Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. YA073793, Eric C. Taylor, Judge. .
Dejuan Isaiah Hill, in pro. per., and David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, Acting P. J.
Dejuan Isaiah Hill appeals from the judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and admitted he was subject to the “Three Strikes” law for one prior serious or violent felony conviction for robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and under section 667, subdivision (a).
On December 16, 2008, defendant was arrested after he acted as a lookout while his male companion grabbed Minnie Jones’s purse from her shoulder as she walked to her front door. Jones fell to the sidewalk and defendant and his companion fled down the street. As they ran, the two men were holding and “manipulating” the purse. Police recovered a loaded handgun in some ivy, near where Jones’s wallet was found.
Defendant was charged by information with one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The information further alleged as to both counts that Logan had suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions for robbery within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, and under section 667, subdivision (a) and had previously served a separate prison term for robbery under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
After the trial court denied defendant’s motions to dismiss the robbery count under section 995, and to dismiss the prior strike convictions under People v. SuperiorCourt (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, on June 2, 2009, defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to robbery and admitted one prior strike conviction and one prior serious felony enhancement.
At the time defendant entered his plea, he was advised of his constitutional rights and the nature and consequences of his plea. The prosecutor reiterated that defendant would be admitting the convictions for robbery as sentencing enhancements under the Three Strikes law and under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Defendant stated he understood and waived his constitutional rights, acknowledged he understood the consequences of his plea and admissions and accepted the terms of the negotiated agreement. Defendant also stated he was entering his plea and admissions freely and voluntarily.
Defense counsel joined in the waivers of defendant’s constitutional rights and concurred in the plea and admissions. Defense counsel stipulated to, and the court found, a factual basis for the plea based on the police report, the preliminary hearing transcript and the probation report. Pursuant to the agreement, defendant was sentenced to 11 years in state prison, or the middle three-year term for second degree robbery, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus five years for the prior serious felony enhancement. Defendant received presentence custody credit of 194 days (169 actual days and 25 days of conduct credit). The court ordered defendant to pay a $20 security assessment, a $30 court construction fine, and a $200 restitution fine. A parole revocation fine was imposed and suspended pursuant to section 1202.45. The remaining charge and special allegations were dismissed on the People’s motion.
At the conclusion of the plea and sentencing hearing, defendant asked to speak to the trial court, saying: “I just want to just talk for a little while before, you know -- I want to just say like, you know, I understand and believe that, you know, God and everything let everything happen for a reason. So I got to accept this, and it’s for a good reason, but I want to let you all know at the same time that, honestly, everybody know that I didn’t have nothing to do with this. I didn’t do it, but, you know, some time it happen this way. [¶] And I wasn’t just out there just like -- I know it’s the D.A. job to paint a bad picture, make me look like I’m some type of demon, devil, something like that, but I was out there working, going to school, you know. But I guess I just got to take it, but I just want to let you all know at the same time that I didn’t do it. I know I didn’t.”
The trial court immediately inquired of defendant, “Okay. So you are saying you want to withdraw your plea?” Defendant answered, “No, because -- ” The court interrupted, “You can -- ” Defendant continued speaking, “ -- You don’t guarantee. Basically told me I’m going to get life if I don’t take it.”
The court then readvised defendant that he had “a right to a jury trial. You have a right to a jury to determine what the evidence is and determine whether or not you did this.” Defendant replied, “I didn’t. I didn’t.” The court explained, “If you are saying the evidence won’t show that, then take a jury trial, but you do risk the strikes and you do risk being convicted. But only you know what the evidence and -- you and the D.A. know what the evidence is. I don’t. I haven’t seen it. [¶] If you like to withdraw your plea, I’ll let you do that.” (Italics added.) Defendant answered, “I don’t know. I just -- I guess I’ll just take it, take how it is.” The court confirmed, “It’s either yes or no. Would you like to withdraw your plea?” Defendant, “No.”
Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment and was issued a certificate of probable cause. We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal.
After examination of the record counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised. On November 19, 2009, we advised defendant he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. On December 11, 2009, we received a handprinted supplemental brief in which defendant claimed his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by insisting defendant would receive a life sentence if he went to trial rather than agree to the negotiated plea, and by failing to inform defendant of the theory of aiding and abetting, which would have shown him to be not guilty of committing the robbery.
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied defendant’s attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The record fails to demonstrate defense counsel provided ineffective assistance at any time during the proceedings in the trial court. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ZELON, J.JACKSON, J.