Opinion
F061272 Super. Ct. No. F08903477
01-26-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALEXANDER ROYFERNANDO HARWELL, Defendant and Appellant.
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Hilary A. Chittick, Judge.
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Alexander Royfernando Harwell plead no contest to voluntary manslaughter of Maria Padilla and now challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from two incidents: 1) a warrantless search of his motel room conducted shortly after checkout time with the consent of the motel manager acting with apparent authority; and 2) the later warrantless search and seizure and subsequent warrant-based search of a storage locker, the existence of which was discovered from paperwork found among appellant's items seized from the motel room search. He argues the warrantless motel room search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he had an expectation of privacy in the room, and the police's reliance on the motel manager's consent was unreasonable. He further argues he had an expectation of privacy in the storage locker as an authorized user, and thus the warrantless storage locker search and seizure also violated his Fourth Amendment guarantee. Moreover, appellant argues that the subsequent warrant-based search of the storage locker was "fruit of the poisonous tree" of the two prior unreasonable warrantless searches of the motel room and storage locker, and thus evidence gleaned from the storage locker should also have been suppressed. Appellant argues the denial should be reversed and he be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2008, Detective Mark Eaton of the Fresno County Sheriff's Department was called out to a location where a body had been found. The body was missing its head, hands, and feet. It also had a bullet wound through the heart. The location was the vacated home and yard of appellant's former colleague, a location appellant had visited extensively in the past.
All dates are in 2008 unless otherwise indicated.
Olga Padilla came forward shortly thereafter and identified the body as her older sister, Maria Padilla. She had last seen Maria on May 8, and believed her to be with her boyfriend, Lorenzo Sepulveda, since that time.
Maria Padilla also sometimes is referred to as Mary Padilla in the record. We refer to each Padilla sister by her first name for clarity's sake and mean no disrespect.
On May 13, appellant rented a room at a motel in Fresno. He paid for a week-long rental, extending to May 20. The motel manager, Dino "Charlie" Park, testified he saw appellant, Sepulveda, and Maria arrive at the motel on May 13 together. Park testified the normal checkout time for appellant would have been noon, which he told the officers when they questioned him.
On May 20, appellant extended his stay one more night. On the afternoon of May 21, he again extended his stay, this time for two nights, until May 23. Also on May 21, appellant left to Las Vegas. He returned the call of an investigating officer late that night, informing him he intended to return on May 23.
On May 22, detectives contacted Park and inquired about appellant's room rental. They also set up surveillance on appellant's room. On May 23, shortly after checkout time, the police entered appellant's motel room with a master key Park had given them.
Inside the room, detectives found Maria's purse. They also found a garbage bag containing items with dried blood on them, a bullet hole in a couch cushion, and a bullet in the wall behind the couch along the same trajectory as the couch bullet hole.
Officers seized personal items belonging to appellant and Sepulveda from the motel room, such as a filing cabinet and a box with appellant's name on it. Detective Eaton subsequently obtained a search warrant to search those items on June 1.
In the filing cabinet, another detective discovered a rental agreement for a storage locker in Maria's name. Appellant and Lorenzo Sepulveda were listed as authorized users on the rental agreement. Detective Eaton went to the storage facility on June 4 and talked to the facility manager, who confirmed the rental. Access to storage units is tracked by gate activity at the facility. Detective Eaton reviewed the gate activity report and testified the storage unit had been visited by someone, using the gate code provided to the renter and authorized users, after Maria's death.
Detective Eaton had the lock on the storage unit cut off. He then opened the unit to look for biological evidence, such as body parts or insect activity. Finding none, he closed the unit and put a lock on that he had purchased from the facility. There is no evidence in the record that he ever entered the storage unit. Detective Eaton subsequently obtained a search warrant for the storage unit on June 5. Officers later found items with possible blood stains, including a shotgun, in the storage unit.
Appellant was arrested on May 24. He was charged with murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, appellant petitioned this court for a writ of mandate, which we denied. Appellant subsequently pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), and admitted a gun enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). In exchange, he received a 15-year stipulated prison term. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.412.)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Appellant appeals now solely on grounds that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5.
Appellant also requested, and received, a certificate of probable cause to appeal on other grounds, but failed to include any related arguments in his briefing. We deem those claims waived. (See Paulus v. Bob Lunch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 686.) Challenging a motion to suppress evidence requires no certificate of probable cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(A).)
DISCUSSION
Appellant contests the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the motel room and the storage locker. He argues the warrantless searches and seizures of the motel room and the storage unit were improper and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He also argues the warrant-based search of the storage locker was unconstitutional as fruit of the poisonous trees of the improper warrantless searches. Moreover, he asserts the evidence in both the motel room and the storage unit would not have been inevitably discovered in the course of normal police procedure.
Respondent contends the motel room search was validly based on Detective Eaton's reasonable belief that motel manager Park had authority to consent to a search of the room. Respondent further asserts that since the motel room search was proper, the storage unit searches were also proper, and in any case, the storage unit would have been inevitably discovered, and the subsequent warrant-based search of the storage unit was based on sufficient independent information to be valid.
A. Standard of Review
"In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court is charged with (1) finding the historical facts; (2) selecting the applicable rule of law; and (3) applying the latter to the former to determine whether or not the rule of law as applied to the established facts has been violated. [Citation.] On appeal, we review the trial court's resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, under the deferential substantial-evidence standard, but subject the second and third inquiries to independent review. [Citations.]" (People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 345 (Parson).)
B. The Motel Room Search
General Principles
"Exclusion of 'relevant, but unlawfully obtained evidence' is permitted under article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution 'only if exclusion is required by the United States Constitution.' [Citation.] 'The exclusionary rule was adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of all citizens "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures...."' [Citation.]" (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 324 (Sanders).)
Expectation of Privacy
"The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement and other government officials.[] This protection extends to motel and hotel rooms in which the occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. [Citations.]" (Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 345.)
"In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards. [Citation.]"
"In order to have standing to challenge the search of a hotel room under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. [Citation.] 'A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."' [Citation.]" (United States v. Dorais (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3d 1124, 1128 (Dorais).)
"[A]s a general rule a defendant's expectation of privacy in a hotel room expires at checkout time. However ... the polices and practices of a hotel may result in the extension past checkout time of a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. The existence and duration of that expectation depend on the facts and circumstances in each case." (Dorais, supra, 241 F.3d at p. 1129.)
"[A] person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a rented space after the rental period has expired, and that upon expiration of the rental period, the owner is entitled to retake control and physical possession of the rental property and consent to its search by the police. [Citations.]" (Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 347.)
"[W]e examine the record to determine whether [the defendant] presented sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proving that he held a reasonable expectation of privacy in [the motel room] at the time of the search. [Citation.]" (Dorais, supra, 241 F.3d at pp. 1129-1130.) The prosecution holds the burden of proving the reasonableness of the police conduct in performing a warrantless search. (People v. Contreras (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 450, 456.)
Apparent Authority
"California law has long held that the consent of a third party given to a police officer authorizing the officer to enter premises to conduct a search is not lawful unless the police officer reasonably believed that the consenting party had actual or apparent authority to do so. [Citations.]" (People v. Roman (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 674, 679.) The United States Supreme Court also supports this proposition. In Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177 (Rodriguez), the high court concluded that a warrantless search may be proper if based on the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of entry, reasonably believed possessed common authority over the premises, even if that third party did not actually have such authority. (Id. at p. 179.)
The high court further explained, "[w]hat [defendant] is assured by the Fourth Amendment itself ... is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is 'unreasonable.' [Citation.]" (Rodriguez, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 183.) Moreover, "[w]hether the basis for such authority exists is the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it reasonably." (Id. at p. 186.)
"[D]etermination of consent to enter must 'be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief"' that the consenting party had authority over the premises? [Citation.] If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is valid." (Rodriguez, supra, 497 U.S. at pp. 188-189.)
Application to This Case
The trial court found that appellant had not abandoned the motel room and thus retained an expectation of privacy in the room when the search occurred, notwithstanding the noon checkout time. Appellant agrees with this finding and finds fault only with the trial court's finding that Detective Eaton reasonably believed that motel manager Park had authority to consent to the search. Respondent essentially concedes that the trial court properly found appellant had an expectation of privacy in the room, and contends the trial court properly found motel manager Park had apparent authority to consent to the search, which Detective Eaton reasonably relied upon. Thus, the issue as to the motel room search is solely whether Detective Eaton's belief as to Park's authority to consent was reasonable. (See Rodriguez, supra, 497 U.S. at 188-189.) We conclude that it was.
In determining that Detective Eaton's belief was reasonable, the trial court made the following factual determinations, to which we must defer under the substantial evidence standard. Park told law enforcement officers the checkout time was noon on the 23rd and no arrangement had been made to allow appellant to stay beyond that time. Detective Eaton understood the checkout time was noon, and was expecting someone to come back to the motel to extend their stay, but no one did. Officers rechecked paperwork to confirm the checkout date and time. Detectives requested consent from Park before entering the motel room. Park agreed to allow them to enter, advising them that it was the motel's room at that point since appellant had failed to pay. Park provided them with the master key to open the room. They asked for permission to search the room, which was given, and they entered the room sometime between 12:10 and 12:20. The court concluded, "Mr. Park, it seems to the Court, pretty clearly made these representations to the officers. The Court doesn't find there was any information to the contrary provided to the officers."
Our review of the record substantially supports the trial court's factual findings. Park testified he was expecting appellant to return some time on or before May 23. He testified he told the officers checkout time was noon, and did not relay that the motel had a lax checkout policy. He affirmed that law enforcement officers looking at the activity report for the front desk would not have known appellant was planning on extending his stay. Park also testified detectives seemed interested in knowing when appellant was checking out. He told detectives appellant was checking out on May 23. He testified he told the police that no arrangement to extend appellant's stay had been made. He admitted he told the police the rental period expired at noon. He admitted he told detectives the room now belonged back to the motel. He testified detectives asked his permission to search the room, which he gave, along with the master key. He testified that at the time, he had authority as the manager of the motel to enter rooms.
Moreover, Detective Eaton testified he sought guidance as to how to approach the situation. He conducted research in legal resource manuals the morning of the search, and also discussed the situation with his fellow veteran detective. Based on Detective Eaton's testimony, it appears he believed appellant had abandoned the motel room as of checkout time. He testified he questioned Park very specifically as to checkout time. He testified he was aware of the possibility of late checkout at a motel, and testified he was in no rush or inconvenience to delay the search. He testified he was careful to limit the search and seizure to the motel room itself, and refrained from searching personal items of appellant or Sepulveda until he had subsequently obtained search warrants to do so.
In our view, this is not a case of law enforcement officers running roughshod over the Fourth Amendment. (See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 448.) As our Supreme Court has noted, the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment's protection is to deter future unlawful police conduct. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 324.) Based on the record before us, we conclude Detective Eaton's reliance on Park's apparent authority to consent to the search was objectively reasonable, notwithstanding Park's lack of actual authority. (Rodriguez, supra, 497 U.S. at pp. 188-189.)
Because we conclude the motel room search was reasonable, we need not address appellant's inevitable discovery claim as to the motel room search. (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 441-448.)
C. The Storage Unit
Standing
Appellant next asserts the trial court erred in finding appellant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the storage unit, and therefore lacked standing to challenge the searches and seizures related to the storage unit, arguing that the trial court's reliance on United States v. Sarkisian (9th Cir. 1999) 197 F.3d 966 (Sarkisian) was misplaced.
In Sarkisian, the Ninth Circuit held that, "a defendant who merely possesses the authority to access a storage rental room but does not use it, without more, lacks Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the unlawful search of that area. [Citations.]" (Sarkisian, supra, 197 F.3d at pp. 987-988.) There, the defendants were involved in a stolen cars and auto parts trafficking scheme. They were listed as authorized users on a rental agreement for a storage unit in the name of a co-conspirator's grandmother. The police searched the storage room without a warrant based on defendants' searchable state probation status, and found numerous car parts and other relevant evidence. (Id. at p. 974.) The court explained, "[i]t is true that [defendants] were listed on the rental agreement as people who possessed the right to access the storage room, and that the storage room was locked. Still, we believe that this connection alone is insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room." (Id. at p. 986.)
Here, it is reasonable to infer appellant's conduct rose past the threshold set by Sarkisian, such that we conclude he has standing to challenge the storage unit searches and seizures, albeit with unfruitful results. The storage unit was rented the day Maria was last seen. The storage unit was accessed twice after Maria's body was found, inferentially by either appellant, Sepulveda or both. None of Maria's belongings were in the storage unit. It is reasonable to infer appellant's connection to the unit was more than merely being listed as an authorized user on the rental agreement. Although the trial court concluded appellant lacked standing to challenge the storage unit search, it went on to find that even if appellant had standing, the search and seizure did not violate appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. We reach the same conclusion, as discussed below.
Although somewhat unclear, it appears appellant raises the expectation of privacy argument to more specifically challenge both Detective Eaton's preliminary action at his initial visit to the storage facility of opening, looking inside, and closing the storage unit after having the lock removed -a warrantless search, and also Detective Eaton's act of placing a new lock on the unit - a warrantless seizure.
Appellant further challenges the warrant-based search of the storage unit as unconstitutional, but solely on a theory of "fruit of the poisonous tree" gained from the search of the motel room. (Segura v. United States (1984) 468 U.S. 796, 805 (Segura).) Because we have already concluded the motel room search was reasonable, we need not address this latter argument, nor his claim the prosecution failed to prove inevitable discovery of the storage unit. Thus, we focus on the legality of Detective Eaton's initial actions opening and then securing the storage unit prior to obtaining a search warrant.
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General Legal Principles
"[A defendant's] expectation of privacy in a commercial storage area is lower than that in a residential area. [Citations.]" (Sarkisian, supra, 197 F.3d at pp. 986-987.) "A search implies some '"exploratory investigation or an invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out ... a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed ... or intentionally put out of the way."' [Citation.]" (People v. Monson (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 935, 939, fn. 1.)
The Warrantless Search
In People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373 (Bennett), shortly after Bennett's arrest, a police investigator seized his motel room by telling the motel manager not to let anyone into the room without police permission. The next day, the investigator entered the room and saw a rifle. Thereafter, the police obtained a warrant, searched the room, and seized the gun, which proved to be the murder weapon. (Id. at pp. 376-377.)
Discussing the investigator's entry into the room and observation of the rifle prior to the warrant-based search in Bennett, our Supreme Court found the rifle need not be suppressed because "after the [investigator's] entry the police utilized an 'independent source' to seize the rifle: a search warrant issued on the basis of facts unrelated to Moore's conduct." (Bennett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 389.) The Bennett court also observed that the United States Supreme Court has rejected in the past an argument that an initial entry tainted a later search because someone might have eliminated the evidence before a search warrant could be obtained. (Bennett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 389-390, discussing Segura, supra, 468 U.S. 796.)
Even if we assume Detective Eaton's initial action of opening, looking inside, and closing the unit was an improper warrantless search, no evidence was obtained from it. The items in the storage unit were instead obtained by means of the "independent source" of the search warrant, which was based on an affidavit that established probable cause without significant reliance on Detective Eaton's initial actions with respect to the storage unit. The affidavit relayed that parts of Maria's body were yet to be located. It noted Maria's connection with appellant and Lorenzo Sepulveda. It noted the motel room search, the investigation leading to that search, and the evidence seized from that search. It noted appellant had been arrested on May 24. It noted paperwork for the storage unit had been found from the items seized at the motel room and that the rental agreement was in Maria's name with appellant and Sepulveda listed as authorized users. It noted the unit had been visited on May 20 and May 21, after Maria's body was discovered. The warrant here was sufficient to dissipate the taint of any illegality. (Bennett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 390-391.)
The Warrantless Seizure
Our Supreme Court also found the investigator's initial seizure of the motel room reasonable in Bennett. (Bennett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 387-388.) The court explained, "[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, a seizure of property occurs when 'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.' [Citation.] The ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a seizure is reasonableness. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 385.) "When ... police officers remain outside a dwelling, the Fourth Amendment rights implicated are ordinarily not the occupant's privacy interests, but rather the occupant's possessory interests in the dwelling and its contents.... And when ... the dwelling's only occupant has been validly arrested away from the dwelling, the interference with possessory interests is attenuated. Because the occupant is already in custody, the seizure of the dwelling does not prevent the occupant from entering it." (Id. at p. 386.)
The Bennett court further explained, "[i]f police officers have a 'middle ground' of barring entry to a suspect's dwelling for a limited period during their investigations, while the officers remain outside the premises, the investigations may reveal that a search of the dwelling is unnecessary, thus minimizing the intrusion on the occupant's Fourth Amendment interests. If, on the other hand, the investigating officers conclude that a search of the dwelling is called for, permitting the officers to bar entry will give the officers sufficient time to seek a warrant, thereby allowing a neutral and detached magistrate to determine whether the officers have probable cause to search." (Bennett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 388.)
We find the situation here analogous. Detective Eaton's removal of the existing lock and replacement with a police-owned lock, as the trial court concluded, is akin to stationing an officer outside of the unit or telling the motel manager to prohibit anyone from entering a motel room without police authorization. It is an action that prevents persons - including the defendant - from accessing the area. We note that appellant had been arrested and was in custody at the time the storage unit was seized. The seizure did not violate appellant's constitutional rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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Franson, J.
WE CONCUR:
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Levy, Acting P.J.
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Kane, J.