Opinion
C083553
07-26-2017
In re J. B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J. B., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JV137048)
Minor J. B. appeals from a disposition declaring him a continued ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found he had committed unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and drove without a valid driver's license (§ 12500, subd. (a)). The court ordered him to serve 83 days in juvenile hall with credit for 83 days served, revoked and reinstated his probation with various terms and conditions, and committed him to a level A facility for two years with credit for 216 days served. One of the minor's conditions of probation requires him to "take psychotropic medications when prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner if [his] parent(s)/guardian consents."
Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
On appeal, the minor contends: (1) substantial evidence does not support his adjudication for driving without a valid driver's license; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to a level A facility; (3) the medication probation condition is constitutionally overbroad; and (4) the juvenile court failed to assure compliance with mandatory statutory requirements before requiring him to take psychotropic medication.
We reject the minor's challenge to his level A placement and his adjudication for driving without a valid driver's license. We agree with the minor the medication probation condition is constitutionally infirm and remand with directions to the trial court to modify or strike the condition. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The disposition which is the subject of this appeal followed several previous actions by the juvenile court over a relatively short period.
Initially, in March 2015, the prosecutor filed a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleging the minor -- who was then 14 years old -- had committed felony unlawful driving or taking a vehicle (§ 10851, subd. (a)) and felony receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). The minor was released to the custody of his mother on electronic monitoring.
In April 2015, the minor was arrested after he had been out of range of his electronic monitoring equipment without authorization on two occasions. The minor was detained and an amended petition was filed, adding a count for misdemeanor driving without a valid driver's license (§ 12500, subd. (a)).
After the minor admitted he had committed misdemeanor violations of unlawful driving or taking a vehicle and driving without a valid driver's license, the remaining count was dismissed. The juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation with various terms and conditions, including the condition he serve 15 days in juvenile hall with credit for four days served, followed by 45 days on electronic monitoring with 14 days of credit.
Then in June 2015, the probation officer filed a petition alleging the minor violated the conditions of his probation on eight occasions by staying away from his home overnight without permission of his parent and by remaining away from his home for more than 48 hours on three occasions without permission of his probation officer.
In July 2015, the minor admitted one probation violation and the remaining violations were dismissed. The juvenile court revoked and reinstated his probation and ordered him to serve 30 days in juvenile hall with credit for 21 days served, followed by 30 days on electronic monitoring and then 30 days on home supervision.
In August 2015, the prosecutor filed a second juvenile wardship petition alleging the minor committed misdemeanor making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) and misdemeanor resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). After he admitted to making a criminal threat, the remaining count was dismissed. The juvenile court revoked and reinstated his probation and ordered him to serve 60 days in juvenile hall with credit for 20 days served, followed by 45 days on electronic monitoring and then 30 days on home supervision.
In March 2016, the probation officer filed a petition alleging the minor had violated the conditions of his probation by remaining away from his home for more than 48 hours without permission of the probation officer, failing to be home by curfew, and being absent or tardy to school on numerous occasions. It was also alleged the minor violated his waiver in lieu of commitment. On the same day, the prosecutor filed a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777) alleging three probation violations based on the minor's three positive drug tests, possession of marijuana and methamphetamine, and absence from school on numerous days.
In April 2016, the prosecutor filed a third wardship petition alleging the minor had committed felony possession of a firearm capable of being concealed. (Pen. Code, § 29610.) At the conclusion of the contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the firearm count untrue and sustained three probation violations from the probation officer's petition and two probation violations from the prosecutor's petition. The court revoked and reinstated the minor's probation and ordered him to serve 73 days in juvenile hall with credit for 73 days served, followed by 60 days on electronic monitoring with credit for 20 days and then 20 days on home supervision.
Finally, in August 2016, the prosecutor filed a fourth wardship petition alleging the minor had committed felony driving or taking a vehicle (§ 10851, subd. (a)), felony receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor driving without a valid driver's license (§ 12500, subd. (a)). At the conclusion of the contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the receiving a stolen vehicle count untrue and the remaining counts true. At the contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court granted the minor's motion to reduce the unlawful driving or taking a vehicle from a felony to a misdemeanor. The court then revoked and reinstated his probation and ordered him to serve 83 days in juvenile hall with credit for 83 days served. The court also committed him to suitable level A placement for a maximum period of confinement of two years with credit for 216 days served. One of the minor's conditions of probation requires him to "take psychotropic medications when prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner if [his] parent(s)/guardian consents."
The minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Sufficiency Of The Evidence Of Driving Without A Valid License
Minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his adjudication for misdemeanor driving a vehicle without a valid driver's license. He argues the evidence was insufficient to support a finding he drove a vehicle "upon a highway" within the meaning of section 12500, subdivision (a). We disagree.
In October 2016, a contested jurisdictional hearing was held on the allegation in the fourth wardship petition that defendant drove a vehicle without a valid driver's license. At the hearing, the minor's mother testified about two incidents involving the minor taking her vehicle without permission while they resided in an apartment complex on Coloma Road in Sacramento County.
The first incident occurred on August 13, 2016. Around 10:30 p.m., mother gave the minor the keys to her car so he could retrieve some paperwork from inside the car. About 15 to 20 minutes later, she went outside to check on him and could not find him or her car. Mother immediately called the police but they were unable to locate the car or the minor until the next morning around 7:00 a.m. When the police found the car, it was parked in mother's parking space in the apartment complex. The minor was sitting in the driver's seat and the car was not "running." The minor was the only person in the car.
The second incident occurred about a month later. Around 10:00 p.m., mother noticed the keys to her SUV were missing. She went outside and discovered her SUV was gone. When the minor returned home the next day, he handed the keys to the SUV to his mother.
Mother testified the minor did not have a driver's license and did not have permission to take her vehicles. Mother, however, also testified she did not see the minor driving her vehicles on the relevant dates. She also stated the minor had friends who lived within walking distance from their apartment.
Following testimony, the minor argued there was insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation he drove a vehicle without a valid driver's license. He argued there was no evidence he personally drove a vehicle on a public street or highway. The prosecutor disagreed, contending the circumstantial evidence supported a finding the minor drove his mother's car on a highway without a valid driver's license on August 13 and/or 14, 2016. He argued the only reasonable conclusion from the evidence is the minor took his mother's car, "ran off somewhere, came back, [and then] fell asleep." In support of his argument, the prosecutor noted the minor took his mother's car keys prior to mother discovering her car was missing, mother did not see the car anywhere in the apartment complex's parking lot, and the minor was found in the driver's seat of the car the next morning while the car was parked inside the apartment complex. In response to the court's inquiry regarding the evidence supporting the public highway element, the prosecutor asserted: "[T]he [mother] stated that she looked in the parking lot and did not see the vehicle there. If we eliminate the parking lot, the only thing left is Coloma [Road]. I would ask the Court to take judicial notice that Coloma [Road] is a public street, as it's in the county of Sacramento." Without elaboration, the juvenile court sustained the allegation the minor drove a vehicle without a valid driver's license.
" 'The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials.' " (In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 994.) " 'Under this standard, the critical inquiry is "whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation.] An appellate court "must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citations.]' " (Ibid.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, whether a contrary finding is also possible does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 289-290; In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 631.)
" 'Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933.) However, "[e]vidence which merely raises a strong suspicion of the defendant's guilt is not sufficient to support a conviction. Suspicion is not evidence; it merely raises a possibility, and this is not a sufficient basis for an inference of fact." (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755; see People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 ["[a] reasonable inference, . . . 'may not be based on suspicion alone' "], disapproved on another ground in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544, fn. 5.)
Section 12500, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part: "A person may not drive a motor vehicle upon a highway, unless the person then holds a valid driver's license issued under [the Vehicle] [C]ode . . . ." (Italics added.) To prove that a person is guilty of this crime, the prosecutor must establish the person drove a motor vehicle on a highway, did not hold a valid California driver's license while driving, and was not excused from having a driver's license. (See CALCRIM No. 2221.) The Vehicle Code defines "highway" as: "[A] way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. Highway includes street." (§ 360.)
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the minor, we conclude substantial evidence supports the minor's adjudication for driving a vehicle without a valid driver's license. Although there is no direct evidence the minor drove his mother's car or SUV on the dates in question, the circumstantial evidence in the record is sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the minor drove a vehicle on a highway.
II
Commitment To A Level A Facility
The minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to a level A facility. He argues the court had no assurance his mental health and substance abuse treatment needs would be met in such a placement. According to the minor, the court should have placed him in his mother's home with continuing juvenile justice diversion and treatment program (treatment program) services. We find no error.
Prior to the contested dispositional hearing on the fourth wardship petition, the probation officer submitted a memorandum recommending the minor be continued as a ward of the court and committed to the care, custody, and supervision of the probation department for suitable level A placement. In support of the recommendation for level A placement, the probation officer concluded as follows: "[A]ll supervision options ha[ve] been exhausted[,] i.e.[,] Home Supervision (HS), Electronic Monitoring (EM), Juvenile Work Project (JWP); time spent in custody. In addition, the minor was offered Juvenile Justice Diversion Treatment Program (JJDTP) and Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST), all to no avail. This is the minor's fifth appearance before the Court in a relatively short period of time, and the minor continues to show a lack of concern for the conditions the Court has placed upon him. The minor has shown a blatant disregard for his safety and the safety of the community, and needs to be held accountable for his actions. Probation feels the minor will benefit from residing in a more structured and goal oriented environment which would address all of his criminogenic, behavioral and emotional needs."
At the outset of the hearing, the prosecutor requested the juvenile court follow the recommendation of the probation officer, arguing that level A placement was appropriate because "lower form[s] of supervision" (e.g., home supervision, electronic monitoring) and numerous "stint[s]" of in-custody confinement had not had any effect on the minor's behavior. The minor requested he be released to the custody of his mother with an order directing him to continue participating in the treatment program.
In support of his position, the minor called two witnesses: Kristy Schwee and his mother. When Schwee testified, she explained she oversaw the treatment program at River Oak Center for Children and gave a brief overview of the services provided by the program, including the mental health and substance abuse treatment services. When mother testified, she said she wanted the minor to return home. She explained she had recently observed positive effects from the minor's participation in treatment program counseling, including increased maturity, remorsefulness, and a willingness to take responsibility for his behavior. She also noted the minor had set new goals for himself, including continuing his schooling and doing more around the house to help his siblings. On cross-examination, mother admitted the minor had repeatedly stolen cars and continued to associate with a group of people who were "into" committing crimes, even though she had told him not to engage in such behavior on multiple occasions. Mother, however, claimed the minor had stopped hanging around these people just before he was taken into custody for the conduct underlying the fourth wardship petition.
Following this testimony, defense counsel urged the juvenile court not to commit the minor to level A placement because he was making progress as a result of the treatment program, which provided the most effective rehabilitation services, the treatment program services had not been exhausted, and he would not receive the same rehabilitative services if was placed in a level A facility. Defense counsel also argued that level A placement was not appropriate because the minor was not a great risk to the public since he had not committed any serious or violent crimes. Alternatively, defense counsel requested a stayed level A commitment. The prosecutor argued level A placement was appropriate based on the minor's continued criminality while living with his mother. He asserted that a level A facility was the best place for the minor to receive counseling services.
The juvenile court ordered level A placement and adopted the recommendations in the probation report, which included the following findings: (1) continuance in the mother's home would be contrary to the minor's welfare; (2) the mother failed or neglected to provide the proper maintenance and training for the minor; and (3) the minor has been tried on probation in mother's custody and failed to reform. In ordering level A placement, the court found that the once or three times a week services provided by the treatment program were not enough for the minor who was in need of intensive daily therapies. The court explained, "[T]he number of chances that [the minor has] had in the last year and the number of times [he has] been in and out of custody, doing the same thing and expecting a different result . . . is [not] good enough. [¶] Accepting incremental change for small movements in [the treatment program] . . . is [not] enough. I think daily therapy is what it's going to take to turn this around quicker, so [the minor does not] spend now until age 18 having the[ ] same problems." In finding there were no additional preplacement services which would prevent the need for removal, the court noted the minor had been given several months to avail himself of the services provided by the treatment program and such services had not drastically changed his behavior.
In committing the minor to a level A facility, the juvenile court directed the probation officer to find a placement as close to the minor's mother as possible so she could continue participating in counseling with him.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (a), provides that a minor cannot be removed from a parent or guardian unless the court makes one of the following findings: "(1) That the parent or guardian is incapable of providing or has failed or neglected to provide proper maintenance, training, and education for the minor. [¶] (2) That the minor has been tried on probation while in custody and has failed to reform. [¶] (3) That the welfare of the minor requires that custody be taken from the minor's parent or guardian."
We review a juvenile court's commitment decision for abuse of discretion. (In re Antoine D. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1320.) " '[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.' " (In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 432.) "We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.] In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law." (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.) These purposes include the best interests of the child, rehabilitation, the protection and safety of the public, and punishment. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subds. (a), (b); In re Michael D., at p. 1396.)
In concluding level A placement was appropriate, the juvenile court found that all three of the conditions set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (a) had been established. Having reviewed the record, we find no abuse of discretion. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's commitment decision. The record reflects the minor committed new law violations and repeatedly violated the conditions of his probation after he was declared a ward in 2015. (See In re Nathan W. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1502 [a probation violation supports a finding that the minor has been tried on probation and failed to reform].) He was tried on probation in the custody of his mother for more than a year but failed to reform, despite being confined on multiple occasions and receiving rehabilitation services. The record supports the conclusion that out-of-home placement was in the best interest of the minor and was appropriate for the protection and safety of the community.
III
The Psychotropic Medication Probation Condition
As previously indicated, the minor's conditions of probation include the condition he "take psychotropic medications when prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner if [his] parent(s)/guardian consents." The minor challenges this condition as unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. According to the minor, the condition infringes on his constitutional due process right of privacy under the California Constitution and his protected liberty interest under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He argues the condition is problematic because it is not narrowly tailored to his reformation or rehabilitation since its language covers all prescribed psychotropic medications, whether the medication is related to his mental health or criminality, and does not account for any valid objections he may have in taking the medication. In addition, the minor argues that, even assuming the condition is meant only to apply to the prescribed psychotropic drugs he was already taking, the condition is problematic because there was no medically informed showing the drugs were reasonably related to his crimes or future criminality. The People contend defendant forfeited the issue by failing to object to the condition in the trial court. In the alternative, the People argue the condition does not impinge on the minor's constitutional rights and is tailored and reasonably related to the state's interest in reformation and rehabilitation.
In general, a minor's failure to make a timely objection to a probation condition forfeits the claim of error on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235.) However, a minor may challenge for the first time on appeal whether a condition is facially overbroad, so long as the claim presents a pure question of law without reference to the particular sentencing record developed (or left undeveloped) in the trial court. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888-889; People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1435.) The minor has made such a challenge in this case. He argues that a broad medication condition -- forcing a probationer to take every prescribed psychotropic medication unless his "parent(s)/guardian" objects -- is never appropriate. He does not solely argue that such a condition is not appropriate in his particular case. Accordingly, we will reach the merits of the minor's constitutional challenge.
Juvenile courts have broad discretion in devising appropriate conditions of probation. (In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 188.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 727, subdivision (a) provides: "If a minor . . . is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described by Section 601 or 602, the court may make any reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor . . . , including medical treatment, subject to further order of the court." (Italics added.) Likewise, Welfare and Institutions Code section 730 provides, in relevant part: "(a) When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described by Section 602, the court may order any of the types of treatment referred to in Section 727 . . . . [¶] (b) When a ward described in subdivision (a) is placed under the supervision of the probation officer or committed to the care, custody, and control of the probation officer, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward . . . . The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced."
Although juvenile courts have broad discretion to impose conditions of probation, the court's discretion is not boundless. (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1152.) A probation condition in a juvenile case may be challenged as unconstitutionally overbroad. (Id. at p. 1153.) "A restriction is unconstitutionally overbroad . . . if it (1) 'impinge[s] on constitutional rights,' and (2) is not 'tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation.' [Citations.] The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights--bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." (Ibid.) " 'If available alternative means exist which are less violative of the constitutional right and are narrowly drawn so as to correlate more closely with the purposes contemplated, those alternatives should be used . . . .' " (In re Luis F., supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.) We review constitutional challenges to a probation condition de novo. (In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901.)
Here, there is little evidence in the record regarding the minor's need to take psychotropic medication to treat a psychological condition. The March 2015 intake report indicates the minor was in the process of being evaluated for mental health issues and was recently prescribed "Triletel" to help him calm down. Although unclear, it appears the intake report meant to state the minor was taking Trileptal, not Triletel. Mother explained it was her understanding Trileptal was given to her son to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The August 2016 intake report states "the minor continues to take Adderall for his ADHD." The record discloses the minor has only had "ADD/ADHD medication prescribed," and has a special education need: "ADHD/ADD."
The minor asserts, and the People do not dispute, that Trileptal was approved by the Food and Drug Administration for the treatment of epilepsy. There is nothing in the record suggesting the minor suffers from epilepsy or that Trileptal is an appropriate medication to treat a psychological condition the minor has been diagnosed with. --------
We agree with the minor that the probation condition imposed by the trial court is overbroad as a matter of law because it requires the minor to take all psychotropic medications prescribed by any licensed medical practitioner for any identified problem, unless his parent or guardian disagrees. The condition is not limited to medications previously prescribed or medications prescribed to treat a diagnosed medical condition that contributed to his delinquency. Because the probation condition is overly broad in any case, the probation condition as currently drafted cannot stand. However, we decline to strike the condition. This is because a narrower condition would not necessarily impermissibly infringe on the minor's constitutional rights should it require, for example, that the minor take medication prescribed to treat a diagnosed mental disorder which the juvenile court found would significantly impact his reformation and rehabilitation. (See In re Luis F., supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 187 [neither the state nor federal liberty interests in avoiding coerced psychotropic medication are absolute and a probationer's due process rights are not necessarily violated by the imposition of a medication requirement].) Accordingly, we will remand with directions for the juvenile court to cure the constitutional defect or strike the medication probation condition. In light of our decision to remand this matter, we need not consider the minor's additional argument that the juvenile court failed to assure compliance with mandatory statutory requirements before requiring him to take psychotropic medication.
DISPOSITION
We remand the matter to the juvenile court to modify or strike the medication probation condition. In all other respects, the juvenile court's orders are affirmed.
/s/_________
Robie, J. We concur: /s/_________
Blease, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Renner, J.