Opinion
Docket No. CR-024677-22QN
06-27-2023
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. HAMLETT, Defendant.
For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney of Queens County For Mr. Hamlett: Queens Defenders
For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney of Queens County
For Mr. Hamlett: Queens Defenders
Wanda L. Licitra, J. On June 22, 2023, this court held a Mapp hearing in this case. The accused person, Mr. Hamlett, is incarcerated because he cannot pay the $5,000 bond set on a separate pretrial matter pending before a different court. As a result, the Department of Corrections produced Mr. Hamlett for this hearing. He was led into the courtroom and sat at the defense table with his wrists cuffed in front of his body. Before the hearing began, his counsel moved for the court to remove those restraints. The court granted the application and now issues this opinion to explain its reasoning.
The People did not voice an opinion on the issue.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Under the federal and New York constitutions, no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." ( U.S. Const. amend. XIV ; NY const. art. I, § 6 ). "Liberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action." ( Youngberg v. Romeo , 457 U.S. 307, 316, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 [1982] ). That liberty includes the right to be free from shackles in the courtroom. (See Deck v. Missouri , 544 U.S. 622, 629, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 [2005] ). Thus, a general, indiscriminate policy to handcuff any incarcerated person produced to the courtroom is unlawful. A person cannot be shackled during criminal proceedings without a specific factual showing of actual necessity.
This right has "deep roots in the common law." (Deck v. Missouri , 544 U.S. 622, 626, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 [2005] ; see, e.g. , Blair v. Commonwealth , 171 Ky. 319, 188 S.W. 390, 393 [1916] [noting "the common-law rule" that "shackling defendant[s] during arraignment, during the calling and examination of jurors, or at any time during the trial, except in extreme cases to prevent escape or to protect the bystanders from the danger of defendant's attack, [was] reversible error."]). "[E]very person," from "the time of his arraignment," ought to be treated "with all the humanity and gentleness which is consistent with the nature of the thing, and under no other terror or uneasiness than what proceeds from a sense of his guilt, and the misfortune of his present circumstances; and therefore ought not to be brought to the bar in a contumelious manner; as with his hands tied together, or any other mark of ignominy and reproach; nor even with fetters on his feet, unless there be some danger of a rescous [rescue] or escape." (2 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown , 434 [Curwood, 8th ed. 1824]). Blackstone agreed. A person "must be brought to the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless there be evidence danger of an escape." (4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 317 [1769]). So did the authors of other early treatises. (E.g. , 3 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 34 [1797] ["If felons come in judgment to answer, ... they shall be out of irons, and all manner of bonds, so that their pain shall not take away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to answer, but at their free will."]; Richard Burn, The Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer 33 [1836] ["The prisoner, on his arraignment, ... must be brought to the bar without irons and all manner of shackles and bonds, unless there be danger of escape, and then he may be brought with irons."]). While the Supreme Court in Deck v. Missouri opined, in dicta, that Blackstone and other early commentators distinguished this right between trial and pretrial proceedings, the en banc federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has convincingly challenged that claim. (See, e.g. , United States v. Sanchez-Gomez , 859 F.3d 649, 663-64 [9th Cir. 2017] [en banc] ["The Supreme Court's dictum on pretrial proceedings in Deck doesn't control this case because it's contradicted by the very sources on which the Supreme Court relied."], rev'd on other grounds , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 200 L.Ed.2d 792 [2018] [finding the case moot]).
While some jurisdictions have thus far cabined this right—controversially so —to proceedings before juries, that is not the case in New York. In People v. Best , our Court of Appeals unanimously held that "the rule governing visible restraints in jury trials applies with equal force to nonjury trials." ( 19 N.Y.3d 739, 742, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 [2012] ). There, a lower court had kept an accused person handcuffed in front of his body throughout a bench trial. ( Id. at 742-43, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 ). The Court of Appeals held that such shackling undermines three "fundamental legal principles." ( Id. at 743-44, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 ). First, "preserving the presumption of innocence"; second, "ensuring that the defendant is able to participate meaningfully in his or her defense"; and third, "maintaining the dignity of the judicial process." ( Id. at 744, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 ). "The routine and unexplained use of visible restraints does violence to each of these principles, essential pillars of a fair and civilized criminal justice system that are no less implicated when the factfinder is the trial judge rather than a jury." ( Id. ).
See generally Sanchez-Gomez , 859 F.3d 649 ; and e.g., Shelby Shelton, Preserving Dignity: The Due Process Restriction on Shackling Criminal Defendants Should Also Apply to Non-Jury Proceedings , 42 U. of Ark. Law. Rev. 2 [2020]; Sadie Shourd, Shackling Prejudice: Expanding the Deck v. Missouri Rule to Nonjury Proceedings , 73 Vand. L. Rev. 535 [2020] ; Madison Wendt, Like a Bear on a Chain: Implications of Shackling Defendants in Bench Trials , 29-SUM Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 403 [2020] ; Thushan Sabaratnam, Prejudicial Routine Shackling of Defendants Without Proper Judicial Assessment During Pretrial: A Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Violation , 52 UIC J. Marshall L. Rev. 881 [2019].
On this point, Best was unanimous. Chief Judge Lippman only dissented to argue that indiscriminate shackling is so constitutionally offensive, it cannot be harmless. (People v. Best , 19 N.Y.3d 739, 745, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 [2012] [Lippman, C.J., dissenting] ["I would certainly agree with the majority's view that the present facts comprise a violation of constitutional rights."]).
Following Best , New York appellate courts have found that courts cannot keep people handcuffed or shackled at other criminal proceedings without a particular finding of necessity. In People v. Hoebich , the Appellate Term of the Second Department held that the "rule prohibiting handcuffing and shackling of defendants in court, absent a case-specific, on-the-record finding of necessity, applies to nonjury trials and to criminal proceedings, which includes probation revocation hearings." ( 42 Misc 3d 128[A], at *1, 2013 WL 6639960 [App. Term, 2d Dep't 2013] ). In People v. Cain , the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the rule is "no less necessary when a defendant testifies before a grand jury." ( 209 A.D.3d 124, 126, 175 N.Y.S.3d 142 [3d Dep't 2022] ). And in People v. Ashline , the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, found "error" where a lower court had "denied defense counsel's request to remove defendant's handcuffs during the suppression hearing." ( 124 A.D.3d 1258, 1259, 3 N.Y.S.3d 469 [4th Dep't 2015] ). These courts reason that the fundamental legal principles undermined by shackling are at stake in these other criminal proceedings as well.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, has "assum[ed]" but not "decid[ed]" that "the right to be free of restraints absent a finding of necessity applies, in some fashion, to a pretrial hearing." (People v. Gamble , 137 A.D.3d 1053, 1055, 27 N.Y.S.3d 226 [2d Dep't 2016] ).
This court follows the reasoning of these appellate courts. The ways that shackling undermines "fundamental legal principles" is well established. (See, e.g. , Best , 19 N.Y.3d at 742-44, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 ; Deck , 544 U.S. at 630-32, 125 S.Ct. 2007 ). And these principles—fair factfinding and the presumption of innocence, the assistance of counsel, and the dignity of the judicial process—are at stake in a suppression hearing. Therefore, the due-process rule against indiscriminate shackling must apply to those hearings, as well.
First, "[v]isible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process" in a suppression hearing. (See Deck , 544 U.S. at 630-32, 125 S.Ct. 2007 [making the point regarding a sentencing decision, "no less important" than guilt or innocence at trial]). "The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." ( Coffin v. United States , 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 [1895] ). "To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the factfinding process." ( Estelle v. Williams , 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 [1976] ). But the fairness of factfinding is not only at issue at trial—it is also at issue in grand jury proceedings, ( Cain , 209 A.D.3d at 126, 175 N.Y.S.3d 142 ), sentencing hearings, ( Deck , 544 U.S. at 630, 125 S.Ct. 2007 ), probation violation hearings, ( Hoebich , 42 Misc 3d 128[A], at *1 ), and suppression hearings, ( Ashline , 124 A.D.3d at 1259, 3 N.Y.S.3d 469 ). For instance, in a Mapp hearing like this one, a judge will often have to determine whether an accused person appeared justifiably suspicious to police. (See generally People v. De Bour , 40 N.Y.2d 210, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 [1976] ). And in any suppression hearing, the accused may present testimony about what happened in their interactions with police. "Visible shackles," however, "give the impression to any trier of fact that [the accused] person is violent, a miscreant, and cannot be trusted." ( Best , 19 N.Y.3d at 746, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 [Lippman, C.J., dissenting]; see also Deck , 544 U.S. at 630-33, 125 S.Ct. 2007 [shackles "almost inevitably affects adversely" the "perception" of the person accused]).
As in Best , it is of no moment that the factfinder in a suppression hearing is a judge and not a jury. It cannot merely be assumed that judges are immune from the prejudice and bias caused by visible shackles. We "judges are human, and the sight of a defendant in restraints may unconsciously influence even a judicial factfinder." ( Id. ; see also Terry Carter, Implicit Bias Is a Challenge Even for Judges , American Bar Ass'n [Aug. 5, 2016]; Eyal Peer & Eyal Gamlieli, Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decisions , 49 Ct. Rev. 114, 116 [2013] [showing that judges are subject to the same use of heuristics, such as confirmation bias, hindsight bias, and anchoring, as is observed in jurors]). The everyday machinations of the city's high-volume criminal legal system may even worsen the situation. After all, people working in this system routinely refer to people who are incarcerated as "bodies," "inmates," or "jails"—terms that tend to obscure an individual person's humanity.
Second, shackling a person hinders their constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel at a suppression hearing. The federal and New York constitutions both require that a person have the right to counsel at a pretrial suppression hearing equal to that at a trial. (E.g. , People v. Carracedo , 89 N.Y.2d 1059, 659 N.Y.S.2d 830, 681 N.E.2d 1276 [1997] ; see also People v. Anderson , 16 N.Y.2d 282, 287-88, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110, 213 N.E.2d 445 [1965] ). The "assistance of counsel at a suppression hearing is of great significance." ( People v. Costan , 169 A.D.3d 820, 822, 94 N.Y.S.3d 131 [2d Dep't 2019] ). "[T]he determination of a motion to suppress evidence is a crucial step in a criminal prosecution, and it may often spell the difference between conviction or acquittal, for the evidence seized may constitute the principal, if not the only, means of establishing the defendant's guilt." ( Id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). "The use of physical restraints," however, "diminishes that right" to counsel. (See Deck , 544 U.S. at 631, 125 S.Ct. 2007 ). That is for at least two reasons. Physically, "[s]hackles can interfere with the accused's ability to communicate with his lawyer." ( Id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). They hinder a person's ability to pass notes, to whisper information, and to get their attorney's attention. (See, e.g. , Davis v. Texas , 195 S.W.3d 311, 317 [Ct. App. Texas 2006] [noting that the inability of a person to write and hand his counsel notes "in fact hindered" his communication with his attorney]; Pennsylvania v. Boyd , 246 Pa. 529, 92 A. 705, 706 [1914] [noting that the assistance of counsel includes the right to "sit with his counsel" and "assist by suggestion and information in his own defense"]). Mentally, shackles bear on a person's faculties. (E.g. , People v. Harrington , 42 Cal. 165, 168 [1871] [noting that shackles "impos[e] physical burdens, pains, and restraints ..., ten[d] to confuse and embarrass" a person's "mental faculties," and thereby tend "materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights"]). They "can interfere with a defendant's ability to participate in his own defense, say, by freely choosing whether to take the witness stand on his own behalf." ( Deck , 544 U.S. at 631, 125 S.Ct. 2007 ). And "the psychological impact on the defendant of being continually restrained at the order of the individual who will ultimately determine" whether to believe their testimony "should not be overlooked." (See Best , 19 N.Y.3d at 744, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 ). Third, shackling a person during their public suppression hearing degrades the dignity of the court. A suppression hearing is a public proceeding. ( Associated Press v. Bell , 70 N.Y.2d 32, 517 N.Y.S.2d 444, 510 N.E.2d 313 [1987] ). Anyone who attends any of our proceedings must perceive the courtroom as a place where justice is fairly administered regarding persons presumed innocent. As a result, criminal courts must vigilantly guard the dignity of their processes, and that includes ensuring "the respectful treatment of defendants." ( Deck , 544 U.S. at 631, 125 S.Ct. 2007 ). That protects not only the person accused, but the process itself. The courtroom's formal dignity "reflects the importance of the matter at issue" and "the gravity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an individual's liberty." ( Id. ). "And it reflects a seriousness of purpose that helps to explain the judicial system's power to inspire the confidence and to affect the behavior of a general public whose demands for justice our courts seek to serve." ( Id. ). The routine use of publicly visible shackles "would undermine these symbolic yet concrete objectives." ( Id. ). Therefore, a court cannot "ignore the way the image of a handcuffed or shackled defendant affects the public's perception of that person and of criminal proceedings generally." ( Best , 19 N.Y.3d at 744, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 ).
Our courts must be mindful of the context in which they operate. That context was recently summarized by Jeh Johnson, commissioned by former Chief Judge Janet DiFiore to issue a report on equal justice in our courts:
[M]ultiple interviewees from all perspectives still complain about an under-resourced, over-burdened New York State court system, the dehumanizing effect it has on litigants, and the disparate impact of all this on people of color.... Over and over, we heard about the "dehumanizing" and "demeaning cattle-call culture" in these high-volume courts. At
the same time, the overwhelming majority of the ... litigants ... are people of color. The sad picture that emerges is, in effect, a second-class system of justice for people of color in New York State.
(Jeh Johnson, Report from the Special Advisor on Equal Justice in the New York State Courts 2-3 [2020]). Widely read popular analyses connect the modern criminal legal system to historical types of racial subjugation. (E.g. , Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow [2010]). And the public is well aware of the massive overrepresentation of people of color in the city's jails today. (E.g. , Reuven Blau, Racial Gap in City Jails Has Only Gotten Worse, John Jay Study Finds , The City [Mar. 2, 2023] [noting that "Black and Hispanic people made up almost 90% of jail admissions in 2021"]). As a result, there is not likely to be much public confidence in a criminal courtroom that indiscriminately hauls out a line of people of color, convicted of nothing, bound at the wrists. (See also Trial of Christopher Layer , 16 How. St. Tr., 94, 99 [K.B. 1722] [statement of Mr. Hungerford] ["[T]o have a man plead" in shackles before "a court of justice, the highest in the kingdom for criminal matters" undermines the "dignity of the Court"]).
There is an additional consideration in this case. Mr. Hamlett was only bound at the wrists at this hearing because he is incarcerated. But he is only incarcerated because he is unable to pay the $5,000 bond set on another matter. If he could pay the required ten percent to post that bond—which is $500—none of this would have been an issue. He would have sat free of any physical restraints. He would have been unencumbered in his communications and interactions with counsel. And the public would have seen a free, presumptively innocent man as a litigant at this hearing. A policy that restrains a person solely because they are incarcerated, and not because there is any specific necessity requiring it, often selectively punishes those who do not have means. That disparity is difficult to square with the court's duties to guard fair factfinding and the presumption of innocence, the assistance of counsel, and the dignity of the courtroom.
In this case, there was nothing before the court that would suggest that physical restraints were necessary. Mr. Hamlett had not acted disruptive in court in any way. To be sure, Mr. Hamlett has been accused in this case (and in his other case) of "resisting arrest" and "obstructing governmental administration." But mere reference to a person's charges is not sufficient to impose physical restraints. Even in murder cases, after all, "it is unacceptable to make a stun belt a routine adjunct of every murder trial, without a specifically identified security reason." ( People v. Buchanan , 13 N.Y.3d 1, 4, 884 N.Y.S.2d 337, 912 N.E.2d 553 [2009] ; see also People v. Cruz , 17 N.Y.3d 941, 946, 936 N.Y.S.2d 661, 960 N.E.2d 430 [2011] ["While shackles are different from stun belts, the principal underlying rationale for requiring judicial justification for restraining a defendant at trial is the same."] [Lippman, C.J., concurring in the judgment]). Courts cannot simply assume someone is guilty when conducting a pretrial analysis. And from experience, this court knows it cannot define people solely by the accusations against them. In fact, despite those accusations, Mr. Hamlett continued to act calm, attentive, and courteous while unrestrained during this hearing. In any event, an analysis that looks only to a person's charges would be intellectually dishonest. A Mr. Hamlett who could afford $500 would never have had his wrists bound at this hearing simply because of the charges. As judges, we must treat all people who come before us with the full respect that a human being deserves, even if they are accused of a crime and unable to afford bail.
That is why the law requires that a court conduct an individualized analysis of actual necessity before imposing shackles in a public courtroom. A court may "shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of a special need." ( Best , 19 N.Y.3d at 743, 955 N.Y.S.2d 860, 979 N.E.2d 1187 [internal quotation marks omitted]). That "special need" must be "specific to the defendant." ( Id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). Courts may not institute routine policies reflecting a presumption or conclusion that shackles are necessary for all people who are incarcerated. (See id. ). These rules apply with as much force at a suppression hearing as at a trial. (See Ashline , 124 A.D.3d at 1259, 3 N.Y.S.3d 469 ). No matter the proceeding, a courtroom is a place where each person is treated "not as a member of a group but as a separate human being." (Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Foreword to Celebrating the Courthouse 9, 11 [2006]). And each of those persons has the right to be treated with respect and dignity—not bound at the wrists without reason before the very forum sworn to deliver fairness and justice to all.