Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 05F09481
BUTZ, J.A jury convicted defendant James Patrick Huffman of the felony of petty theft with a prior theft conviction (Pen. Code, § 666), while acquitting him of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). After the trial court found true two prior prison term allegations (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), defendant was sentenced to a total of four years in state prison.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach him with four prior felony convictions. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 6, 2005, Lance Oliver’s GMC Yukon Denali was stolen from his garage. The vehicle was recovered later the same day, but many items of personal property were missing, including some expensive softball equipment. Other property from Oliver’s GMC was later recovered from a stolen Toyota 4Runner, but the softball equipment was still missing. Defendant worked for Central Valley Towing, a towing contractor for the California Highway Patrol (CHP). Defendant towed the stolen 4Runner after CHP Officer Roberto Ramos impounded the vehicle.
A few weeks after the theft, Oliver discovered that his stolen softball equipment was posted on Craig’s List, an online auction site. Oliver called the seller, who identified himself as “James,” to discuss a sale price. Oliver also contacted CHP Officer Michael Gallisdorfer, who was involved in recovering his vehicle, and informed him that the softball equipment was being advertised online. Officer Gallisdorfer requested that Oliver set up a meeting with “James,” which undercover officers would attend. Oliver called “James” back and arranged to meet at a Walgreen’s parking lot.
CHP Officers Gallisdorfer and Ramos, who were members of the Sacramento County Auto Theft Task Force, went undercover to the arranged meeting. When defendant arrived on a motorcycle, both officers recognized him as a Central Valley Towing employee. Defendant’s girlfriend soon arrived in a Chevy Blazer and defendant unloaded softball equipment from the Blazer. Oliver identified the equipment as the property stolen from his vehicle and defendant was placed under arrest.
Once in custody, defendant waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he knew the equipment was stolen. Defendant stated he took the equipment from the trunk of a vehicle that he had towed for the CHP and put it up for sale on Craig’s List. He stated that since the items in the trunk of the stolen vehicle had not been inventoried, he decided to take the equipment home with him. Defendant also admitted he had previously stolen personal property from other towed vehicles.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694].
Defense Case
Defendant testified in his own defense. He told the jury that on the same night he towed the stolen 4Runner for the CHP, he also towed a Mazda or Honda. The owner called to pick up the car, and arrived to pay for the Mazda or Honda. After inspecting his car, the owner asked defendant if he could leave some items he found in the car that did not belong to him, and placed the softball equipment next to a dumpster. Defendant took the equipment home with him, believing that it was abandoned. He denied telling the officers he had previously stolen from towed vehicles. On cross-examination, the prosecutor impeached defendant with four prior felony convictions.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to trial, defendant filed separate motions in limine, requesting that the trial court prohibit the prosecution from impeaching him with five prior felony convictions: (1) grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487) in 2002; (2) second degree burglary (id., § 459) in 1999; (3) perjury (id., § 118, subd. (a)) in 1997; (4) forgery (id., § 475, subd. (a)) in 1996; and (5) driving under the influence (DUI) with injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) in 1991. The motions were made pursuant to People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 453-454 (Beagle), People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 313-315 (Castro I) and Evidence Code section 352, on the ground that the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative.
Defense counsel argued that the effect of hearing about these prior convictions would prejudice defendant in front of the jury and deny him a fair trial. The prosecutor rejoined that the jury needed to hear of the prior convictions to properly evaluate defendant’s credibility.
After hearing arguments, the trial judge granted defendant’s motion to exclude the 1991 DUI conviction based on its substantial prejudicial effect. The judge denied the other four motions, noting that the remaining convictions clearly went to the issue of defendant’s veracity.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to use four prior felony convictions for impeachment. He claims that, except for the 2002 grand theft conviction, the convictions from 1996, 1997, and 1999 were relatively remote; that admission of the convictions was prejudicial by virtue of their sheer number; and that, because the prior offenses were based on similar conduct, the court at least should have “sanitized” the priors.
Any witness in a criminal trial may be impeached with a prior felony conviction. (Evid. Code, § 788; People v. Sizelove (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 104, 108.)The rationale is that the conviction is relevant to the jury’s assessment of the witness’s credibility, since the offense may reflect on the witness’s honesty and veracity. (Castro I, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 314; People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 97-98, disapproved on different grounds in People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123.)
The California Supreme Court inBeagle held that admissibility of prior felonies is subject to the court’s discretion pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, which allows the trial court discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a danger of undue prejudice. (Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 452-453.) In Castro I, the court further held that, subject to the trial court’s discretion under section 352, only felonies involving moral turpitude (Castro I, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 306), or a “general readiness to do evil,” may be used for impeachment (id. at p. 314).
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under Evidence Code Section 352 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 699.) A trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court exceeds the bounds of reason such that the result manifests an injustice. (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 182-183 (Green); People v. Muldrow (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 636, 644 (Muldrow).)
In exercising its discretion to admit prior convictions for impeachment, the trial court should be guided by the four factors set out in Beagle: whether the prior conviction reflects on honesty and integrity; whether it is near or remote in time; whether it was incurred for the same or substantially similar conduct for which the witness-accused is on trial; and what effect admission would have on the defendant’s decision to testify. (Castro I, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 307, citing Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441.) Here, defendant does not contest that the first and last Beagle factors weigh in favor of admission, conceding that the prior convictions were crimes of moral turpitude (theft- and deceit-related offenses) and that the court’s ruling did not prevent him from testifying. However, he claims that some of the convictions should have been excluded on account of their remoteness, similarity and numerousness. We discuss each factor separately.
I. Remoteness
Defendant argues the 1996, 1997, and 1999 convictions were remote and, therefore, more prejudicial than probative since the current offense occurred in October 2005.
The oldest prior conviction (forgery) was 10 years old at the time of defendant’s trial. However, appellate courts have held that felonies far older may be used for impeachment purposes. (People v. Mendoza (2000)78 Cal.App.4th 918, 926 (Mendoza) [18-year-old prior conviction]; Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 182-183 [20-year-old prior]; Muldrow, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 647-648 [20-year-old prior].)
Defendant also claims that his “trouble-free” existence since being convicted of grand theft in 2002 weighed in favor of excluding the three older convictions. He asserts that because the 1996 forgery and 1997 perjury convictions were the most remote, they were not very probative of his veracity. The argument is not persuasive.
Remote convictions are not automatically inadmissible for impeachment purposes and are admissible when the defendant has not led a “legally blameless life” since the conviction. (Mendoza, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 926; Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 183; Muldrow, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 647.) Moreover, remoteness weighs in favor of exclusion only where the defendant has led a crime-free life since incurring the convictions he wishes to exclude. (See Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 183.) Here, defendant received felony convictions in 1996, 1997, and 1999, in addition to his 2002 conviction, which led to a 16-month prison sentence. Defendant’s history of committing multiple felonies within a relatively short period “create[d] a pattern that [was] relevant to [his] credibility.” (Muldrow, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 648.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to exclude the priors on grounds of remoteness.
II. Similarity
Defendant next contends the 2002 grand theft and 1999 second degree burglary convictions were “too similar” to the petty theft charge and, therefore, should not have been admitted.
The fact that prior convictions are identical or similar to the crime charged no longer automatically compels their exclusion. (People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 59, 66 (Stewart).) Courts have allowed as many as four identical convictions to impeach a defendant in a criminal trial. (Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 173 [four prior convictions for unlawful driving of a vehicle admitted in prosecution for unlawful driving of a vehicle]; Muldrow, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 647 [three prior convictions for burglary admitted in prosecution for burglary]; Stewart, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 63 [four prior convictions for robbery admitted in prosecution for robbery].) The trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason in admitting two prior convictions that were similar, but not identical, to the charged crime of petty theft.
III. Number of Convictions Admitted
Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing four prior convictions to be admitted for impeachment, contending that one conviction from the 1996 to 1999 period would have been sufficient to indicate to the jury the nature of his prior record. But appellate courts have refused to impose arbitrary limits on the number of prior convictions admissible for impeachment. (People v. Dillingham (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 688, 695; People v. Castro (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1211, 1216 (Castro II).) As many as 10 prior convictions have been held proper for impeachment in criminal trials. (Mendoza, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 923, 927 [10 priors]; Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 173 [six priors]; Muldrow, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 646 [six priors]; Stewart, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 63 [four priors].) Defendant is simply wrong in asserting that four is “too many.”
A series of crimes relevant to credibility is more probative than a single such offense. (Stewart, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 66.) Defendant had a history of convictions stretching from 1996 to 2002. Moreover, his convictions--for forgery, perjury, and grand theft--were all extremely relevant to truthfulness. (Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at 453.)
Defendant’s suggestion that the forgery and perjury convictions are “the least probative with regard to [defendant’s] current honesty and veracity” is incorrect. “[F]orgery [is] a crime involving honesty and integrity” (People v. Williamson (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 206, 212) and “perjury [is] intimately connected with” an individual’s “honesty or veracity” (People v. Burdine (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 442, 448).
Defendant also points out “‘there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused by the defendant’s prior offenses.’” (Quoting People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1353.) However, this is just one of the several factors that must be balanced by the trial court when exercising its discretion under Evidence Code section 352. Had the trial court limited impeachment to just one or two convictions, as defendant suggests, he would unfairly benefit from a “‘false aura of veracity.’” (Muldrow, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 646 & 647; Castro II, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 1211.) The trial court could reasonably find that the probative value of admitting all four convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect, especially where, as here, the priors were sustained within a relatively short period and bore directly on character traits of honesty and veracity. (Muldrow, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 647.)
IV. Sanitization
Defendant’s final argument is the trial court erred in not “sanitizing” the four prior convictions, for example, by describing them as “felonies involving crimes against property.” Defendant admits he did not make a specific request for sanitization in the trial court, but nonetheless asserts the issue is cognizable on appeal because a consideration of possible sanitization is “merely a normal part of the Evidence Code section 352 analysis” and “appears to be implicit in any Evidence Code section 352 objection.” We disagree.
When a defendant does not request sanitization of prior convictions, he forfeits the issue on appeal. (Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 182, fn. 9.) Defendant’s claim that the Green footnote only “suggests that the request to sanitize must be made before trial” (emphasis added) is incorrect. The holding in Green is unequivocal: “Appellant’s alternative contention that the trial court should have allowed impeachment with ‘sanitized’ descriptions of his four identical prior convictions relating to auto theft pursuant to his request is not cognizable. The record reveals appellant did not make such a request.” (Ibid., italics added.)
We also reject defendant’s argument that Green should not be followed because itrelies on “ambiguous dicta” from People v. Renteria (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1076 (Renteria).) On the contrary, Green’s holding rests on the well-settled principle that a party who does not object to a ruling generally forfeits the right to complain of that ruling on appeal, and a defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable. (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 301-302.) The policy reason for the rule is that it “is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided.” (People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276.)
The Renteria court held that a defendant must testify to raise the issues of improper impeachment and failure to sanitize a prior conviction on appeal, and further noted that the trial judge did not sanitize the conviction because the defendant never made such a request. (Renteria, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1081-1082.)
In any event, it would not have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to sanitize defendant’s prior convictions. The issue of credibility was crucial in this case, since defendant’s guilt depended entirely upon which side’s witnesses were telling the truth. The trial court could reasonably have determined the jury was entitled to know the exact nature of the crimes in order to accurately judge defendant’s credibility. Moreover, an amorphous, “sanitized” description was potentially misleading. Since felonies come in many different varieties, sanitization might well have led the jury to conclude that defendant’s crimes must have been especially egregious for the trial court to have repackaged them by a generic label. By learning of the specific nature of defendant’s priors, the jurors were able to determine for themselves exactly how to factor them into an assessment of defendant’s credibility.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., ROBIE, J.