Opinion
E070392
09-09-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD MICHAEL HITCHCOCK, Defendant and Appellant.
William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FSB1204159) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. J. David Mazurek, Judge. Affirmed. William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant and appellant Ronald Michael Hitchcock guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), and maliciously killing a dog (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a determinate term of three years and a consecutive indeterminate term of 15 years to life. Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the law concerning a defendant's flight. (CALCRIM No. 372.) We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. CRIMES
Defendant was married to Deborah Crouch (Wife). Defendant and Wife lived in a house in Big Bear City. Defendant had a workshop at his house. Defendant and Wife drank alcohol frequently and heavily. Wife had a black Labrador that would "never leave her side."
On September 14, 2012, at approximately 7:00 p.m., defendant's and Wife's neighbor (Neighbor) saw defendant's vehicle, a Hyundai Santa Fe, parked outside defendant's house. Defendant typically parked his vehicle outside his house, near Neighbor's house. At approximately 11:00 p.m. or midnight on September 14, Neighbor "heard voices . . . like, commotion" coming from defendant and Wife's house. The voices sounded like a male and female arguing, and the commotion sounded "[l]ike thumps," "[l]ike somebody being pushed around maybe." Neighbor looked outside, and saw, in the dark, what she believed was defendant's parked vehicle. Neighbor went to sleep. On September 15, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Neighbor awoke because she often wakes during the night. Neighbor looked outside and noticed that defendant's vehicle was gone.
Kareen Faber resided in Big Bear Lake. At approximately 5:00 a.m. on September 15, Faber awoke to a loud bang. Faber "tried to figure out what just happened, and then [Faber] laid back down again." At approximately 5:50 a.m., Faber awoke to "[a] clanging, banging sound, metal on metal." Faber looked outside and saw defendant banging a pole at the corner of a chain-link fence around a T-ball field across the street from Faber's house.
Faber stepped outside onto a deck. Faber observed defendant "try[ing] to break open the gate by bending and pulling the tubing out of the gate." While banging and pulling on the gate, defendant repeatedly shouted, " 'She's not gonna get out of this. She's not gonna get out of this.' " Faber called the police at 6:15 a.m.
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Deputy Cottrell responded to Faber's call. At 6:21 a.m., Cottrell arrived at the T-ball field. Defendant was inside the T-ball field. Cottrell cut the lock on the gate, so as to not have to climb over "a very tall fence." Inside the field, Cottrell saw a steel post laying on the ground. Defendant "was wearing a shirt with blue jeans and tennis shoes." Defendant's "blue jeans were wet and his shirt was dry."
As Deputy Cottrell approached defendant, defendant said, "The car's in the lake and she is floating." Defendant said his vehicle was in the Swim Beach area. The T-ball field was located approximately 100 yards from Swim Beach, which was an area of Big Bear Lake that was designated for swimming. Deputy Collins arrived to assist Cottrell. Cottrell, Collins, and defendant drove to Swim Beach. The vehicle gate at the beach, which would typically be locked, had been "bent and put onto the ground." Cottrell saw "tire impressions in through the grass and into the sand." Cottrell could see "some type of object just visible in the water."
Deputy Wijnhamer was a member of the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department dive team. Upon diving into the lake, Wijnhamer saw defendant's vehicle at a water depth of approximately 10 feet. The front of the vehicle was pointed "straight into the water," with the back of the vehicle toward the shoreline. Wife was inside the vehicle, floating face down next to the roof, in the backseat of the vehicle. "[A] dog [was] partially hanging outside of the [halfway open] rear driver side window." A chainsaw was in the front passenger seat. Wife was wearing only an adult diaper.
Wife had "[a] lot of bruises" on her arms, legs, and torso. Wife had elongated bruises on the right side of her upper back, which indicated she had been struck on her back. Some of Wife's bruises were consistent with defensive injuries. Wife did not have any drugs or alcohol in her system. Wife's cause of death was drowning, and the manner of her death was homicide. There was nothing in Wife's autopsy indicating she had a disability.
At Swim Beach, defendant submitted to a law enforcement blood draw, which later revealed defendant was under the influence of amphetamines. After Deputy Cottrell examined the scene at Swim Beach, defendant said he was cold so Cottrell sat with defendant in Cottrell's patrol vehicle, with the heater running. Cottrell gave defendant a drink and snacks. Defendant did not have any visible injuries.
Deputy Cottrell asked defendant what happened. Defendant said that at 11:30 p.m. he and Wife were kidnapped by two men, a woman, and a little girl. One of the men stayed at defendant's house, while the others took Wife and defendant in defendant's vehicle. Defendant did not know the kidnappers, but they were "[r]eally, really thin" and "looked like they were from outer space, they were so thin." The male kidnapper drove "all crazy all through town" and then drove through the fence at Swim Beach and into the lake. Approximately 15 people helped the group out of the water; however, defendant did not see Wife leave the water. Defendant told Cottrell, "I just walked out on water today."
Defendant's statement to Deputy Cottrell rambled and he appeared to be falling asleep at times. Within defendant's discussion with Cottrell, defendant said "two guys," who were friends of Wife's and defendant's friend, Tony, came to Wife's and defendant's house with Tony's little girl. They asked if Wife would watch Tony's little girl and Wife agreed.
After the two men and Tony's daughter (collectively, the friends) had been at the house for approximately five minutes, defendant walked into the house from his workshop. Defendant was carrying his nail gun loaded with two- and one-half inch nails. Defendant asked, "Who is this kid?' " Defendant then asked for Tony's telephone number and said, "I don't want him come, coming over anymore period." Defendant called Tony, but Tony did not answer. Defendant excused himself and Wife from the room to speak to Wife outside the presence of the friends.
Defendant then went back into the room where the friends were and said, "'[Y]ou know, you guys got to go now.'" The friends said they were waiting for Tony to arrive to give them a ride. Defendant responded, " '[I]t doesn't matter.' " Defendant explained, "You weren't invited. You got to go." Tony called defendant. Defendant said to Tony, " 'Tony, don't come over here no more. . . . I like the people, I don't know any of them.' " When Tony arrived, defendant was angry. Defendant and Tony went to defendant's workshop. Defendant shot four or five nails, at least one of which struck Tony.
Around 11:00, defendant "carried [Wife] out the front door" and put her and her walker in his vehicle. Defendant said Wife was "so sick she can't, can't even walk." Defendant drove the car. While in the car, Wife said to defendant, "Get me home please [defendant]. Get me home. We're gonna be okay, you know. Just help me get home." Wife's "black dog [was] right next to her, barking up a storm."
After the car entered the lake, it began sinking. Defendant saw Wife's head "going underneath the water." The dog "wouldn't leave [Wife's] side." Defendant heard pounding on Wife's car door. Defendant "was swimming for [his] life." It took defendant 15 to 20 minutes to come ashore because he could not see well.
Defendant went to a pastor's house. Defendant found a pillow by the pastor's garage. Defendant stayed at the pastor's garage with "another guy named Mike and a couple other of the people . . . staying on a canvas sheet." Defendant slept with the pillow inside his shirt, which was why his shirt was dry and his pants were wet. Defendant was unsure if he would be able to take Deputy Cottrell to the pastor's house. At 10:00 or 10:30, after speaking with Cottrell, defendant laid down on a patch of grass and slept for two hours. Cottrell did not find a pillow at the T-ball field.
B. JURY INSTRUCTION
The defense objected to instructing the jury on the law related to a defendant's flight. Defendant's trial counsel said, "[B]ased on the evidence that has come out, there's no indication that he fled the scene of the incident. Upon immediate contact from law enforcement[,] which was close, I believe that there's testimony that it's less than a hundred yards from where the incident took place. He immediately told the officers what had occurred and where it occurred. I don't think there's anything indicating that he was attempting to flee the area of where the accident happened."
The prosecutor responded, "I believe that based on the testimony it does indicate that the defendant had fled the area. The vehicle was located in the lake approximately a hundred yards from his location. By his own statements, he indicated that it happened around 11:30 the night before. He went to sleep at a pastor[']s house and was located inside of the baseball field area and had not made any contact with law enforcement. The only way that law enforcement was contacted is because a neighbor overheard him. I do think that goes to his flight."
The trial court said, "I think there's an argument to be made. The jury can decide whether he was fleeing or not fleeing the scene, but he was away from the Swim Beach area. He was at a gate or fence doing something. And I think one of the reasonable conclusions was he was trying to get out of the gate and the fence. And had he gotten out of the gate and the fence, the argument is he would have just kept going. [¶] But it's up to the jury to decide whether he did or didn't. There's evidence that would support that conclusion. So if the jury does reach that conclusion, then this instruction tells them what they should do with that or could do with that."
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 372, which provided, "If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled or tried to flee, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself."
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the law concerning a defendant's flight. (CALCRIM No. 372.)
We apply the de novo standard of review. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 376.) " 'In general, a flight instruction "is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt." [Citations.] " '[F]light requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly does require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.' " " (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 982.)
In regard to departing Swim Beach after Wife's and the dog's drowning, defendant said that, after swimming ashore, he went to a pastor's garage and slept. Defendant's statement constitutes substantial evidence that defendant left the crime scene after the crimes.
In regard to consciousness of guilt, during Deputy Cottrell's and defendant's conversation, the following exchange occurred:
"Dep[uty] Cottrell: Okay, I believe he gave you a pillow, but your shirt is dry.
"[Defendant]: Well, um, I can't explain it. Not bad humidity right now. I haven't done anything wrong here."
Also, during Deputy Cottrell's and defendant's conversation, defendant said, "I mean me and [Wife] were just starting to do great. I got a settlement coming the 27[th] of this month and [inaudible 00:08:05] 200[,]000 dollars. I mean why would I want to do anything to her. It's ridiculous."
In defendant's statements he denied guilt. Thus, defendant had awareness that he could be criminally liable for Wife's death and the dog's death. One can reasonably conclude, from defendant's awareness of his possible criminal liability, that defendant left the crime scene because he was conscious of his guilt and wanted to avoid criminal liability for his acts. Defendant's awareness of his guilt was further supported by defendant failing to summon help for Wife. If defendant believed an accident had occurred, then one would reasonably have expected him to call for assistance or ask the pastor for assistance. In sum, because defendant was aware of his possible criminal liability and did not seek assistance for Wife, there is substantial evidence that defendant left the crime scene for the purpose of avoiding arrest. In sum, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the law related to a defendant's flight.
Defendant contends the trial court erred because he did not flee. Defendant points to the evidence that he was found 100 yards from the crime scene, and he was making loud noises. Defendant's argument fails to account for the version of events wherein defendant left the crime scene and went to a pastor's garage. Accordingly, we find defendant's argument to be unpersuasive.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
Acting P. J. We concur: CODRINGTON
J. SLOUGH
J.