described in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 . . . an executed sentence for a felony punishable pursuant to this subdivision shall be served in the state prison." (§ 1170, subd. (h)(3), italics added.)
Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), provides that a "serious felony" includes "any felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice." (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
Jackson's no contest plea to violating Section 243(d) requires that he be punished pursuant to Section 1170(h). (§ 243, subd. (d).) Under Sections 1170(h)(1) and (2) commitment to county jail is prescribed for specified felonies "except as provided in paragraph (3)." (§ 1170, subds. (h)(1), (2).) One exception stated in paragraph (3) provides that a defendant with a "felony conviction for a serious felony described in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7" shall serve his or her punishment "in the state prison." (§ 1170, subd. (h)(3).)
California courts have recognized that the term "serious bodily injury," as used in section 243, is "essentially equivalent to and synonymous" with the term "great bodily injury," as used in section 1192.7. (See People v. Moore (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1868, 1870.) It is undisputed that Jackson's offense qualified as a serious felony. Under the plain meaning of Section 1170(h)(3), the trial court properly committed Jackson to state prison.
Jackson claims Section 243(d) is ambiguous because its express language provides for incarceration pursuant to Section 1170(h), which normally allows a commitment to county jail. But serious felonies such as the one Jackson was convicted of are excluded from county jail eligibility under Section 1170(h)(3). Reviewing the relevant statutes as a whole, there is no ambiguity. Section 1170(h)(3) clearly states that a defendant convicted of a serious felony, such as Section 243(d), must be sentenced to state prison. The statute's provisions apply "notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2)," which specify county jail eligibility. The statute's plain meaning shows the Legislature's intent that the exclusions in Section 1170(h)(3) control over Sections 1170(h)(1) and (2).
Jackson relies on People v. Guillen (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 992 (Guillen) and People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310 (Butcher) for the general proposition that a statute's express reference to Section 1170(h) indicates the Legislature's intent to allow a county jail sentence for that crime. (See, e.g., Butcher, at p. 321 ["If the governing statute so provides that the offense is punishable pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h), the felony sentence must be served in county jail."].) We are not persuaded. Guillen involved a sentence for driving under the influence under Vehicle Code section 23550.5. (Guillen, at p. 995.) Butcher involved a sentence for reckless driving while evading a police officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2. (Butcher, at pp. 321-322.) Neither case involved a statute that directed sentencing under Section 1170(h), nor do they address the exception in Section 1170(h)(3).
Jackson's reliance on the rule of lenity is misplaced. " 'The rule [of lenity] applies only if the court can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended; there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to justify invoking the rule.' " (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58.) There is no egregious ambiguity or uncertainty to justify applying the rule in this case. Section 1170(h)(3) plainly requires that sentences for serious felonies, such as battery with serious bodily injury under Section 243(d), are to be served in state prison.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Siggins, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Fujisaki, J. /s/_________
Jackson, J.