Opinion
01-10-2024
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Kathleen M. HOLLWEG, appellant.
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Amanda E. Schaefer of counsel), for appellant. Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Kathleen Becker Langlan and Marion Tang of counsel), for respondent.
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Amanda E. Schaefer of counsel), for appellant.
Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Kathleen Becker Langlan and Marion Tang of counsel), for respondent.
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, J.P., PAUL WOOTEN, HELEN VOUTSINAS, LILLIAN WAN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Stephen L. Braslow, J.), rendered March 24, 2022, convicting her of driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3), upon her plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
On September 20, 2020, the defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor information. Thereafter, the defendant was charged under an indictment. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that she was deprived of her statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30(1)(a). The People opposed, contending, inter alia, that a 65–day period from November 16, 2020, through January 20, 2021, was excludable pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(b). By order dated November 9, 2021, the County Court denied the defendant’s motion.
[1] "Where, as here, a defendant is charged with a felony, the People are re- quired to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action" (People v. Taback, 216 A.D.3d 673, 674, 188 N.Y.S.3d 167; see CPL 30.30[1][a]; People v. Connell, 185 A.D.3d 1048, 1049, 126 N.Y.S.3d 372). Here, the six-month period referable to this case, measured from September 20, 2020, to March 20, 2021, consisted of 181 days. The County Court determined that 142 days were chargeable to the People.
[2] Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the 65-day period from November 16, 2020, to January 20, 2021, was not chargeable to the People since the transcripts of the pertinent proceedings established that defense counsel either consented to or requested the adjournment at issue (see CPL 30.30[4][b]; People v. Barden, 27 N.Y.3d 550, 555, 36 N.Y.S.3d 80, 55 N.E.3d 1053; People v. Gregg, 219 A.D.3d 503, 504, 194 N.Y.S.3d 520; People v. Martinez, 186 A.D.3d 1530, 1531–1532, 130 N.Y.S.3d 828; People v. Connell, 185 A.D.3d at 1049, 126 N.Y.S.3d 372). Furthermore, no hearing was necessary to resolve the motion because the proof submitted by the People in opposition demonstrated that the total time chargeable to them was well within the six-month time period for trial readiness (see People v. Baugh, 91 A.D.3d 965, 966, 937 N.Y.S.2d 599; People v. Brown, 5 A.D.3d 789, 789, 773 N.Y.S.2d 585). Since the total time chargeable to the People was less than six months, the County Court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that she was deprived of her statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30 30(1)(a).
IANNACCI, J.P., WOOTEN, VOUTSINAS and WAN, JJ., concur.