Opinion
D071842
03-07-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LEQUAN IMEEN, Defendant and Appellant.
Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Pulos and Heidi T. Salerno, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCE365672) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Evan P. Kirvin, Judge. Affirmed. Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Pulos and Heidi T. Salerno, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Lequan Imeen appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of one count of evading an officer with reckless driving, one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale, one count of transportation of methamphetamine, one count of possession of heroin and cocaine, and one count of driving without a license.
On appeal, Imeen makes five arguments. First, Imeen contends that the People's expert should not have been permitted to testify regarding the habits of drug addicts because this testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay and was outside the bounds of the witness's expertise. Although Imeen acknowledges that defense counsel did not object to the challenged testimony, he asserts that his attorney's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, Imeen contends that he was prejudiced by the fact that the People's expert offered an opinion as to Imeen's state of mind as he was evading the officer. Third, Imeen contends that he was prejudiced when, despite the court having issued an in limine order prohibiting testimony regarding the fact that Imeen was found with marijuana in his possession, in addition to the other controlled substances alleged in the charging document, an officer mentioned during his testimony that Imeen was found with marijuana. Fourth, Imeen contends that the cumulative effect of these evidentiary errors requires reversal. Finally, Imeen contends that the probation condition that requires that he submit his computers and recordable media to search when requested by his probation officer is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to him.
We conclude that we need not consider whether Imeen's attorney's performance was deficient with respect to the challenged expert opinion testimony because Imeen cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more favorable result at trial absent defense counsel's asserted failings with respect to this testimony. We further conclude that the court did not err with respect to the other two instances of witnesses making statements regarding evidence that the court had ruled inadmissible because the court immediately sustained defense counsel's objections to the testimony, struck the offending testimony, and admonished the jury to disregard it. The trial court's handling of these evidentiary issues was sufficient to prevent Imeen from being prejudiced by the references to inadmissible evidence. Given this, we also reject Imeen's contention that the cumulative effect of these evidentiary issues prejudiced him.
Finally, we conclude that because Imeen failed to object to the imposition of a probation condition that requires that he submit to searches of his computers and recordable media, he has forfeited any challenge that the condition is unconstitutional as applied to him. To the extent that Imeen's argument can be construed as a facial challenge to the electronic media search condition, we conclude that the condition is not facially overbroad.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
1. The prosecution case
Imeen was observed at a stop light while driving a yellow motorcycle. When the light turned green, Imeen accelerated rapidly, to the point where he was traveling 56 miles per hour in a 40 mile per hour traffic zone. A California Highway Patrol officer driving in a marked vehicle observed Imeen speeding and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. The officer pulled his vehicle behind Imeen and drove behind him with his overhead lights flashing. The officer also briefly sounded his siren. The officer and Imeen both came to a stop at another red light. The officer sounded his siren again. However, when the light turned green, Imeen turned left, despite not being in a turn lane, thereby cutting off cars that were in the left turn lane. Imeen accelerated to approximately 80-90 miles per hour in a residential area that was zoned for a maximum speed of 25 miles per hour.
The officer activated his steady siren and began to follow Imeen, intending to pull him over. Imeen ran a stop sign and two red lights. The officer followed Imeen after he ran through the second red light, as Imeen turned left onto another street. When the officer turned left, he lost sight of Imeen.
The officer noticed an abandoned yellow motorcycle when he reached the next intersection. The officer stopped and asked people who were nearby whether they had seen where the motorcycle's driver had gone. No one had seen the driver. After asking a number of people whether they had seen the motorcycle driver and receiving no positive responses, the officer returned to the motorcycle. At that point, someone pointed the officer toward Imeen, who was walking nearby.
The officer called out to Imeen, saying, "Sir, stop." Imeen continued walking. The officer continued to ask Imeen to stop, and was eventually able to catch up to him. Imeen finally stopped.
Imeen walked somewhat slowly due to a disability.
The officer asked Imeen whether he had been driving a motorcycle. Imeen responded that he did not know what the officer was talking about. Imeen provided the officer with his identification card in response to the officer's request for identification. The officer ran the plates on the motorcycle and determined that Imeen's identification matched the registered owner of the motorcycle. Upon being told this information, Imeen admitted that he had been driving the motorcycle.
The officer arrested Imeen, and, incident to the arrest, the arresting officer and another officer who was assisting in the arrest searched Imeen's person. Inside a pocket of Imeen's jacket, officers found a black vial that contained three clear plastic bags of methamphetamine, weighing 6.38 grams, 1.55 grams, and 1.55 grams; a clear plastic bag of black tar heroin weighing 2.10 grams; two clear plastic bags of cocaine, weighing 1.57 grams and .12 grams; and two used syringes. Officers also found two clear plastic bags of methamphetamine weighing .32 grams and .23 grams, three glass pipes containing methamphetamine residue, a used syringe, four empty plastic baggies, $947 in cash, a digital scale, and black gloves in Imeen's possession.
The cash consisted of 32 one-dollar bills, 19 five-dollar bills, 8 ten-dollar bills, 12 twenty-dollar bills, and 5 one-hundred-dollar bills.
San Diego County Sheriff's Department detective Francisco Brambila testified as an expert in the field of narcotic sales. He had been a law enforcement officer for 19 years, had substantial field experience, and had testified as an expert in numerous cases. According to Brambila, a common dosage for methamphetamine, heroin, or cocaine is .05 grams; Brambila testified that the average person will get high on that amount of each of those drugs. Brambila also opined that, based on his training and experience, Imeen possessed the methamphetamine for the purpose of sale, and also expressed the opinion that Imeen had been transporting the drugs for the purpose of sale. Brambila based his opinion on the amount of methamphetamine found on Imeen, the fact that it was packaged in "quick-sell" amounts in five individual baggies, and the fact that Imeen had in his possession some empty baggies, a scale, multiple other controlled substances, and cash in the denominations referred to above.
In addition, Brambila noted that the amounts of the drugs that Imeen was carrying in the baggies approximated amounts that are commonly sold. Brambila also addressed the fact that Imeen was found with syringes and pipes in his possession. According to Brambila, he has "come across sellers that are also users of their narcotics," although that is not "as common" as sellers who do not also use their product.
2. The defense
Imeen's wife testified that she is disabled, and that Imeen was employed as her caregiver. Imeen was paid by the government to be his wife's care provider. He received his pay through direct deposit.
A defense drug expert, Arthur Fayer, also testified. Fayer had formerly been a regular drug user. He testified that between 1962 and 1984, he had used every drug, including marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine. He had also been a drug dealer. At the time of trial, he had been sober for almost 33 years. Fayer's professional experience included working at a number of drug diversion and treatment programs, working as a "private drug/alcohol assessor/counselor," and completing "drug assessments" to help people who have to find appropriate drug treatment programs.
Fayer testified that an average daily user of methamphetamine consumes one to three grams a day, contradicting Brambila's contention that a day's usage would typically be around .05 grams. According to Fayer, the most common way to ingest methamphetamine is to either smoke it, usually in a glass pipe, or to inject it with a syringe, but it can also be consumed by being placed in a liquid and drinking it, or rubbing it on a mucous membrane. Similar methods for usage apply to heroin and cocaine.
Fayer expressed his opinion that the drugs that Imeen had in his possession were not possessed for sale, but instead, "could be for personal use." Fayer based his opinion on the fact that Imeen did not have a cell phone in his possession at the time of his arrest. According to Fayer, most people who sell drugs use cell phones as part of their business. Also relevant to Fayer was the absence of any pay-and-owe sheets, or a weapon. Fayer testified that the quantities of drugs found in Imeen's baggies were not typical amounts that one would sell, and noted that Imeen did not have a "significant amount of packaging materials" on him. B. Procedural background
A jury found Imeen guilty of evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 1); possession for sale of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 2); transportation of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 3); possession of a controlled substance (heroin) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 4); possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 5); and driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 6).
The trial court suspended sentence and placed Imeen on formal probation for three years, with 365 days of custody in county jail.
Imeen filed a timely notice of appeal.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Imeen cannot establish that it is reasonably probable that he would have obtained a more favorable result if his attorney had objected to the testimony he now challenges on appeal
Imeen contends that certain portions of Detective Brambila's opinions were improperly admitted, and that the admission of this evidence prejudiced him with respect to his convictions on counts 2 and 3.
For example, Brambila testified that heavy users of methamphetamine generally do not use or carry more than one or two grams for use in a single day. Brambila has encountered users who "carry more than what they can use in a day," though this is "not very common," in part because users are afraid of the consequences of carrying larger quantities of drugs on them. When asked how he came to know how much a typical drug user uses in a day, Brambila stated that drug users had told him how much they use in a day. According to Brambila, a typical drug user also does not carry scales, multiple different types of drugs, or empty baggies. Brambila acknowledged that some users might carry a couple of empty baggies that have some residual substance in them, in the hope that they might be able to gather enough to use, but Brambila did not believe that this is what Imeen was doing because his empty baggies appeared to be new and did not contain any residue. Brambila also testified that drug addicts tend to use only one type of drug. He based this opinion on information he had gathered from drug users. Later, when questioned by defense counsel as to whether drug users have told him that they use more than two grams of methamphetamine per day, Brambila said that drug users "usually" are not telling him the truth. Brambila stated that drug users are typically not truthful when questioned about their habits.
Imeen takes issue with Brambila's testimony concerning drug usage, noting that Brambila's expertise is in drug sales, and his expertise is derived from his experience as an investigative officer in drug sales, not drug usage. Imeen also argues that portions of this testimony improperly conveyed inadmissible hearsay, in that Brambila relied on out-of-court statements from drug users as the basis for his expert opinions, which, Imeen contends, is in contravention of the rule announced in the Supreme Court's opinion in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. Imeen also contends that Brambila's testimony concerning the habits of drug users was "unreliable and unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352," given that Brambila's conclusions were based not on "reasonably reliable sources and methods," but instead, by Brambila's own admission, on "the statements of individuals who apparently lie to him most [of] the time."
Imeen acknowledges that his counsel did not object to Brambila's testimony regarding the habits of drug users, but contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to do so.
In order to successfully establish an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show not only that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also that it is reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have been reached absent counsel's deficient performance. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (Strickland).) Without a showing of prejudice, a claim of ineffective assistance fails, and an inquiry into the adequacy of counsel's performance is unnecessary. (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 40-41, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 & fn. 22.)
In order to show that prejudice resulted from an attorney's claimed deficient performance, a defendant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been more favorable absent defense counsel's asserted failings. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694; In re Welch (2015) 61 Cal.4th 489, 517; People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 690.) As the United States Supreme Court explained in Strickland, "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." (Strickland, supra, at p. 694.) A defendant must show a reasonable probability of a different result as a demonstrable reality. (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 136.) Moreover, "a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." (Strickland, at p. 697; accord, People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 982.)
Imeen cannot establish that there is a reasonable probability that the result in this case would have been more favorable to him if defense counsel had objected to Brambila's testimony regarding the habits of drug users. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) Even if Brambila had not been permitted to discuss what drug users had told him, he nevertheless would have been able to provide his opinion, based on his significant training and experience in the area of drug sales and purchases, that Imeen possessed the methamphetamine for sale. The evidence that Imeen not only possessed significant quantities of methamphetamine, apportioned into various quantities that approximated amounts that are commonly sold, but also that he was carrying unused empty baggies, and, most significantly, a scale and a large sum of cash in varying denominations, including smaller denominations, strongly supports the jury's conclusion that Imeen possessed the methamphetamine for sale, and not solely for his own personal use.
Thus, even if the jury had not heard Detective Brambila's opinions regarding the amount of drugs that a typical user might use in a day, or what quantity of drugs a typical daily user might carry on his person for a day, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a more favorable result with respect to counts 2 and 3, regarding the possession of methamphetamine for sale and the transportation of methamphetamine for sale. B. Imeen cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the People's expert's statement regarding Imeen's state of mind while evading the police, given that the trial court immediately struck the testimony
On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Brambila, "Based on your experience and the facts you've reviewed in this case, when the defendant was riding his motorcycle, do you have an opinion as to whether he was transporting those drugs for the purpose of sale?" Brambila responded that he did have such an opinion, and then said, "[I]t appears he took off because he knew he had the narcotics on him, didn't stop. He got off the bike and tried to distance himself." At that point, defense counsel objected that the testimony was based on speculation and that the expert lacked qualifications to opine on that issue, and moved to strike the testimony. The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection and struck the expert's response.
The prosecutor again sought to elicit Brambila's opinion regarding why Imeen fled from police. The prosecutor asked whether Brambila had "encountered individuals who have run from the police." Brambila indicated that he had. The prosecutor then asked whether Brambila had "encountered individuals who have run from the police while carrying drugs." At that point, defense counsel again objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. The prosecutor requested a sidebar conference. After a sidebar discussion between the attorneys and the court, the court reaffirmed its prior rulings that the expert's testimony on this matter was inadmissible. At the conclusion of the trial, the court gave the following instruction to the jury: "If I ordered testimony stricken from the record you must disregard it and must not consider that testimony for any purpose."
Imeen argues that the prosecution's expert was not qualified to express an opinion on the meaning of Imeen's decision not to stop his motorcycle and instead to flee, and that his testimony on that issue did not constitute legitimate expert opinion testimony. According to Imeen, "[e]ven though the defense successfully objected to the admission of the above testimony, the trial court's admonitions were insufficient to cure the harm caused by the prosecutor's continued probe into the subject."
Imeen also argues that the "evidentiary error further undermined the jury's ability to fairly resolve the question of intent in Counts 2 and 3 and should be considered for its cumulative impact on the jury verdicts."
The trial court clearly agreed with defense counsel that the expert could not properly opine on the reason Imeen evaded police. The court ruled in Imeen's favor when defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's questions on this topic. Much of Imeen's argument in briefing is an attempt to establish that the trial court "may exclude an expert's opinion testimony if that expert lacks an adequate basis in formulating it." However, it is clear that the trial court did not err with respect to this testimony. The court sustained defense counsel's objections and struck the testimony.
Imeen has not established that he was prejudiced by the jury being exposed to this testimony. "Ordinarily, a curative instruction to disregard improper testimony is sufficient to protect a defendant from the injury of such testimony . . . ." (People v. Navarrete (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 828, 834.) The trial court provided such an instruction to the jury. Nevertheless, Imeen suggests that "[t]he jury was apt to view Brambila's opinions about appellant's failure to stop the motorcycle as credible and sound expert testimony." We disagree, given that the trial court immediately indicated to the jury that the court was striking the offending testimony, and instructed the jury not to consider the stricken testimony. We presume that the jury understood and followed the court's instructions. (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 422 (Sandoval).) For this reason, we also reject Imeen's contention that the "evidentiary error[] . . . undermined the fairness of the proceedings and should be considered for its cumulative impact on the jury deliberations as to Counts 2 and 3." C. Imeen cannot establish that he was prejudiced as a result of a law enforcement officer testifying that Imeen was in possession of marijuana at the time of his arrest, despite the court's prior ruling that such information was not admissible, given that the court struck this testimony
Again, there was no trial court error; the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection, struck the testimony, and admonished the jury.
In an argument similar to the one above, Imeen contends that "the jury was exposed to inadmissible evidence that appellant was in possession of a small amount of marijuana at the time of his arrest." Imeen complains that despite an in limine order by the trial court that the prosecution was not to present evidence that marijuana had been found in Imeen's jacket when he was searched, a prosecution witness nevertheless testified about the marijuana.
Defense counsel objected to the testimony, and the court sustained the objection. The court excluded the evidence and admonished the jury to disregard the testimony regarding marijuana. The court denied Imeen's motion for a mistrial, concluding that the reference to marijuana was not prejudicial to Imeen.
Imeen asserts that this court should "defer to the trial court's [in limine] evidentiary findings that the evidence [regarding the marijuana] was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352." While we have no reason to second-guess the trial court's in limine ruling prohibiting the prosecution from eliciting testimony regarding the fact that Imeen had marijuana in his possession at the time of his arrest, we do not agree with Imeen's contention that a witness's reference to finding the marijuana was prejudicial to Imeen, given that the court immediately sustained an objection to the testimony and admonished the jury that it was to disregard that testimony. Imeen maintains that "[t]he jury was not likely to disregard the testimony that appellant possessed marijuana because Detective Brambila used the sheer variety of the substances as a basis for finding the methamphetamine was possessed for sale." We disagree; we presume that the jury did disregard the testimony because the trial court instructed the jury to do just that. (See Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 422 [we presume that the jury understands and follows the court's instructions].) D. The three claimed evidentiary "errors" do not amount to cumulative error and did not result in a denial of Imeen's right to due process
The witness who mentioned the marijuana was not Detective Brambila, but rather, the officer who searched Imeen at the time of his arrest.
Imeen contends that "the cumulative impact of multiple evidentiary errors in this case requires reversal of counts 2 and 3 because the errors subverted the jury's ability to fairly resolve the intent element." (Capitalization omitted.) "Under the 'cumulative error' doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial." (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fns. 32, 7.)
As we have already stated, two of the three purported "errors" do not involve trial court error, and, as we explained, the trial court's striking of improper testimony and admonishing the jury to ignore the testimony adequately addressed the complained-of testimony. Further, we have determined that Imeen cannot demonstrate prejudice with respect to his attorney's failure to object to the testimony about which he now complains. Even in considering all of these matters together, we reject the contention that the combination of these evidentiary issues was cumulatively prejudicial. E. The electronic media search condition is not facially overbroad
Among the probation conditions that the court imposed on Imeen is the condition that he "[s]ubmit person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media . . . to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by P.O. or law enforcement officer." (Italics added.) Imeen contends on appeal that this probation condition "is an unconstitutionally overbroad restriction upon his federal right to privacy" because it allows unfettered access to his computers and other digital media.
We note, at the outset, that Imeen accepted the conditions of probation, including the electronic media search condition, without objection. Although the failure to make a timely objection to a probation condition ordinarily forfeits the claim of error on appeal, where a claim that a probation condition is facially overbroad and violates fundamental constitutional rights is based on undisputed facts, it may be treated as a question of law that is not forfeited by a failure to raise it in the trial court. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 881, 888-889 (Sheena K.); People v. Quiroz (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1127 [forfeiture rule does not apply to defendant's contention that as a matter of law probation condition, on its face, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad]; People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1347 (Pirali) ["[a]lthough a probation condition may be overbroad when considered in light of all the facts, only those constitutional challenges presenting a pure question of law may be raised for the first time on appeal"].)
Given Imeen's unqualified acceptance of the probation conditions in the trial court, the only challenge that he may raise to the electronic search condition on appeal is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the condition. We therefore review solely the question whether the search condition imposed in this case, which requires Imeen to submit his "computers" and "recordable media," among other things, to search when requested by a probation officer, is unconstitutionally facially overbroad because of these terms.
"If a probation condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may 'impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is "not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens." ' " (People v. O'Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355.) A constitutionally overbroad condition is one that restricts a defendant's fundamental constitutional rights to a greater degree than necessary to achieve the condition's purpose. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 384.) The overbreadth doctrine requires that probation conditions, which may impinge on constitutional rights, be tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation. (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) " 'The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.' " (Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346.)
As Imeen points out, a search condition that permits unlimited searches of a probationer's computers and recordable media requires the probationer to waive his Fourth Amendment protections and thus, imposes a burden on the probationer's constitutional rights. We therefore consider whether the search condition permitting searches of a probationer's computers and/or recordable media, in the abstract, is simply not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the state's legitimate interest in reformation and rehabilitation of probationers. (See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 885 [appellate claim that the language of a probation condition is unconstitutionally vague or facially overbroad "does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts"].) When considering the search condition that allows searches of electronic media is viewed in this light, we cannot say that such a condition is facially overbroad based on its language and legal concepts. Although it is readily apparent that application of this search condition could be constitutionally overbroad as applied in certain circumstances, it is equally apparent that such a search condition may be entirely appropriate, and constitutional, as applied in other circumstances. There can be no dispute that certain probationers may require more intensive supervision and monitoring—in particular with respect to their use of computers and other electronic and recordable media—as the specific facts of the case may demand. For this reason, we reject a constitutional challenge to the search condition allowing for searches of computers and recordable media on the ground that such a condition is facially overbroad.
By way of example, a defendant who utilized a computer or cell phone to commit the offense or offenses of which he or she has been convicted could clearly fall within a class of probationers for which application of even a broad electronic media search condition, such as the one imposed here, would be appropriately tailored to ensure the probationer's reformation and continued compliance with the law during the probationary period.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. BENKE, J.