Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 06HF2460, John S. Adams, Judge.
Law Offices of John R. Blanchard and John R. Blanchard for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
A jury convicted defendant Abdullah Naim Hafiz of first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460.) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that defendant had two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subds. (b), (e)(2)(A)), two prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)), and had served four prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5. subd. (b)). It struck one of the prior convictions (Pen. Code, § 1385) and sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison, consisting of the low term of two years for the burglary conviction, doubled to four years for the prior strike conviction, and two consecutive five-year terms for the prior serious felony convictions; sentence on the remaining enhancement allegations was stayed.
Defendant contends (1) his statements to police were involuntary and obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (Miranda), (2) the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions, certified records to prove a prior conviction, and an outstanding arrest warrant, (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (4) the evidence was insufficient to prove his burglary conviction and the allegations of prior convictions. Finding no error, we need not address defendant’s claim of cumulative prejudice and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
In December 2006, David and Barbara Hoffman were living in the upstairs unit of their Corona del Mar duplex while the downstairs unit was being remodeled. One day they were in the downstairs unit for about half an hour before they returned upstairs. When Mrs. Hoffman went to the bathroom she saw defendant, fully clothed, standing between the toilet and the vanity facing her. Mr. Hoffman chased defendant and yelled, “Hey, buddy, what are you doing in my house?” Defendant did not respond.
Mr. Hoffman confronted defendant in the alley outside the duplex. Defendant, who was wearing a polo shirt with a K&S Air Conditioning (K&S) logo on it, stated he was there to estimate an air conditioning job. Mr. Hoffman had never asked for or authorized such an estimate and questioned defendant about the address he was supposed to be at. Defendant responded, “What street is this?”
Defendant made no attempt to call his office despite Mr. Hoffman suggesting it. He appeared nervous and never gave Mr. Hoffman his name or the name of his company. When Mr. Hoffman yelled for his wife to call the police, defendant backed away and went to a car, where he picked up a piece of paper and appeared to make a phone call. As Mrs. Hoffman handed the cell phone to Mr. Hoffman, defendant stated, “[Y]ou don’t want to do that,” got into the car and left. Mrs. Hoffman did not notice anything missing from their home.
K&S, for whom defendant had worked since August 2006, handles only commercial installations of heating, air conditioning, and ventilation systems. On the day of the Hoffman incident, it assigned defendant to a commercial job in Newport Beach. It did not send him to the Hoffman residence in Corona del Mar on that date or ask him to prepare an estimate for a residential air conditioning installation. Nor would it have assigned him to any residential air conditioning job.
Additional relevant facts are set forth in the discussion of the issues.
DISCUSSION
1. Admissibility of Statements to Police
Defendant asserts his statements to Detective William Depweg should have been suppressed because they were coerced and taken in violation of his Miranda rights. We disagree.
a. Involuntary Statements
Before trial, defendant moved to exclude his statements to Depweg on the ground they were involuntary and coerced. At the hearing, Depweg testified that two weeks after the incident at the Hoffman residence, he and his partner went to the commercial building where defendant was working. Building security told them defendant was on the roof. Upon reaching the rooftop, the officers found defendant but did not recall seeing anyone else there. Both were dressed in civilian clothing but had their badges around their necks where they were out and visible.
Depweg identified himself as a police officer and asked defendant to remove his tool belt. After defendant complied, Depweg set the tool belt aside and conducted a consensual pat down of defendant. At Depweg’s request, defendant sat down where he was, approximately 15 feet from the roof edge. Depweg stood about three feet from defendant while his partner was 10-15 feet away.
Depweg told defendant he needed to talk to him about an incident and asked him what happened. Defendant spoke willingly with Depweg and gave him his version of the events. Defendant stated he was in the area of the burglary to look for someone in the music industry named Steve who lived nearby at an address defendant was unable to provide. While doing so, he needed to use the restroom and went into the Hoffman’s home to use theirs.
Defendant was not handcuffed or restrained during the 5 to 10 minute conversation, during which he was calm and cooperative and never indicated he wanted to stop talking to Depweg or tried to flee. At no time did the officers draw their weapons, nor did they use force or threats to convince him to stay. After the conversation, defendant and the officers went down the ladder and upon reaching the ground, Depweg placed defendant under arrest and did not ask any more questions.
Defendant testified he was on the roof with three coworkers installing an air-conditioning unit on a four or five story building when two officers in civilian clothes climbed up to the roof. One officer ordered defendant’s coworkers to leave the rooftop and followed them down. The other, Depweg, told defendant to stop what he was doing and place his hands behind his back. Defendant complied and asked, “What is this about?” to which Depweg responded, “Just stand right there, don’t move.” Depweg had not identified himself and defendant did not see a badge or a gun. Once Depweg was sure no one else was on the roof, he grabbed defendant, took off his tool belt, and led him to a corner, stating, “come over here to the edge....” Defendant could see the ground below five stories down. Depweg said in an angry tone, “Either you gonna tell me the truth[,] what I want to know, or you can taste the pavement, the cement.”
They were on the roof for about 45 minutes. Defendant asked Depweg if they could “go where everybody else at” [sic] because he was afraid for his life and wanted to be somewhere with other people around. When they got downstairs Depweg handcuffed defendant, but did not arrest him, and searched his car without consent. Depweg continued asking him questions both before and after placing him in the patrol car.
Defendant argued his statements to Depweg were involuntary and inadmissible because they were coerced by threats of physical violence. The court denied the motion, finding Depweg more credible than defendant and that defendant’s claim Depweg took him to the edge of the roof and threatened him was not “compelling or particularly credible.”
A statement is involuntary and inadmissible in a criminal proceeding “if it is the product of police coercion” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 647) and is acquired by overcoming the defendant’s will, such as by threats or violence or any direct or implied promise (People v. Cahill (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 310-311). The prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s statement was voluntary. (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 336, fn. 10.) Voluntariness is determined by “the ‘totality of [the] circumstances,’” rather than “on any one fact.” (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79.)
We review de novo the trial court’s determination of voluntariness. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 114.) But where supported by substantial evidence, we uphold the trial court’s findings about the events surrounding the statement, its resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its credibility determinations. (Ibid.)
Contrary to defendant’s claim, Depweg testified no threats were made to obtain his statement. The conversation lasted 10 minutes, during which time no guns were drawn, defendant was not handcuffed, and no force or threats were used to make defendant stay. Under these facts, we conclude defendant’s statement was voluntarily given. We reject defendant’s attacks on Depweg’s testimony as nothing more than a request that we reweigh the court’s credibility determination, which we will not do.
b. Violation of Miranda Rights
At the preliminary hearing, Depweg testified that although defendant “was detained” on the roof, he did not advise him of his Miranda rights at any time while up there or on the way to the police station. Defendant, representing himself, moved to set aside the information because he was not given Miranda warnings when questioned by police. The prosecutor argued defendant was not in custody at the time and the court denied the motion.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, withdrew it, then filed a new suppression motion asserting Miranda error. He also filed a petition for writ of prohibition or mandate, Hafiz v. Superior Court (Apr. 19, 2007, G038373) [nonpub. opn.]), challenging the denial of his motion to set aside the information, which this court summarily denied.
The trial court apparently conducted no further hearing on defendant’s suppression motion. Counsel appointed at defendant’s request argued the statements were involuntary but not that they violated Miranda. After conviction, defendant renewed his Miranda violation claim in a motion for new trial. The court denied the motion, believing the issue had been fully litigated in an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant challenges this ruling, relying on Depweg’s testimony that defendant was detained during the questioning on the roof. But “[w]hether an individual has been... seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and whether that individual is in custody for Miranda purposes are two different issues. [Citation.]” (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1405.) In determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda, the issue “‘is not whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave, but rather whether such a person would believe he was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1403, fn. 1.) “[O]bjective indicia of custody for Miranda purposes [include]: “(1) whether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning.” (People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753.)
Here, at the time he made the challenged statements, defendant was not subject to police “restraints... tantamount to formal arrest. [Citations.]” (People v. Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1403, fn. omitted.) Defendant had not been formally arrested; his detention lasted only 10 minutes; he was not detained at a police station or any other intrinsically coercive location but at his place of employment; although more than one officer was present, only one questioned him; and Depweg addressed him neutrally without accusatory questions or statements. These criteria point toward investigative detention, not custody. The fact that a reasonable person in his position would not have felt free to leave or terminate the encounter, and that therefore defendant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, does not establish otherwise.
We reject defendant’s additional claim that his statements to the officers while being transported to jail should have been suppressed. Depweg testified that when defendant was in the patrol car being transported to the police station, Depweg asked him “standard booking questions. Name. Date of birth. Where he lives. Where he works. Things like that.” While answering those questions, defendant made statements that he could not be arrested for burglary because he did not have the intent to steal anything although there were nice things in the home to steal, and that the most he could be arrested for was trespassing.
Depweg’s questions in the patrol car did not constitute police interrogation aimed at “elicit[ing] an incriminating response” and fell within the “‘routine booking question’” exception to Miranda requirements. (See Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 601 [110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528].) Where, as here, there is no interrogation and a person volunteers statements, Miranda advisements are not necessary. (See United States v. Gonzales (5th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 928, 939-940; United States v. Rhodes (4th Cir. 1985) 779 F.2d 1019, 1032; Anderson v. Thieret (7th Cir. 1990) 903 F.2d 526, 532 and cases cited therein].)
2. Erroneous Admission of Evidence
a. Prior Convictions
Defendant asserts the court erred in admitting his 2003 and 2005 convictions for receiving stolen property and residential burglary into evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) (all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated). But the 2003 conviction was never offered or admitted into evidence under that section in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief and defendant does not address that conviction aside from “perfunctorily assert[ing]” it was erroneously admitted. (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214, fn. 11.) Without supporting argument, defendant did not sufficiently raise the issue. (Ibid.)
Regarding the 2005 burglary conviction, the court found it admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b) to show defendant’s intent and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial aspects. To prove the conviction, the prosecutor introduced certified copies of the felony complaint for an arrest warrant, the abstract of judgment, and sections of minute orders showing defendant had entered a no contest plea. Additionally, a photographer testified that he left his home one morning and when he returned that afternoon his cameras and lenses were missing. Defendant declares it was error to admit such evidence because the similarity between the two cases “is so remote to be of little evidentiary value on the critical issue of intent.” Not so.
Although section 1101 prohibits the admission of evidence of other crimes to prove propensity or bad character, subdivision (b) of that section allows this evidence when relevant to prove some fact such as intent. We review the court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1149.) “‘The least degree of similarity is required to establish relevance on the issue of intent. [Citation.] For this purpose, the uncharged crimes need only be “sufficiently similar [to the charged offense] to support the inference that the defendant ‘“probably harbored the same intent in each instance.” [Citations.]’”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 636-637.)
Here, sufficient similarities exist between the 2005 offense and the current one to show defendant had the same intent in both. As the Attorney General argues, “In both..., [defendant] entered an apparently empty residence during the daytime. In the prior crime, [defendant] took several cameras and lenses from the [photographer’s] home.” (See People v. Brandon (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1049 [evidence of prior robberies admissible to prove intent where in both cases the defendant entered female victim’s car and asked about money]; see also People v. Denis (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 563, 568 [evidence of prior robberies admissible where they occurred at same location and against same types of victims].)
The cases relied on by defendant are inapposite. People v. Felix (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 997 involved the admission of a prior offense to prove identity, not intent. (Id. at p. 1005.) People v. Harvey (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 90 likewise primarily addressed the propriety of admitting prior act evidence to establish the defendant’s identity. (Id. at p. 100.) But as to the issue of intent, the California Supreme Court has found Harvey’s “reasoning... neither clear nor persuasive; the court simply referred [citation] to its earlier discussion regarding proof of identity, without explicitly considering whether the lack of ‘“distinctive”’ similarities that made the prior crime irrelevant on identity [citation] also precluded an inference that the assailant in the two incidents acted with the same criminal intent.” (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 18.) Here, the court specifically analyzed the two events to determine defendant’s intent in committing both offenses and concluded they were sufficiently similar for that purpose. Defendant has not shown the court abused its discretion in doing so.
Moreover, the court’s instructions to the jury on the limited use of the prior conviction evidence, both at the time it was introduced and when the trial concluded, eliminated any danger “of confusing the issues[] or of misleading the jury.” (§ 352.) We presume the jury “followed these instructions.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107.)
b. Certified Record of 2005 Conviction
The corpus delicti rule requires the prosecution to establish an injury or loss was caused by a criminal act independently from a defendant’s statement or admission. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301.) Defendant argues the prosecutor failed to adequately establish the corpus delicti of the 2005 conviction notwithstanding the documentary and testimonial evidence because there was “[n]o live testimony... showing that [he] did in fact enter [the victim’s] home in 2005.”
He relies on People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883 to support his claim the corpus delicti rule applies to uncharged crimes introduced to prove they were committed. But Williams did not decide this issue because the prosecution there conceded the corpus delicti rule applied to certain other crimes evidence where that evidence was necessary “to prove the commission of those crimes” and the asserted need for corroboration was met by other evidence. (Id. at pp. 910-911.)
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court noted, “It is not clear that the corpus delicti rule applies to other crimes evidence offered solely to prove facts such as motive, opportunity, intent, or identity, or for impeachment. [Citation.]” (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 124.) Clark declined to reach the issue because the corpus of the crime was independently established. (Ibid.)
But several California courts of appeal have addressed that issue, concluding the corpus delicti rule does not apply to evidence of prior crimes offered for those purposes. (People v. Denis, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 568-570 [corpus delicti rule inapplicable to “uncharged conduct, offered for a limited purpose under... section 1101, subdivision (b)”]; People v. Martinez (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 537, 545 [“corpus delicti rule has never been applied to other-crimes evidence introduced for impeachment purposes in the guilty phase of a trial”]; People v. Davis (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 617, 638 [“corpus delicti rule is not applicable to uncharged act evidence, except in penalty trials”].) We agree with these cases and conclude evidence of the 2005 burglary was properly admitted to show intent.
Defendant does not appear to be contending the documentary evidence was inadmissible, as he acknowledges section 452.5 “allows for the introduction of certified records” and that under People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, “a certified court document can be used to show both the fact of a conviction and that the offense occurred....” Rather, his complaint is that “one can[]not use a certified court document, coupled with the disjoined testimony of a victim that his house was broken into by somebody ...” to prove he was the one “who entered the... residence and stole the cameras.” He asserts he had pleaded no contest “to the burglary, not because he actually burglarized anyone, but instead... to protect his son who was also charged in the crime and who was hoping to pursue a career in medicine.” The contention lacks merit.
A plea of no contest is legally equivalent to a guilty plea and constitutes an admission of every element of the charged offense. (People v. Warburton (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 820-821, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1093; see also People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 49.) The elements of burglary are “entry into a home or certain other structures ‘with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1255.) By entering a no contest plea to the 2005 burglary, defendant admitted he had entered the residence with the intent to commit larceny.
Defendant maintains that given his explanation of why he had pleaded no contest, “the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the probability its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, or confusing the issues, and of misleading the jury, and thus should have been disallowed under... [section] 352.” But although evidence of an uncharged incident will often present the possibility that a jury might be inclined to view the evidence of defendant’s prior involvement as evidence of his criminal propensities, “prejudice of this sort is inherent whenever other crimes evidence is admitted [citation], and the risk of such prejudice was not unusually grave here.” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 372.)
Under section 352, the trial court has the discretion to admit evidence that is relevant to prove a material fact as long as its probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 856.) Although “[e]vidence of uncharged offenses ‘is so prejudicial that its admission requires extremely careful analysis’ [citations]” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404), a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under section 352 will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion (People v. Brown (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1396).
Based on the record in this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting relevant evidence tending to prove a material fact. The fact the evidence regarding the 2005 incident was no more inflammatory than the testimony regarding the charged offense, the relative minimal nature of that evidence, and the temporal proximity of the two acts (less than two years between convictions) substantially reduced any prejudice to defendant. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 404-405.) Additionally, any prejudice attributable to this evidence of prior misconduct is mitigated by the fact that the defendant was convicted of the uncharged robbery. Thus, the possibility that a jury might convict the defendant in order to punish him for the uncharged robbery is lessened by the fact that he had been punished for the prior offense. (People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 427.)
c. Outstanding Arrest Warrant
During his cross-examination of Depweg, defense counsel questioned him extensively about the basis for arresting defendant and the sufficiency of the investigation. Before redirect examination, the prosecutor asked the court to allow him to question Depweg whether he had concluded it was proper to arrest defendant and if so what factors he relied on. He argued defense counsel had “opened the door” by raising doubt regarding the basis for Depweg’s decision to arrest defendant. The court agreed and concluded that the prosecutor was entitled to rehabilitate Depweg given “the probing questions from defense counsel” that suggest[ed] a “rush to judgment.” Depweg subsequently testified over hearsay objections that he had an independent basis to arrest defendant, namely, “He had a warrant for his arrest.”
Defendant contends the court erred in overruling his objections because “[w]ith... Depweg testifying he had no intention of arresting [him] when he went out to interrogate him, there was no relevance whatsoever to the fact [he] had a warrant for his arrest.” (Capitalization omitted.) On the contrary, it was relevant to the inference raised by defense counsel that Depweg had formed an opinion about defendant’s guilt without sufficient investigation. On redirect examination, a witness may properly testify to facts and circumstances that tend to clarify incorrect inferences that may have been elicited during cross-examination. (§ 774; People v. La Macchia (1953) 41 Cal.2d 738, 749, overruled on another ground in Los Angeles County v. Faus (1957) 48 Cal.2d 672, 679; see also Myers v. Rose (1938) 27 Cal.App.2d 87, 89.) The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725.)
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant asserts his counsel was ineffective by (1) not arguing the admission of his statements to police violated Miranda; (2) not cross-examining witnesses about inconsistencies in their testimonies; (3) questioning him about his prior convictions; and (4) failing to obtain an order prohibiting his irrelevant “spontaneous statements” to the police in the patrol car after his arrest. To prevail on any of these claims, defendant must demonstrate (1) “counsel’s performance fell below a standard of reasonable competence” and (2) “prejudice resulted. [Citations.]” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) Defendant has not made the requisite showing.
We have already rejected defendant’s argument his statements to the police on the roof were obtained in violation of Miranda. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make what would have been a futile motion. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 928.)
Defendant contends defense counsel should have cross-examined police officers about Mr. Hoffman’s statements to them that he had heard noises while in the downstairs unit, which would have been consistent with defendant’s version of events. He admits “defense counsel did question Mr. Hoffman as to whether or not he told police officers that ‘he heard noise upstairs[,’ but claims he]... did not question... Depweg, or any other police officer involved in the investigation, as to whether or not Mr. Hoffman made that statement.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The extent of cross-examination of a witness is tactical decision for counsel and rarely provides an adequate basis on appeal for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 217.) The decision whether to call a witness is likewise a matter of trial tactics that the attorney controls, unless it “results from unreasonable failure to investigate. [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 334; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1031.) We “defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436-437.)
Defendant summarily asserts “[c]ounsel[] fail[]ed to adequately investigate the case,” but cites no supporting evidence, thereby waiving the claim. (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) Additionally, his contention is belied by the fact counsel questioned Mr. Hoffman about telling police he heard noises upstairs while in the downstairs unit, which counsel could not have done without sufficient investigation. From this it can be inferred counsel’s decision not to question Depweg or other officers regarding Mr. Hoffman’s statements was a matter of trial tactics to which we defer. (People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 436-437.)
Defendant next asserts he received ineffective assistance when his counsel extracted from him during direct examination that he had been convicted of theft-related felonies in 2003 and 2005, and that the 2005 conviction was for burglary. But “[e]ven where defense counsel may have ‘“elicit[ed] evidence more damaging to [defendant] than the prosecutor was able to accomplish...”’ [citation], we have been ‘reluctant to second-guess counsel’ [citation] where a tactical choice of questions led to the damaging testimony.” (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 217.) It is also well-established that, when considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “on direct appeal, competency is presumed unless the record affirmatively excludes a rational basis for the trial attorney’s choice. [Citations.]” (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1260.)
Here, the record does not affirmatively establish there was “‘“no conceivable tactical purpose”’” for trial counsel’s questions. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 675.) To the contrary, the court had already ruled evidence of the prior crimes were admissible for impeachment purposes, and “trial counsel’s decision to voluntarily bring the priors out before the jury can be fairly characterized as a reasonable tactical choice designed to demonstrate defendant’s candor and honesty to the jury.” (People v. Mendoza, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.)
Finally, defendant argues counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the “[s]pontaneous [s]tatements” he made in the patrol car as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We are unpersuaded. Defendant’s statements, about the inability to arrest him for burglary because he lacked the intent to steal anything inside the residence despite there being nice things to steal and that he could be arrested at most for trespass, were relevant to show he entered the Hoffman home. The testimony was brief, and neither confusing, unduly prejudicial, nor misleading.
Defense counsel may also have had a tactical reason for not objecting. “An attorney may choose not to object for many reasons, and the failure to object rarely establishes ineffectiveness of counsel. [Citation.]” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 540.) Where, as here, “‘“the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,]... unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,” the claim on appeal must be rejected.’ [Citations.] A claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Citations.]” (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.) That is the case here with a record devoid of anything to show why trial counsel did not object or that he asked to explain his reasons for not objecting.
4. Sufficiency of the Evidence
a. Burglary
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the verdict, drawing all inferences that reasonably support it, and determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a trier of fact could rationally find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Little (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766, 771.) We “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.]” (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425.) “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,” we must affirm the judgment. (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 924, fn. 2.) “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.)
Burglary is the “entry into a home or certain other structures ‘with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1255.) Defendant argues the only issue before the jury was his intent upon entering the Hoffman residence and that without his “illegally-obtained confession and the introduction of his 2005 conviction for burglary, the record would contain no evidence sufficient to support [his burglary] conviction.” [Capitalization omitted.) We have concluded his statements to police were not illegally obtained and that the court did not err in admitting evidence of his 2005 conviction. This evidence, combined with inferences from defendant’s acts of entering what appeared to be an empty second-floor unit, giving a false reason for being there when confronted by Mr. Hoffman, and subsequently fleeing the scene, constitutes substantial evidence to support defendant’s burglary conviction.
b. Prior Convictions
Defendant’s final contention is that the Penal Code section 969b packet was insufficient to prove his 1982 conviction because the abstract of judgment “is not file stamped []or certified by the Clerk of the Superior Court.” The record shows otherwise. Defendant also notes there were no photographs or testimony that the fingerprints in the packet matched his. But his failure to cite any legal authority that such evidence is required to prove he was the person identified in the certified court documents forfeits the issue on appeal. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
In any event, “[i]t has long... been the rule in California, in the absence of countervailing evidence, that identity of person may be presumed, or inferred, from identity of name. [Citations.]” (People v. Mendoza (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 390, 401.) Here, there was no countervailing evidence. Furthermore, defendant’s name is “sufficiently uncommon to support the presumption that, absent contrary evidence,” the defendant “Abduallah Naim Hafiz” aka Harold Lou Sims named in the case before the court was the same person who had suffered the numerous prior convictions. (People v. Brucker (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 230, 242.) Additionally, the court had not only defendant’s full name by which to identify him, but also his date of birth. Defendant’s claims as to the 1982 conviction fail for these reasons, as does his assertion the remaining “alleged prior convictions suffer from similar deficiencies.”
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, J., IKOLA, J.