Opinion
June 2, 1986
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County (Santagata, J.).
Judgment affirmed.
The defendant was charged in a three-count indictment, with murder in the second degree under Penal Law § 125.25 (1) (intentional murder), murder in the second degree under Penal Law § 125.25 (3) (felony murder), and burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25). During the trial, the court instructed the jury that if it found the defendant guilty on the felony murder count, it need not deliberate on the separate burglary count. The jury acquitted the defendant of intentional murder and convicted him of felony murder.
We do not consider the defendant's claim that the verdict is repugnant, inasmuch as he did not object to the verdict prior to the discharge of the jury (see, People v. Satloff, 56 N.Y.2d 745).
In a felony murder prosecution, there is no requirement that there be corroboration of a confession to the underlying predicate felony (People v. Davis, 46 N.Y.2d 780). The purpose of the corroboration statute (CPL 60.50) is to obviate the danger that there may be a conviction for a crime when in fact no such crime has been committed by anyone (People v. Anderson, 80 A.D.2d 33, 37). It has been construed only as requiring proof by independent evidence that the confessed crime occurred (People v Safian, 46 N.Y.2d 181, 186, cert denied sub nom. Miner v. New York, 443 U.S. 912). While the defendant's admissions to three witnesses cannot satisfy the corroboration requirement, that requirement was satisfied by the evidence that the victim was found dead of stab wounds. Lazer, J.P., Bracken, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.