Opinion
B296647
05-07-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JON PAUL LOUIS HIPPOLYTE, Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Acting Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and William H. Shin, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA462342) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Drew E. Edwards, Judge. Affirmed with sentence modification. Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Acting Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and William H. Shin, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The trial court's minute order and abstract of judgment include a sentencing term that the court did not orally pronounce. The People concede this was error. We order that the trial court strike the term to conform to its orally pronounced sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After attempting to solicit an undercover officer to work for him as a prostitute, the People charged Jon Paul Louis Hippolyte (defendant) with (1) pandering by encouraging (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (a)(2)), and (2) attempted pandering by procuring (id., §§ 266i, subd. (a)(1), 664). After a jury convicted him of both counts, the trial court imposed a four year prison term as well as other terms and conditions of his sentence. Among other things, the minute order and abstract of judgment purporting to memorialize the sentence stated that the court ordered defendant "not [to] own, use or possess any dangerous or deadly weapons, including any firearms, knives or other concealable weapons." Although the trial court orally ordered defendant not to "own[], us[e], or possess[] . . . any firearms or ammunition," the court did not orally pronounce the "no dangerous or deadly weapon" term.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the "no dangerous or deadly weapon" term must be stricken from the minute order and abstract of judgment because it was not part of the court's oral pronouncement of sentence and is accordingly not part of the sentence actually imposed. As the People concede, defendant is correct. It is a trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence that controls (see People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89), and the inclusion of terms in a minute order or abstract of judgment that were not orally pronounced is a clerical error subject to correction on appeal (People v. Contreras (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1300, fn. 3; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185).
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of conviction, but order the trial court to strike the "no dangerous or deadly weapon" term from the pertinent minute order and abstract of judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
/s/_________, J.
HOFFSTADT We concur: /s/_________, P.J.
LUI /s/_________, J.
CHAVEZ