Opinion
June 8, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hall, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of the arresting officer (see, People v. Ayers, 161 A.D.2d 770, 771). The defendant was allowed to explore the potential bias of the officer (see, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308), and was limited only to the extent that the trial court found the questions to be repetitious in nature.
The defendant's claim that the interested witness charge was imbalanced is unpreserved for appellate review since the defendant voiced no protest to the charge actually given (see, People v. Hoke, 62 N.Y.2d 1022, 1023; People v. McLaughlin, 104 A.D.2d 829, 830). In any event, the charge was properly balanced. The court gave a general interested witness charge, and charged that the defendant was interested as a matter of law (see, People v. Ochs, 3 N.Y.2d 54, 56; People v. Stokes, 117 A.D.2d 693, 694). Although the court did not charge the jury that the police officers testifying on behalf of the prosecution were interested as a matter of law, there is no requirement that a trial court do so (see, People v. Suarez, 125 A.D.2d 350; People v. Melvin, 128 A.D.2d 647). The jury was properly advised to examine the testimony of the police officers using the same credibility tests as with any other witness, thus balancing the charge to the requisite degree (see, People v. Olden, 173 A.D.2d 867, 868; People v Walker, 170 A.D.2d 362, 363). Harwood, J.P., Rosenblatt, Ritter and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.