Opinion
FYC-00000-00/000
02-13-2020
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. J.A., Adolescent Offender.
Hon. Madeline Singas, Nassau County District Attorney, Tova Simpson, Esq., Robert Schalk, Esq., Counsel for Adolescent Offender J.A.
Hon. Madeline Singas, Nassau County District Attorney, Tova Simpson, Esq., Robert Schalk, Esq., Counsel for Adolescent Offender J.A.
The defendant in this matter, J.A. (D.O.B. 00/00/2003) is charged as an Adolescent Offender ("AO") in the Youth Part of the County Court in Nassau County. He is charged by way of a felony complaint with one count of Gang Assault in the First Degree [ Penal Law § 120.07 ] and with one count of Assault in the First Degree [ Penal Law § 120.10(1) ]. The within Decision and Order is issued following the Court's review of the accusatory instrument, arguments by counsel and other relevant facts pursuant to CPL 722.23(2)(b).
The charges filed against the AO relate to an incident alleged to have taken place on January 8, 2020, at about 2:40 PM in U., N.C., New York. The AO was arrested on January 10, 2020 and was arraigned by an Accessible Magistrate on January 11, 2020. On January 23, 2020 , the Court conducted a "sixth-day appearance" pursuant to CPL § 722.23(2)(a), to review the accusatory instrument and determine whether the AO's case is disqualified from automatic removal to the Family Court.
The AO, through counsel, waived the timeliness of the sixth-day appearance.
CPL § 722.23 provides that, with limited exception, AO matters are to be automatically removed to the Family Court unless, within thirty days of the AO's arraignment, the People move to prevent removal of the action. ( CPL § 722.23[1][a] ). However, in cases, such as this one, where the AO has been charged with one or more violent felonies, the Youth Part judge is required to schedule an appearance no later than six calendar days following arraignment to review the accusatory instrument and "any other relevant facts" and determine whether the matter will proceed toward automatic removal to Family Court under CPL § 722.23(1)(a) or be disqualified from such automatic removal. ( CPL § 722.23[2] ).
At that sixth-day appearance, the Court is required to review the accusatory instrument and "any other relevant facts" to determine whether the People prove, "by a preponderance of the evidence", one or more of the following three aggravating factors "as set forth in the accusatory instrument:
(i) the defendant caused significant physical injury to a person other than a participant in the offense"; or
(ii) the defendant displayed a firearm, shotgun, rifle or deadly weapon as defined in the penal law in furtherance of such offense; or
(iii) the defendant unlawfully engaged in sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct or sexual conduct as defined in section 130.00 of the penal law."
( CPL § 722.23[2][c] ). Both parties may be heard and submit information relevant to the Court's determination. ( CPL § 722.23[2][b] ). If the People satisfy their burden, then the case is disqualified from automatic removal to the Family Court. [ CPL § 722.23(2)(c) ].
SIXTH DAY APPEARANCE FOR REVIEW OF ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT
At the sixth-day appearance in this matter, the People did not call any witnesses or submit any medical records into evidence. However, one photograph of the victim's injuries was entered into evidence, on consent [People's Exhibit 1]. The People relied upon the factual allegations set forth in the Felony Complaint and asserted additional hearsay-based facts. Defense counsel did not assert any arguments in response to the People's presentation.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
It is alleged in the felony complaint that on or about January 8, 2020, at about 2:40 PM at W. Street in U., N.C., New York, the AO and four other individuals confronted the victim. It is further alleged that this AO stabbed the victim with a knife in his lower abdomen. It is further alleged that the victim was also struck in the head by two male subjects (neither one this AO). It is further alleged that the victim suffered an intercranial bleed and a stab wound to his lower left abdomen.
At the sixth-day appearance, the People further asserted that this AO was identified by several witnesses and by the victim as the individual who possessed the knife and who actually stabbed the victim in his lower left abdomen. The People further asserted that the stabbing resulted in a "significant injury" to the victim, and that the victim was in the hospital for four days due to the stab wound and the intercranial bleeding. It was further asserted that the victim remained bandaged up from the stab wound for two weeks after the incident occurred. People's Exhibit 1 depicted the victim's stab wound, and showed the victim bandaged up in the hospital with blood on his sheets under his abdomen.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The purpose of the statutory sixth-day appearance is for the Court to review the accusatory instrument and "other relevant facts" to determine whether the People proved by a "preponderance of the evidence", as set forth in the accusatory instrument, the presence of one or more of three factors that will "disqualify" the AO's case from proceeding towards automatic removal to the Family Court; including, as relevant here, that the AO "caused significant injury" to the victim. ( CPL § 722.23[2] ). To establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence means that the fact is more likely than not to have occurred". ( Matter of Beautisha B. , 115 AD3d 854, 854 [2d Dept. 2014] ; People Giuca , 33 NY3d 462, 486 [2019] [in dissent ] ).
The issue in this case is whether the People proved "by a preponderance of the evidence", that the AO "caused significant physical injury to the victim". As there is no statutory definition for the term "significant physical injury", the Court must "ascertain the legislative intent and construe the pertinent statutes to effectuate that intent". ( People v. Roberts , 31 NY3d 406, 418 [2018] ). "As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof". ( Roberts , supra , 31 NY3d at 418 ).
Therefore, the Court begins by giving the term "significant" its "ordinary" and "commonly understood" meaning and in doing so, the Court can use dictionary definitions as "useful guideposts". ( People v. Andujar , 30 NY3d 160, 163 [2017] ; People v. Ocasio , 28 NY3d 178, 181 [2016] ). Merriam Webster defines "significant" as "having or likely to have influence or effect: important". (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, significant [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant] ). Cambridge dictionary defines "significant" similarly, as "important, large or great, especially in leading to a different result or to an important change". (Cambridge Online Dictionary, significant [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/significant] ).
The Court finds that construing the phrase "significant physical injury" to mean an "important", "large or great" physical injury is not helpful in ascertaining the legislative intent. The legislative history for the "Raise the Age" ["RTA"] legislation is more helpful in determining that intent. When negotiating the RTA legislation, legislators could not agree on whether the test should be "physical injury" or "serious physical injury", so they compromised and used "significant physical injury" in order to "get [the] bill done". (Assembly, Record of Proceedings, April 8, 2017 ["Assembly Record"], p. 26). They contemplated that the courts would define the phrase "significant physical injury", and that the definition would "fall somewhere in between" a "physical injury" and a "serious physical injury", both of which are phrases defined elsewhere in the Penal Law . (Assembly Record , p. 48). To that end, legislators contemplated that a "significant" physical injury would be "more serious than a bruise, but less serious than a disfigurement". (Assembly Record , p. 27).
"Physical injury" is defined as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain", [Penal Law § 10.00(9) ], while "serious physical injury" is defined as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ" [Penal Law § 10.00(10) ].
As the term "significant physical injury" is not defined by statute, and because legislators contemplated that the term "significant physical injury" would be court-defined, there are no precise examples of what constitutes a qualifying "significant physical injury". However, after comparing the People's evidence and arguments concerning the victim's injuries in this case, with cases where a stab wound has been found to constitute a "physical injury" , and with cases where a stab wound has been found to constitute a "serious physical injury" , the Court finds that the People have established, for sixth-day appearance purposes, that this AO caused sufficiently "significant physical injury" to the victim to warrant keeping his case in the Youth Part.
E.g. , People v. Brown , 95 AD3d 1229 [2d Dept. 2012].
E.g. , People v. Rudenko , 151 AD3d 1084, 1084 [2d Dept. 2017].
The Court finds that the People made a sufficient showing to warrant disqualifying the AO's case from removal to the Family Court, based on allegations and evidence that the AO stabbed the victim with a knife in his lower abdomen. The Court is further persuaded by the photographic evidence depicting the victim's injury and showing blood-soaked sheets under the victim's bandaged midsection (People's Ex. 1); and by the hearsay-based fact that the victim was hospitalized for multiple days in part due to the stab wound, and that his stab wound continued to require bandaging at least two weeks after the incident occurred.
Further relevant to the Court's determination is the fact that the AO's counsel did not assert any evidence or arguments in opposition to the People's presentation.
Accordingly, because the People have met their burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the AO caused "significant physical injury" to the victim in this case, the AO's case is disqualified from automatic removal to the Family Court and the case will remain in the Youth Part.
This constitutes the opinion, decision and order of this Court.