Opinion
F083490
06-22-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAYMOND HANSEN, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
Carla J. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. No. CR19005448 Nancy A. Leo, Judge.
Carla J. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Raymond Hansen, Jr., previously appealed from his negotiated plea agreement in which he pled no contest to felony hit and run with injury in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) and admitted a prior prison term enhancement. He was sentenced to a term of five years' imprisonment. In his initial appeal, our court struck the prior prison term in light of the passage of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) and remanded for further proceedings regarding the plea agreement.
In August 2021, the trial court resentenced defendant to a four-year term; he was subsequently released on parole. In September 2021, defendant sought clarification of his parole status, arguing he had served in excess of four years and should not be on parole. The court disagreed, stating parole started once defendant was released from custody, and it issued a minute order stating defendant was to report to postrelease community supervision (PRCS) or parole upon release. Defendant appeals from that order.
On appeal, appointed counsel for defendant asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant filed a supplemental brief. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant pleaded no contest to felony hit and run with injury in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) and admitted a prior prison term enhancement as part of a negotiated plea agreement pursuant to which he was sentenced to a term of five years' imprisonment. In defendant's initial appeal, our court struck the prior prison term in light of the passage of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) and remanded for further proceedings regarding the plea agreement.
On August 5, 2021, the trial court held a hearing following the issuance of the remittitur in the direct appeal. The court struck the Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement and ordered defendant's sentence to be reduced by one year. Accordingly, the court resentenced defendant to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for the aggravated term of four years on the Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2) violation, and an amended abstract of judgment reflecting this judgment was prepared.
Defendant was released on parole on August 19, 2021, and he acknowledged the various conditions of his parole.
On September 10, 2021, the court held another hearing at the request of defense counsel for "clarification of [defendant's] parole status." At the hearing, defense counsel asserted the corrected abstract of judgment following the striking of the enhancement did not reflect that defendant was to report "to parole or probation upon release" under section four of the abstract. She explained, defendant believed that when he was released from prison, he had served more than four years, so he should not be on parole. The court stated parole or PRCS starts when defendant is released from custody, and defendant had to be admitted to PRCS or parole. It further noted the records reflected defendant was "to report to PRCS" and "[i]t's up to them to decide what to do." The court then issued a minute order directing defendant to report to parole or PRCS within seven days of release. Defendant filed a notice of appeal related to this order.
A petition for revocation of defendant's parole was filed on November 17, 2021, alleging defendant disabled his electronic monitoring device by failing to properly charge it and failed to attend sex offender treatment. The petition recommended defendant be returned to custody for 180 days based on his failure to comply with the conditions of parole. On November 19, 2021, a warrant was filed for a contested hearing on a violation of parole.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel, who filed an opening brief pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, requesting independent review of the record for arguable issues. Appellate counsel notified defendant that she was filing a Wende brief and informed defendant he had 30 days from the filing of the brief to submit any claims, arguments, or issues that he wished our court to review. Our court also sent defendant a letter notifying him he could submit a letter stating any grounds on appeal he wanted our court to hear. He filed a letter brief.
1. Defendant's Supplemental Brief
In his brief, defendant asserts his previous appellate counsel told him "the prior was no longer validated, or active coming from the Fifth Appellate Court in Fresno, Calif." He states he was told he had 10 days to appeal the decision "if we still wanted to argue it. If not, the case would be remanded, meaning the case be brougt [sic] back to court for re-trial if I chose; which I did not by not appealling [sic] the prior." He asserts, "I did excess time for this, so should not even be on parole and have a new trial to show my constitution [sic] rights be protected."
2. Analysis
"A sentence resulting in imprisonment in the state prison pursuant to Section 1168 or 1170 shall include a period of parole supervision or postrelease community supervision, unless waived, or as otherwise provided ...." (Pen. Code, § 3000, subd. (a)(1); accord, People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 609 ["Parole is a mandatory component of any prison sentence"].) "For a crime committed on or after July 1, 2013, at the expiration of ... a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to Section 1170 . .,, the inmate shall be released on parole for a period of 3 years," unless a longer period of parole is specified. (Pen. Code, § 3000, subd. (b)(2)(B).)
"[U]nder the present law the prison 'term' is the actual time served in prison before release on parole, and the day of release on parole marks the end of the prison term. ... [T]he period of parole is not part of a defendant's prison term, and the length of time an offender may remain on parole or may be incarcerated for a parole violation is measured by statutory provisions setting the maximum parole period for most offenses at three years and establishing the maximum period of confinement for a parole violation at one year." (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 95-96; accord, In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 975 ["Under post-1977 law, '"Parole is no longer service of the term"'"]; see People v. Nuckles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 609; Pen. Code, §§ 3000, subd. (b)(1), 3057, subd. (a).) "The inmate has the right to reconsideration of the length of parole and conditions thereof by the department or the parole authority, whichever is applicable." (Pen. Code, § 3000, subd. (b)(7); see In re Lira (2014) 58 Cal.4th 573, 584 ["whether a period of parole is to be required and, if so, its duration and conditions are matters for the Board (of Parole Hearings)"].)
Here, the trial court properly referred defendant to parole or PRCS upon his release from prison. Thus, there is no relief for this court to grant as defendant has shown no error in the trial court proceedings or abstract of judgment.
We are satisfied no arguable issues exist and defendant's counsel has fully satisfied her responsibilities under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pages 441-442 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Before Levy, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Pena, J.