Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ronald M. Christiansen, Judge. Super.Ct.No. FSB047252
Jamie Popper, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI J.
Defendant appeals from his conviction on four counts of second degree robbery, to which he pleaded guilty in exchange for a sentence of 15 years in prison.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2003 and November 2004, defendant committed a string of second degree robberies in the San Bernardino and Colton areas. Defendant would approach the victim, simulate a gun, and forcibly take the money from either the victim’s person or cash register and at times would assault the victim. The victims all identified defendant as the perpetrator in a photographic lineup. In one incident, defendant was caught on camera walking into a Seven-11 store, jumping over the counter, striking the employee in the face, removing cash from the register, and fleeing the store.
The factual background is taken from the preliminary hearing transcript.
On June 15, 2007, a first amended information was filed charging defendant with four counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). The information also alleged that defendant had suffered one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, sud. (a)(1)), to wit, robbery in 1996, and one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, sud. (b)-(i), 1170.12, sud. (a)-(d)), to wit, the 1996 robbery.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Defendant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to all of the counts and admitted all of the allegations in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 15 years. At the time of the taking of the plea, in response to the court’s inquiry, defendant admitted that he had gone over the terms of the plea, that he had had enough time to discuss the case with his attorney, and that he understood everything on the plea form. Defense counsel agreed that he had gone over the entire form with defendant and that defendant understood everything on the plea form. The court found that defendant had read and understood the declaration and plea form and that he understood the nature of the charges to which he was pleading and all of the consequences and punishments for the offenses. The court also found that defendant understood his constitutional rights and was freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waiving those rights.
In regard to the prior felony and strike conviction, when the court asked defendant, “And do you admit that on or about December 3rd, 1996 . . . you were previously convicted of a second degree robbery which falls as a strike and prior prison term,” defendant responded, “That’s the difficult part, your Honor, because I signed a plea before, okay, but I didn’t sign for no -- in ’96 signed for a plea, but I didn’t sign for no strike back then in ’96 on that plea, according to that plea form.” Defendant further stated, “They didn’t tell me I had a strike on it.” The court responded, “Right. But as of the three strikes law as of today, a second degree robbery qualifies as a strike and as a prior serious felony. So I’m asking if you admit you had a prior conviction of second degree robbery on December 3rd, 1996 under the case number I gave?” Defendant replied, “Yes.”
On July 5, 2007, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement with total custody credits of 953 days for time served.
Defendant appealed and obtained a certificate of probable cause, and upon his request this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wendie (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 Led.2d 493] setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues and requesting this court to undertake a review of the entire record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he has done so. In his supplemental four-page letter brief filed November 11, 2007, defendant makes arguments related to the voluntariness of his admission of the prior robbery conviction.
II
ANALYSIS
“[B]before accepting a criminal defendant’s admission of a prior conviction, the trial court must advise the defendant and obtain waivers of (1) the right to a trial to determine the fact of the prior conviction, (2) the right to remain silent, and (3) the right to confront adverse witnesses. [Citation.] Proper advisement and waivers of these rights in the record establish a defendant’s voluntary and intelligent admission of the prior conviction. [Citations.]” (People v. Cosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 356; see also People v. Stills (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1770; People v. Ditcher (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 223, 233.) “The focus is not on whether [the allegations] would have been found true, but on whether the defendant knew of his constitutional rights” and the consequences of his admissions. (Stills, at p. 1770.)
“[I]f the transcript does not reveal complete advisements and waivers, the reviewing court must examine the record of ‘the entire proceeding’ to assess whether the defendant’s admission of the prior conviction was intelligent and voluntary in light of the totality of circumstances. [Citation.]” (People v. Cosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th 353 at p. 361.) “For instance, ‘a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system’ is . . . ‘relevant to the question [of] whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights.’ [Citation.] That is so because previous experience in the criminal justice system is relevant to a recidivist’s ‘“knowledge and sophistication regarding his [legal] rights.”’ [Citations.] Here defendant’s prior conviction was based on a plea of guilty, at which he would have received [the pertinent] advisements.” (Id. at pp. 364-365, fn. omitted.)
Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that defendant’s admission to the prior robbery conviction was voluntary and made intelligently. Defendant was explicitly given his constitutional rights in the plea form. He clearly waived those rights by initially paragraph 7, which states in pertinent part, “As to each crime, enhancement, and/or prior conviction . . . [¶] I waive and give up each of the above constitutional rights listed in paragraph 5.” He acquiesced that he had gone over the plea form with his counsel and that he understood everything on the plea form. Defense counsel concurred that he had reviewed the entire form with defendant and that defendant understood everything on the plea form. In addition, prior to pleading guilty, defendant had gone through a preliminary hearing, in which he was aware that he had a right to an attorney, the right cross-examine all witnesses who testified against him, the right to present his own evidence, and the right to either testify or remain silent. In fact, defendant had observed his attorney cross-examine the People’s witnesses, and he had exercised his right to not testify. Moreover, defendant is not new to the criminal justice system. Accordingly, based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that defendant voluntarily and intelligently admitted his prior conviction.
We have concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P.J., McKINSTER J.